Why Did The Regime Resort To Mass Terror Analysis

Why did the regime resort to mass terror in 1936-1938?

The regime resorted to mass terror in 1936-38 mainly to counteract perceived threats. These threats were both viewed as external and internal. Externally, the soviet regime felt threatened from ‘capitalist encirclement’ and acted to prevent the regime succumbing to a foreign invasion. Internally, there was an increase in the identification of anti-Soviet sentiment spreading. Though these threats were largely untrue, the constant uncovering of them justified Stalin’s policy to counteract them. Finally, Stalin also used the mass terror to consolidate his power. However, before the immediate reasons as to why the regime resorted to mass terror are discussed, the reason as to why terror
was selected as the primary tactic of control over all others has to be identified.

Totalitarianism is the concept of complete state control upon a citizenry. It is a concept that explains why the state undertook violence as the general course of action against those deemed as threats. Peter Holoquist argues that violence was implanted into the soviet regimes psyche during the party’s rise to power.1 He states that violence wasn’t used to repress, but to fashion a better society.2 Christopher Ward corroborates this point by stating that Lenin instilled philosophies that guaranteed the regime would turn to violence when looking to alter its society. He states that the civil war created a police-machine, which could be used against opponents. 3 He also argues that Lenin’s rulebook of 1919 coupled with the band of factions in 1920 gave Stalin the organizational means to carry out mass terror.4 This shows that the violence of the Great Terror was undertaken mainly because it was so easily carried out.

However, other factors did contribute. The failing of education also drove the party towards the use of violence; with Rudzutak stating in 1932 that half of party members didn’t read ‘Pravda’.5 By this point in time the citizenry were largely literate, meaning that increased education did not result in more people reading party literature, contrary to what Kirov professed. This failing of other measures used to prevent anti-establishment sentiment from spreading did slightly contribute to the use of mass terror. Furthermore, there was a general belief amongst the Soviet hierarchy the violence was prophylactic. Holoquist writes that Molotov and Solzhenitsyn stated that the use of violence against threats to the state meant that it would deter these threats ever coming back. Promoting violence would promote fear, which in turn would stop people from ever acting against the establishment again.6 They believed that they shouldn’t pacify the territories, but instead completely cleans them.7 However, it was the ease with which violence could be implemented that was the primary reason for it becoming the regimes tool of choice after 1936.

The fear of external threats proved to be a large motivator in the movement towards this installation of mass terror in 1936.
The fear of ‘Capitalist Encirclement’ was consistently pointed to by the Soviet regime as a reason for them taking a harsh stance against those they believed posed a threat to the Soviet Union. Capitalist Encirclement is the Soviet theory that capitalist states were engulfing the communist country, with war being inevitable as a result. As James Harris states, this fear was very real in the regimes eyes, and not only used to justify the demands of state policy.8 It was ingrained within the Bolshevik ideology that the success of communism was perceived by the rest of the world as a direct threat to capitalism.9 This is evidenced by Stalins 1937 party address where he stated that 5/6ths of the world were capitalist, and that they were actively trying to implement spies and saboteurs within the soviet system in order to undermine power.10 Stalin pointed to the success of Franco in the Spanish Civil war through the use of what was deemed the ‘5th column’, this being fascist support existing with anti-fascist areas such as Madrid. He viewed this as evidence of how opponents can be successful should they sew support within the societies they were trying to
conquer.11

To accelerate things, this fear was constantly being proved true in Stalins eyes throughout the decade. The internal passport and registration system set up in 1933 became a tool for the protection of the state by being tasked with isolating ‘socialist spaces’ from ‘superfluous people’.12 By August 1934 384,922 people had been refused passports by the agency. These people were viewed as threats to the soviet system, and the large number of them served to justify Bolchvik fears. Furthermore, Sergei Mironov, the head of the Western Siberian UNKVD discovered large amounts of Japanese supporters within his area, again validating the fears of a foreign entity having infiltrated the soviet system. As Rees writes, the Soviet Union had taken action to secure its safety through foreign diplomacy such as the joining of the League of Nations in 1934.13 However, they still believed that the main threat lay within the Unions boundaries. In his 1937 address, Stalin states that the Tsarists failed to secure the home front following World War One and he didn’t want the same to happen to his regime.14 With there already being deep seeded fear of foreign threats existing in the 1930s, the Soviets consistently ‘proved’ their suspicions throughout the decade. This culminated in Stalin deciding to employ mass terror in 1936 in order to, in his belief, preserve the Soviet system against external threats. He viewed a united country as being the best defense against foreign invaders.

Internal threats proved equally influential in altering party policy towards implementing mass terror in 1936. This was due to the increasing rate at which threats were being identified. Following the political trials of the likes of Trotsky and Bukharin, Stalin had successfully implemented an, ‘enemy syndrome’ within the populace. This proved to promote the reporting of crimes to the state, thus leading to the party identifying more threats. Wendy Goldman proves this when citing the constant handing over of supposed criminals to the state by such organizations as the VTsSPS, in order to prove their loyalty.15 Furthermore, Getty points out that it was normal citizens who were the overwhelming victims of the mass terror.16 He says that those within the states hierarchy, while partially motivated by their own paranoia, were mainly driven to persecute in order to prove their own allegiance to communism.17 Therefore, with increased reports of internal threats, came gravitation towards more extreme methods to suppress it.

However, this increase in identification of threats did not mean that there were actually more threats. Claude LeFort argues that the soviet authority eradicated the separate spheres of social life and political life within the public, creating instead one large ‘politisocial’ body. As a result, all crime became politically related. This meant that simple crimes were no longer seen as such, but rather seen as larger threats to the communist system. Though the party implemented this system, they still feared the apparent ‘enemies’ they uncovered. As John Arch Getty writes, there was the creation of this ‘omnipresent conspriacy’. By this he means that the hierarchy of the Soviet Union felt that at all times the soviet system was subject to threats within its very system. He writes that even top officials felt unsafe at being instigated in crimes against the state.18 As previously discussed, the party used violence to seek out current threats as well as striking preemptively against future threats to the union. Therefore violence was implemented because internal threats were identified at every level.
Cases such as the ‘Nest of Trotskyites’ discovered in 1936 served to lend credence to the States overall belief that it was under threat from within, which ratified the regimes paranoia. Therefore, mass terror was implemented due to a fear of internal threats. These threats were mainly false and only existed due to the regime implementing a system that resulted in citizens turning upon one another. However, in the regimes eyes these constant reports of crimes against the state only served to confirm their suspicions, and motivated them to resort to mass terror.

The final reason for the Soviet Union resorting to mass terror in 1936 was that it was the final act in the consolidating power of Stalin.
Stalin had recognized threats to his leadership earlier in the decade, and implemented tools he could call upon to carry out mass terror. Conquest is the primary contemporary in this school of thought. He points to the totalitarianism instilled by Lenin as a primary reason for Stalin carrying out this Great Terror, but also cites that Stalin firmly believed that he had to eradicate those that challenged him for the good of the nation. Conquest writes that there were 3 movements against him from within the soviet hierarchy from 1930-33.19 He states that this marks the beginning of when Stalin began to plan his consolidation of power. Christopher ward states that in 1932 Riutin circulated a 200-page pamphlet asking for the end of enforced collectivization.20 Furthermore he says that in 1934 at the 17th Part Congress provisional delegates had asked for Kirov to become General Secretary. 21 This demonstrates that there was certainly very real opposition to Stalin’s rule from within the part, thus showing why he resorted to mass terror. Citing how Stalin had always believed in the use of mass terror as a tool, Conquest states that Stalin realized he could not validate using it against opponents who were merely political. Conquest points to the assassination of Kirov in 1934 as being planned by Stalin in order for him to justify his plan for
the use of violence.22 With the threat of terrorism being on the minds of those within the party, they supported Stalins violent approach. While never supporting Conquest in his claim that Stalin planned Kirov’s murder, Christopher Ward does state that Stalin had seen Kirov as an increasing threat to his leadership.23 As a result, Stalin was able to direct authorities towards stamping out anti-Stalinist sentiment with little opposition.24 This shows that Kirov’s assassination marks a moment where Stalin was able to justify the implementing of mass terror in order to consolidate his power.

However, there are schools of thought that go against the idea that Stalin implemented mass terror in order to consolidate power. J. Arch Getty writes that the Great Terror was planned, but was merely reactionary. He states that Stalin in the lead up to 1936 had largely implemented peaceful policy. He points to how in 1933 Stalin reduced the economic goals of the second 5-year plan and the in 1934 he had planned to abolish the rationing of bread. He states that these are not the policies of a man wanting to assert his authority. He states that Kirovs assassination proved to cause Stalin to merely act reactionary. Getty writes that throughout the decade the regime responded to threats on an ad-hoc basis, thus proving that there was no pre-planned consolidation of power. Jorvasky writes that Conquest makes Stalin ‘ominpitent’ in his writing and that there was no way Stalin could have planned the terror.25 While Conquest may somewhat overstate the way in which Stalin prearranged the terror, it is hard to argue that he did preemptively put in place means to which he could implement a consolidation of power. Holoquist points to the merging of the political and normal police in 1934 as evidence of Stalin planning to crush those who were against him.26 In Stalins speech of 1937, he states that he had been able to create ‘technically steeled Bolshevik cadres’ capable of surprising anti-Stalinist sentiment27. Therefore, through his actions throughout the decade, it is clear that Stalin was putting in place tools, which he could call upon in order to implement mass terror. This demonstrates that the mass terror was executed to a certain degree for Stalin to consolidate his personal power.

In conclusion, external and internal threats were the main reason for the regime turning to mass terror in 1936. The fear of the regime being made vulnerable to external threats due to foreign support existing within the citizenry served as a large motivator for installing the Great Terror. Internally the regime had eradicated the line between normal and political crimes. This resulted in the mass reporting of threats to the regime, which coaxed them into acting extremely against it. Finally, Stalin had use mass terror to consolidate power, as he had put in place means to implement personal authority throughout the decade earlier.
Bibliography

Conquest, Robert, and Paul Hollander, Political Violence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
Getty, J. Arch, and Roberta Thompson Manning, Stalinist Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
Getty, J. Arch, Stalinist Terror: A New Perspective (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1993)
Goldman, Wendy, 'Victimes And Perpetrators ', in Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression, 1st edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 163-201
Harris, James, 'Encircled By Enemies: Stalin’S Perceptions Of The Capitalist World, 1918–1941 ', Journal of Strategic Studies, 30 (2007), 513-545
Holoquist, Peter, State Violence As Technique: The Logic Of Violence In Soviet Totalitarianism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003)
McDermott, Kevin, and Matthew Stibbe, Stalinist Terror In Eastern Europe (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010)
McLoughlin, Barry, and Kevin McDermott, Stalin 's Terror (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)
Rees, E. A, The Nature Of Stalin 's Dictatorship (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
Stalin, Joseph, Mastering Bolshevism (New York: New Century Publishers, 1945)
Ward, Christopher, 'Purges And Politics, 1928-1941 ', in Stalin 's Russia, 1st edn (London: Edward Arnold London, 1993), pp. 106-147