Why Did Japan Attack Pearl Harbor
World War II was full of massive battles that led every country involved to almost total destruction. Few moments stand out in American history more than Pearl Harbor. It was, and still is today, one of the most well-known events of World War II, and continues to ignite a strong nationalistic pride for the U.S.’s strong defensive comeback after Pearl Harbor. Though Pearl Harbor is renowned as a military feat, it can be argued that Japan’s victory actually was a counterproductive, strategic disgrace. Carefully examining the preparation and execution of the attack on Pearl Harbor reveals the many flaws within Japan’s military operation. It becomes obvious that the Japanese did not attack as whole-heartedly, effectively, or effortlessly as they
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had in previous battles during World War II. Even after ten months of arduous planning, the attack was riddled with inflexibility, poor strategic plans, wasted resources, and a lack of coordination.
The attack on Pearl Harbor suffered from significant command blunders. For example, none of the major military leaders could agree on what the primary target should be, thus dooming the plan of attack from the beginning. The Japanese Naval General Staff and Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander in chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, both agreed that sinking battleships would be most effective in demoralizing the American people while at the same time allowing the Japanese to secure their Southern advance toward the American-backed Philippines. However, Commander Minoru Genda, the supposedly brilliant Japanese aviation operations commander, disagreed. He had figured that it would be more effective to attack any carrier ships that might be in the port therefore planning to ignore the assigned targets. (SOURCE 6) This disagreement led to miscommunication, and these miscommunications led to an overly complicated and reckless plan. The fact that the key military leaders in charge of the plan of attack could not even agree on the targets at Pearl Harbor builds a case for why Pearl Harbor was such a sloppy attack. If prominent military leaders could not make a coherent plan of attack, how could any member of the Japanese air force or navy be expected to execute it properly? In fact, these command blunders alone could have come close to derailing the entire attack itself. In addition to this incongruous plot, Japan’s reasons for attacking Pearl Harbor were farfetched and their whole victory relied on the contingency of a complete surprise attack.
For instance, Noroku Yamamoto believed that the United States would only continue to grow and become a powerful force to be reckoned with as time went on. He hoped that by ambushing The U.S. before they became too advanced, Japan could gain an early advantage in the Pacific. (SOURCE 1) Yamamoto is quoted saying that “If war comes, our only chance is to destroy the fleet at Pearl Harbor.” (PRIMARY SOURCE QUOTE SOURCE 3) These anxious thoughts began to transform into a desperation to attack the U.S. as soon as possible, thus turning Pearl Harbor into a disheveled and rushed attack. In fact, it was so rushed that Yamamoto did not realize that American decoding intelligence had already heavily compromised his operations. (SOURCE 2) Along with a compromised attack, Yamamoto also misjudged American character. He assumed that the attack on Pearl Harbor would cause the U.S. to give in to Japanese demands. However, the attack only further united America in the effort to defeat Japan. (SOURCE 1) These pieces of evidence go to show that the Japanese military jumped to many false conclusions that would be detrimental to a victory at Pearl Harbor. These assumptions and Japan’s desperation to strike quickly only contributed to a sloppy attack. Though the Japanese attacked as a way to blindside the U.S. in order …show more content…
to gain time and territory, in reality, they only ignited the American resolve and fury to destroy those who have wronged them. Arguably, attacking Pearl Harbor was counterproductive to the Japanese goal. If they had not attacked at all, America would not have been so quick to focus on the demise of Japan.
To add to the mess that was already prevalent, the coordination and logistics of the attack were not properly thought through.
For example, due to the harbor’s relative shallowness of 45 feet, most would agree that an aerial torpedo attack would not be effective, not to mention impossible, since traditional torpedoes ran at a depth of about 100 feet. However, this did not stop the Japanese; in fact the Japanese completely overlooked it. (SOURCE 3) This shows that once again, military leaders ignored details because they believed that if the attack was a complete surprise, miniscule features like these would not matter. However, this was based on that unlikely contingency that the U.S. was not and would not become aware of the pending attack. Another example of overlooked specifics is that the raid took place on a Sunday. When planning a surprise attack that will “Awake a sleeping giant” (PRIMARY SOURCE FROM SOMEONE WHO SAID THIS) and hopefully turn the tide of the war, planning it on a day when the base is at its least active is not sensible. If the goal was to be as destructive as possible, then targets must be present. Along with many key American military figures absent at Pearl Harbor, all four of the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers were not present on the fateful day of the attack either, escaping destruction. (SOURCE 4) Once more, these pieces of evidence go to show that the attack on Pearl Harbor was rushed and therefore not well-structured or prepared.
Though the Japanese military had been trained to fight until the death and total destruction of their enemies, allowing these key details, however minor they may be, to slip by them certainly effected the success rates of the attack.
As a result of the unclear planning and disregard to details beforehand, the attack on Pearl Harbor was strategic chaos and a miserable performance. To begin with, the plan was to arrive in a single file formation with seven second intervals between aircrafts. However, because the pilots clearly lacked practice in changing from cruise to attack formation, it proved to be a poor choice. Miles began to open up between each aircraft. As a result, pilots lost sight of their leaders, consequently losing their bearings as well. (SOURCE 6) This first of many major blunders led to many mistakes such as aborted runs, misidentified targets, and at least one near collision that forced a bomber to jettison its torpedo. But most significantly, instead of a tightly timed attack lasting 90 seconds, the torpedo attack stretched out over 11 minutes. (SOURCE 7) Had American pilots been aloft over the harbor, instead of grounded by communication issues, the scattered torpedo bombers could have been easily slaughtered. Another example of poor attack procedure lies in the allocation of ammunition. While more than enough firepower had been sent to sink the carriers, there was only just enough firepower to cripple the battleships. This meant that, hypothetically, there was no room for error. Accordingly, aviators were instructed to evenly distribute their attacks to avoid overkill on ships already sinking as any such hits would be a waste of ammunition that could be better applied to other targets. (SOURCE 6) However, in the midst of this cluttered attack, order quickly crumbled. Since none of the pilots wanted to go home from the most important battle in Japanese history to say they had attacked a secondary target, and all of them were desperate to drop their torpedoes before the defending antiaircraft fire began, both dive-bombers and torpedo bombers raced each other to the biggest and easiest targets, many aborting their previous orders in the process. (SOURCE 7) Yet again, this example shows the poor attack approach that the Japanese used during Pearl Harbor. It can also be concluded that during the strike, personal agendas combined with an unclear plan of attack creates a miserable performance.
The Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor failed to do many things. Along with not evenly attacking the boats at Pearl Harbor, many also completely failed to even hit their targets at all. Nearly half of the torpedo bombers fell into disarray over which ships to target. For example, six of the bombers misidentified the demilitarized battleship Utah as a frontline battleship and attacked. However, even out of all six of these bombers, only two of the hits scored and one missed so badly that it hit the light cruiser Raleigh in the adjacent berth. In total, only 11 of the torpedo hits were against properly identified targets that were also part of the main objective. The score rises to 13 only if the accidental hits are included. (SOURCE 6) Out of all the Japanese bombers at Pearl Harbor only 14 of the 78 bombers attacked appropriate targets. (SOURCE 7) Though the military leaders did not plan accordingly for the attack, there was no way they could have prevented the failure to destroy the crucial targets. For instance, instead of destroying 14 of the 16 priority targets as the Japanese plan expected, only three were severely damaged. The score rises to 5 out of 16 priority targets if the two others that later sank because of flooding, damage control errors, and poor construction are taken into consideration. (SOURCE 5) However, even that is just a coincidence. Initially a 60% success rate had been expected, but even with a charitable definition of what constitutes a hit, the Japanese only achieved a 19% success rate. (SOURCE 6) In addition, the Japanese also failed to destroy both the repair facilities and the oil supplies at Pearl Harbor, only making it easier for the United States to get back on her feet again in full fury. (SOURCE 5) No matter how these facts are dissected, these examples confirm the fact that Pearl Harbor was a poorly planned and executed attack.
In conclusion, Pearl Harbor was a lazy attack on Japan’s part and leaves much to be desired tactically. From dive-bombers failing to climb to standard bombing altitudes reducing the accuracy of their attack, to pilots with general-purpose bombs deciding to attack battleships, despite knowing how ineffective the bombs would be. (SOURCE 6) Because of rudimentary mistakes like these, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not only far from brilliant but also just narrowly avoided disaster. Many of the strategic mistakes made of Japan’s part were sloppy and reckless. Overall, the Japanese attack simply fell far short of its potential. Though at the time, short-term victory obscured the many faults of Pearl Harbor, the poor command and planning of the attack, all the ignored details in the design of the strike, and the poor attack tactics and accuracy rates would all be traits that would later manifest themselves throughout the rest of Japan’s battles in World War II, eventually leading to their demise. Unquestionably, those who do not learn from their mistakes are doomed to repeat them. Japan was lucky that they happened to be victorious that fateful December day. The attack was so poor that this very easily could have not been the case. Nevertheless, all flaws aside, Pearl Harbor was able to get the job done--destroying the base, taking many American soldiers’ lives, and in turn living eternally in its infamy. However, the Japanese should have known that, even with this defeat, America’s willpower and resolve would not sink along with the mutilated battleships.
had in previous battles during World War II. Even after ten months of arduous planning, the attack was riddled with inflexibility, poor strategic plans, wasted resources, and a lack of coordination.
The attack on Pearl Harbor suffered from significant command blunders. For example, none of the major military leaders could agree on what the primary target should be, thus dooming the plan of attack from the beginning. The Japanese Naval General Staff and Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander in chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, both agreed that sinking battleships would be most effective in demoralizing the American people while at the same time allowing the Japanese to secure their Southern advance toward the American-backed Philippines. However, Commander Minoru Genda, the supposedly brilliant Japanese aviation operations commander, disagreed. He had figured that it would be more effective to attack any carrier ships that might be in the port therefore planning to ignore the assigned targets. (SOURCE 6) This disagreement led to miscommunication, and these miscommunications led to an overly complicated and reckless plan. The fact that the key military leaders in charge of the plan of attack could not even agree on the targets at Pearl Harbor builds a case for why Pearl Harbor was such a sloppy attack. If prominent military leaders could not make a coherent plan of attack, how could any member of the Japanese air force or navy be expected to execute it properly? In fact, these command blunders alone could have come close to derailing the entire attack itself. In addition to this incongruous plot, Japan’s reasons for attacking Pearl Harbor were farfetched and their whole victory relied on the contingency of a complete surprise attack.
For instance, Noroku Yamamoto believed that the United States would only continue to grow and become a powerful force to be reckoned with as time went on. He hoped that by ambushing The U.S. before they became too advanced, Japan could gain an early advantage in the Pacific. (SOURCE 1) Yamamoto is quoted saying that “If war comes, our only chance is to destroy the fleet at Pearl Harbor.” (PRIMARY SOURCE QUOTE SOURCE 3) These anxious thoughts began to transform into a desperation to attack the U.S. as soon as possible, thus turning Pearl Harbor into a disheveled and rushed attack. In fact, it was so rushed that Yamamoto did not realize that American decoding intelligence had already heavily compromised his operations. (SOURCE 2) Along with a compromised attack, Yamamoto also misjudged American character. He assumed that the attack on Pearl Harbor would cause the U.S. to give in to Japanese demands. However, the attack only further united America in the effort to defeat Japan. (SOURCE 1) These pieces of evidence go to show that the Japanese military jumped to many false conclusions that would be detrimental to a victory at Pearl Harbor. These assumptions and Japan’s desperation to strike quickly only contributed to a sloppy attack. Though the Japanese attacked as a way to blindside the U.S. in order …show more content…
to gain time and territory, in reality, they only ignited the American resolve and fury to destroy those who have wronged them. Arguably, attacking Pearl Harbor was counterproductive to the Japanese goal. If they had not attacked at all, America would not have been so quick to focus on the demise of Japan.
To add to the mess that was already prevalent, the coordination and logistics of the attack were not properly thought through.
For example, due to the harbor’s relative shallowness of 45 feet, most would agree that an aerial torpedo attack would not be effective, not to mention impossible, since traditional torpedoes ran at a depth of about 100 feet. However, this did not stop the Japanese; in fact the Japanese completely overlooked it. (SOURCE 3) This shows that once again, military leaders ignored details because they believed that if the attack was a complete surprise, miniscule features like these would not matter. However, this was based on that unlikely contingency that the U.S. was not and would not become aware of the pending attack. Another example of overlooked specifics is that the raid took place on a Sunday. When planning a surprise attack that will “Awake a sleeping giant” (PRIMARY SOURCE FROM SOMEONE WHO SAID THIS) and hopefully turn the tide of the war, planning it on a day when the base is at its least active is not sensible. If the goal was to be as destructive as possible, then targets must be present. Along with many key American military figures absent at Pearl Harbor, all four of the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers were not present on the fateful day of the attack either, escaping destruction. (SOURCE 4) Once more, these pieces of evidence go to show that the attack on Pearl Harbor was rushed and therefore not well-structured or prepared.
Though the Japanese military had been trained to fight until the death and total destruction of their enemies, allowing these key details, however minor they may be, to slip by them certainly effected the success rates of the attack.
As a result of the unclear planning and disregard to details beforehand, the attack on Pearl Harbor was strategic chaos and a miserable performance. To begin with, the plan was to arrive in a single file formation with seven second intervals between aircrafts. However, because the pilots clearly lacked practice in changing from cruise to attack formation, it proved to be a poor choice. Miles began to open up between each aircraft. As a result, pilots lost sight of their leaders, consequently losing their bearings as well. (SOURCE 6) This first of many major blunders led to many mistakes such as aborted runs, misidentified targets, and at least one near collision that forced a bomber to jettison its torpedo. But most significantly, instead of a tightly timed attack lasting 90 seconds, the torpedo attack stretched out over 11 minutes. (SOURCE 7) Had American pilots been aloft over the harbor, instead of grounded by communication issues, the scattered torpedo bombers could have been easily slaughtered. Another example of poor attack procedure lies in the allocation of ammunition. While more than enough firepower had been sent to sink the carriers, there was only just enough firepower to cripple the battleships. This meant that, hypothetically, there was no room for error. Accordingly, aviators were instructed to evenly distribute their attacks to avoid overkill on ships already sinking as any such hits would be a waste of ammunition that could be better applied to other targets. (SOURCE 6) However, in the midst of this cluttered attack, order quickly crumbled. Since none of the pilots wanted to go home from the most important battle in Japanese history to say they had attacked a secondary target, and all of them were desperate to drop their torpedoes before the defending antiaircraft fire began, both dive-bombers and torpedo bombers raced each other to the biggest and easiest targets, many aborting their previous orders in the process. (SOURCE 7) Yet again, this example shows the poor attack approach that the Japanese used during Pearl Harbor. It can also be concluded that during the strike, personal agendas combined with an unclear plan of attack creates a miserable performance.
The Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor failed to do many things. Along with not evenly attacking the boats at Pearl Harbor, many also completely failed to even hit their targets at all. Nearly half of the torpedo bombers fell into disarray over which ships to target. For example, six of the bombers misidentified the demilitarized battleship Utah as a frontline battleship and attacked. However, even out of all six of these bombers, only two of the hits scored and one missed so badly that it hit the light cruiser Raleigh in the adjacent berth. In total, only 11 of the torpedo hits were against properly identified targets that were also part of the main objective. The score rises to 13 only if the accidental hits are included. (SOURCE 6) Out of all the Japanese bombers at Pearl Harbor only 14 of the 78 bombers attacked appropriate targets. (SOURCE 7) Though the military leaders did not plan accordingly for the attack, there was no way they could have prevented the failure to destroy the crucial targets. For instance, instead of destroying 14 of the 16 priority targets as the Japanese plan expected, only three were severely damaged. The score rises to 5 out of 16 priority targets if the two others that later sank because of flooding, damage control errors, and poor construction are taken into consideration. (SOURCE 5) However, even that is just a coincidence. Initially a 60% success rate had been expected, but even with a charitable definition of what constitutes a hit, the Japanese only achieved a 19% success rate. (SOURCE 6) In addition, the Japanese also failed to destroy both the repair facilities and the oil supplies at Pearl Harbor, only making it easier for the United States to get back on her feet again in full fury. (SOURCE 5) No matter how these facts are dissected, these examples confirm the fact that Pearl Harbor was a poorly planned and executed attack.
In conclusion, Pearl Harbor was a lazy attack on Japan’s part and leaves much to be desired tactically. From dive-bombers failing to climb to standard bombing altitudes reducing the accuracy of their attack, to pilots with general-purpose bombs deciding to attack battleships, despite knowing how ineffective the bombs would be. (SOURCE 6) Because of rudimentary mistakes like these, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not only far from brilliant but also just narrowly avoided disaster. Many of the strategic mistakes made of Japan’s part were sloppy and reckless. Overall, the Japanese attack simply fell far short of its potential. Though at the time, short-term victory obscured the many faults of Pearl Harbor, the poor command and planning of the attack, all the ignored details in the design of the strike, and the poor attack tactics and accuracy rates would all be traits that would later manifest themselves throughout the rest of Japan’s battles in World War II, eventually leading to their demise. Unquestionably, those who do not learn from their mistakes are doomed to repeat them. Japan was lucky that they happened to be victorious that fateful December day. The attack was so poor that this very easily could have not been the case. Nevertheless, all flaws aside, Pearl Harbor was able to get the job done--destroying the base, taking many American soldiers’ lives, and in turn living eternally in its infamy. However, the Japanese should have known that, even with this defeat, America’s willpower and resolve would not sink along with the mutilated battleships.