Why Is Aristotle's Argument For Fatalalism Is Not True

In Aristotle’s De Interpretatione he discusses an argument for Fatalism. The aim of the argument for Fatalism is to illustrate that our actions can have no effect on the future. The argument for fatalism begins by claiming that, with regard to statements, E must be either true or false (30a). It then claims that if E is true, then it was always true (30a), and argues that if E has always been true, then it couldn’t be false. The argument for fatalism claims that if E couldn’t be false, then it’s necessarily true. In claiming that if E couldn’t be false, fatalism then argues that E is necessarily true. It argues that if E is necessarily true, then surely we cannot affect its truth (30a). The idea is that if these claims are shown to be true for all propositions, then Fatalism is true (18b).
I will argue that it’s not the case that ‘either E is true or it’s not true,’ on the grounds that prior to event E’s occurrence, the statement regarding that event is neither true nor false. I will argue that a statement only becomes true when the event to which it refers happens. A statement regarding an event has no truth or falsity prior to its occurrence. Consequently, it cannot be the case that ‘either E is true or it’s not true’ and one cannot determine that ‘if E is true, then it always was true’ (30a).
Sure enough, as they’d said, I showed up at that coffee shop at 6 PM on December 10th. An advocate of fatalism would argue that the statement made by my friend was true because I showed up when they said I would, but the friend’s statement can only be assigned a truth value because I showed up. The event of me showing up had not yet occurred and the time in which they’d said I would be there had not yet passed, so my friend had only made a claim. Prior to when I showed up, their statement held no truth