Why Is Kantian Deontology Morally Wrong

In this essay I will present an argument to show that Kantian Deontology is not a plausible moral theory because the two fundamental principles from Kant’s Categorical Imperatives are unable to account for the permissibility of certain acts that would otherwise be considered immoral. This would discredit the usefulness of Kant’s theory as a moral guideline because individuals would then be able to commit acts - those of which would be considered immoral according to considered moral judgements - and yet not be proven morally wrong because of the lack of accountability that the principles have. In addition, Kant’s theory would no longer have the value of helping us lead a morally good life - even as a form of moral guideline - than the initial
An act is morally wrong if and only if it violates the categorical imperative (Luco, Week 11 Notes p.3).
An act is obligatory if and only if it is morally wrong not to do it, according to the above definition of morally wrong (Luco, Week 11 Notes p.3).
There are instances when an act is both obligatory and morally wrong by following the categorical imperative.
An action cannot be both obligatory (morally wrong not to follow) and morally wrong to follow at the same time.
The categorical imperative generates contradictions.

Premise 1 and 2 of the argument is true as they are a summary of the moral definitions advanced in Kant’s ethics (Luco, Week 11 Notes p.3).

Premise 3 can be supported through the analogy of the “train problem”. The “train problem” depicts a scene where a runaway train is heading towards a track with 10 people tied to it and only you have the capability to switch the tracks onto another one that is safe. However there’s a person who is blocking you from switching tracks, and the only way to switch tracks is to push the person off the train, which would result in his
Kantians do claim that the principle of universalisability is a standard of rationality but it doesn’t have to be the only one (Luco, Week 11 Notes p.16), and yet in the first argument I have proven that the principle of universalisability itself fails as a standard of rationality when maxims are vague. Furthermore, even if the principle of humanity can be useful as an essential framework for moral deliberation rather than an independent and determinant guide (Hill, 2006), the flaws of the scope in the principle itself would render it unable to be considered a framework for deliberation when careful deliberation of the principle would permit various forms of immoral acts. Hence, even if the value of Kant’s theory is diminished to that of a guideline than a rule of morality, it is hard to see how it could be considered a plausible moral theory when it fails to take into consideration of these loopholes that are created from its