Why Did George Wilson Enter World War 1

Regarding Britain, the views that Moltke had were that any British forced would be defeated. “Any British army that landed on the Continent, in their view, would simply be swept up by the great German “wheel” advancing through Belgium and France.” (Hamilton 66, must PP). This ended up being costly for the Germans, as Britain began negotiating their war plans. “What is more, Germany’s action united the previously divided British cabinet and established for Britain the perfect pretext for entering the war.” (Ehlert, 53, must PP). Moltke did not fear the British, and continued on with his plan to invade Belgium.
With a request to march through France securely to the Belgian King Albert in Potsdam, Moltke aimed to avoid losing men to Belgium and storm France quickly. Moltke tried to scare the King, but he ultimately failed. King Albert declared that he would not allow German or French entry through Belgium without any retaliation. (Ehlert, 49, PPEd).
However, the failure of his attempt to force Belgium to allow the German army through peacefully did not altr his plan. The reason was due to his belief that the German army needed to be one the attack. (Ehlert, 49, pped).
Another area where Moltke’s plans differentiated from Schlieffen’s in regard to Belgium was that the railroads in became crucial through Moltke’s plan.
“Moltke’s alterations made the immediate seizure of the intact Belgian railways an absolute necessity” (Foley, 112). With Belgium not allow safe passage through their country, the railroads became an issue. “This restriction of the advance to Belgium, however, caused severe constraints on the German deployment, as the right wing could not use the important rail lines of the Dutch Maastricht area.” (Foley, 112). Moltke was confident that he did not need Holland’s railways, but his confidence turned out to be
costly.
On August 4th, 1914, The German assault on Belgium had started. This opening conflict would be critical for the Schlieffen-Moltke plans success. (Hamilton, 67, pped). If the plan was delayed, more troubles with Russia would occur in the future. “To wait any longer, given German fears of war the minute that the great Russian rearmament program was completed by 1916 or 1917, entailed almost certain failure for the Schlieffen plan in the minds of the military leaders of 1914.” (Herwig, 693). Liege was a decisive battle in Moltke’s mind, and unluckily for him, it was not going as planned.
“In the event, the storming of one of the strongest fortresses in Europe proved more difficult than anticipated. a serious, if characteristic, underestimate. Liège put up strong resistance. The early mobilization of the Belgian army further impeded German hopes of a quick capture of the fortress town. As a result, it appeared initially as if the important coup de main was failing.” (Mombauer, 231, must pp). The reason that the plan was failing was due to Moltke relinquishing the Belgians as a threat. “The General Staff had only expected about 6,000 garrison troops and 3,000 militia.” (Hamilton 67). This was a critical error by Moltke, as the Belgians in the Liege were ready to fight. “Manned with 35,000 garrison troops, Liege put up strong resistance, and the early mobilization of the Belgian army further impeded German hopes of quickly capturing the fortress town.” (Hamilton 67). Completely failing to realize the Belgian army’s capabilities was costly to Moltke’s armies. “Within days, the German armies on the Western Front would be retreating from the enemy for the first time. (Hamilton, 71). Though they were retreating, the eventually gained the forts of Liege. “The last of Liège’s forts was finally taken on August 16th, and two days later than planned, was the right wing of the German army able to proceed with its enveloping move through Belgium.” (Mombauer, 231). The problems of the Schlieffen-Moltke plan were encountered immediately during the storming of Liege. “Liège had required ‘an expenditure of men and munitions beyond all expectations’. Despite the meticulous planning, the operation was characterized by a lack of co-ordination and liaison between the troops and their leaders.” (Mombauer, 231). Moltke’s alterations and Poor leadership from his staff was very clear in Belgium, as they were not prepared for the Belgian army.
Along with the plans for Belgium, Moltke differentiated from Schlieffen in regards to France. “Moltke expected the French not to remain on the defensive at the beginning of a war (as Schlieffen had), but rather that they would go on the offensive. And that offensive likely would come in the South.” (Hamilton, 244). Moltke’s expectations led to preparing the Alsace-Lorraine to be attacked. He moved the Sixth and Seventh armies towards the Southern border, expecting an attack on the Alsace-Lorraine from the French. (Hamilton, 244, MUST PP). This was an error on Moltke’s behalf, which was a common theme for Moltke. “One of the problems that Moltke faced in war-time decision-making was to anticipate and respond to enemy action. Following the coup de main on Liège, it was difficult to predict where the French would concentrate their troops.” (Mombauer, 237). Moltke lacked a plan to institute if the Schlieffen-Moltke had failed.
The French, however, were willing to switch their military plans and proved it in Spetember. “The French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre realized that the German 1st Army was exposed to attack and on 5 September ordered a counterattack with regrouped forces against the flank of the 1st Army. As a result, Kluck was forced to retreat, now following an earlier order from Moltke that he had so far ignored.” (Fuhrmann, 753-754). The retreat of the German army was a turning point for Moltke. With Moltke’s order to retreat on September 14th was important since it was a signal of the defeat of the German right wing. This decision was also a defeat to Moltke himself. (Fuhrmann, 761). This was the beginning of the end for Moltke’s military career. “That night, he returned to OHL headquarters at Luxembourg a broken man.” (Hamilton, 74). Moltke’s reign as leader of the German army was finished. Following his demotion, the Battle of the Marne was the final failure of the Schlieffen-Moltke plan “It would take Germany’s total defeat in 1918 to elevate both the events of September 1914 and the Schlieffen Plan to truly mythical status. With hindsight, however, it is clear that the Battle of the Marne spelt the end of the Schlieffen-Moltke Plan.” (Hamilton, 76). The Battle of the Marne became a long conflict. “The goal of a short war against one of the two major enemies, France, had not been realized and was now impossible to achieve.” (Hamilton, 76, must PP).
As we have seen, the failures had come from Moltke’s leadership abilities; or lack there of. “Many in the German army’s leadership had largely underestimated the enemy while theybelieved German soldiers capable of almost anything because of their alleged superior morale and training.” (Fuhrmann, 748). This lead to the encounters in September. “The events of September, the first major German defeat, certainly destroyed all hopes of the Schlieffen/Moltke Plan fulfilling its promise of swift victory in the West.” (Mombauer, 251). A quick victory in the West was no long possible, thanks to the leadership shown in Germany.
Germany’s leaders failed their army. “The German war planners had no answers to the new problems that they were facing, no contingency plans or alternatives to the Schlieffen Plan.” (Mombauer, 251). Schlieffen is partially to blame, but it was Moltke’s decisions that costed them. The legacy of Moltke is one of a negative and unprepared commander who wished to avoid large wars. He is also remembered for his poor planning and failing to achieve success at crucial times. (Mombauer, 418, PPed).
The Schlieffen-Moltke Plan; which was drawn up originally by Alfred Von Schlieffen and reshaped by Helmuth Von Moltke the Younger, failed to achieve its objectives in September 1914 due to the alterations implemented by Moltke the Younger. The failure’s that Moltke encountered in Belgium were crucial to the outcome of the Schlieffen-Moltke plan. The attempt to persuade the Belgian King Albert to allow safe passage through Belgium only made the Belgians more willing to stand up for themselves. Moltke pushed the Germans through a narrow corroder into Belgium, and faced heavy resistance that delayed the offensive. Moltke’s failure to attack the Netherlands and gain their railroad system further delayed the attack. The prolonged conflict in Belgium allowed the French and the Russians to mobilize their armies and counter the Schlieffen-Moltke Plan. The battle fought between the Belgians and the Germans in the Liege was crucial to the success of the Germans. The failure led to low moral and a further defeat in the Battle of the Marne by Joseph Joffre and the French, which spelled the end of Moltke as well as his plan in September 1914. The poor leadership by Moltke was shown throughout the execution of the Schlieffen-Moltke plan. He assumed that he had superior soldiers than his enemies, and believed they could beat their armies with fewer soldiers. He also kept his plan secret from his staff members, and knowledge of the plan could have created alternative strategies. Moltke assumed the French would be on the offensive, while Schlieffen believed they would be defensive. This decision eventually led to the retreat of the German army. The underestimations made by Moltke regarding his enemies were evident in the decisions in Belgium and France, as well as his assumption that Russia would not be ready to fight. These decisions made by Moltke led to the defeat of the German army in World War One, and the same decisions left him; and Germany, broken.