Why Germany Failed in the Battle of Barbarossa
Between June and December in 1941, German judgement inhibited achievement in Operational Barbarossa. Strategic indecision in a wider and more specific context was exacerbated by climatic conditions and a widening rift between the reality and the theory of the battle.
The Blitzkrieg strategy that had defined German military capacity was inapplicable to the Russian situation in several contexts. Blitzkrieg was intended to avoid stagnant trench and linear warfare, it was intended to prevent enemy forces form arranging a coherent defence, and it depended upon a highly mobile and mechanised form of warfare. None of these credentials existed in Operation Barbarossa, and the result was a battle of attrition.
In commencing Operation Barbarossa, the German prerogative was; ‘Provided everything was over quickly’. Hitler had expected complete strategic freedom within five weeks, an outcome which did not require substantial supplies. However, the reality was that supplies were grossly mismatched with the capability and objectives of German infantry and tanks. The subsequent extension of supply lines increased exposure to Russian attack.
The changing nature of the Operation had wider ramifications. Blitzkrieg was not just a tactic, but it was the most fundamental structure of the wider German war plan. Consequently, the entire domestic structure of production was intricately arranged to facilitate a particular warfare. This rendered it incapable of supporting the prolonged warfare of Operation Barbarossa. In November 1941, the Quartermaster General of the German Army reported that; ‘We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of a deep winter.’
Hitler was so confident of a rapid victory that he did not prepare for even the possibility of winter warfare. In the first instance, the campaign was launched too late. Hitler should have invaded in April so that objectives could have been achieved before
The Blitzkrieg strategy that had defined German military capacity was inapplicable to the Russian situation in several contexts. Blitzkrieg was intended to avoid stagnant trench and linear warfare, it was intended to prevent enemy forces form arranging a coherent defence, and it depended upon a highly mobile and mechanised form of warfare. None of these credentials existed in Operation Barbarossa, and the result was a battle of attrition.
In commencing Operation Barbarossa, the German prerogative was; ‘Provided everything was over quickly’. Hitler had expected complete strategic freedom within five weeks, an outcome which did not require substantial supplies. However, the reality was that supplies were grossly mismatched with the capability and objectives of German infantry and tanks. The subsequent extension of supply lines increased exposure to Russian attack.
The changing nature of the Operation had wider ramifications. Blitzkrieg was not just a tactic, but it was the most fundamental structure of the wider German war plan. Consequently, the entire domestic structure of production was intricately arranged to facilitate a particular warfare. This rendered it incapable of supporting the prolonged warfare of Operation Barbarossa. In November 1941, the Quartermaster General of the German Army reported that; ‘We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of a deep winter.’
Hitler was so confident of a rapid victory that he did not prepare for even the possibility of winter warfare. In the first instance, the campaign was launched too late. Hitler should have invaded in April so that objectives could have been achieved before