Why Is Operation Anaconda An Ill-Structured Problem
Operation Anaconda an Ill Structured Problem
An ill structured problem is a situation or dilemma that does not have a clear concise objective or solution, or a clear process to solve it. Operation “Anaconda”, which took place in March 2, 2002 would prove to be one of those problems. The three major reason reasons why Operation Anaconda fit this definition so well is due to failures in several areas. The first area of failure was the Command element, even though there were many joint force commands in the area. The area of conception would be the next area of failure, information is critical. Lastly the area of execution would be the final area of failure, there should never be guess work involved. The US found itself learning many brutal lessons regarding ill structured problems during Operation Anaconda.
Command
According to Wikiversity.org. (2018) ill-structured problems(ISPs) have no initial clear or spelled out goals, set of …show more content…
operations, end states, or constraints. In fact, ISPs often, times have unstated goals and constraints that must be determined by those solving the problem. According to the case study by Fleri, al et (2003), the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander was placed in charge on September 12, 2001, of the joint forces in Afghanistan. This was under the mission heading of Operation Enduring Freedom. During the latter half of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 the lack of resistance started to create the thought to reduce the foot print in Afghanistan. The US was not interested in establishing a large contingency there, it was more to assist the Afghanis.
The occupation in Afghanistan was never thought to be a long term operation. In addition to CENTCOM, there was Combined Air Operation Center (COAC), Joint Force Special Operation Component Commander (JFSOCC) and Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) this is just to name a few. In short every branch of the service and the Afghanis had elements in the area. According to Fleri, al et (2003) case study, CFLCC would release a report that revealed al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan near Kowst and Gardez. Fleri, al et (2003) also states that with further investigation it was found that the enemy forces were in the of the Shahi Kot Valley. Once digesting this information it would stand to reason that maybe CFLCC commander would take charge of any offensive that might be considered. At worst case communicate with all the other elements in the area and figure out who should be in charge.
Our joint forces would learn the brutal lesson, that there should never be an operation even conceived without establishing clear cut command authority. This ill structured problem would only get worse with the conception of the operation. Conception Now that it has been decided that the Shahi Kot valley should be cleared, the conception of the operation met with the same ill structured thought process. One of the task forces (TF Dagger) in the area was given the responsibility of coming up with the best way to accomplish the clearing of the Shahi Kot valley. During the conception of the operation the plan would grow larger than Task Force Dagger had resources to accomplish. Now the plan was going to have to encompass some ground forces as well. In some cases ill structured problems can be made worse when there are assets to use and there is a reluctance to use those assets. According to Fleri, al et (2003) it wasn’t until 1 week before the offensive was due to take place was the CAOC, which controlled air operations, notified of the operation and that was done by e-mail. Intelligence is normally one of the first assets needed when organizing an offensive, or the forces could meet with disastrous results. Intangibles are even taken into consideration when lives are on the line.
Considering all of the other mistakes that were being made, it is a certainty the historic value of the area was down played greatly. Identified by Fleri, al et (2003) the Shahi Kot valley was one of the places that the Afghanis were able to hold off the Soviets in 1980. When dealing with a people of faith, knowing that at one time they were able to hold off such a formidable opponent would motivate them to fight harder. As stated by Military (2010) the enemy had learned well from previous engagements, and proved adept at exploiting the rocky and mountainous terrain. In addition Military (2010) stated, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had picked up intelligence that not only might enemy forces be higher in the mountains instead of in targeted villages in the valley, but also might be three times as numerous as the attacking forces suspected. Unfortunately, due to organizational stovepipes, that information never got to the 10th Mountain
division. Another brutal lesson learned, when our forces are sent on a mission with outdated intelligence casualties are an almost certainty. With the conception of the operation being an ill structured struggle it is no surprise that the execution would follow the same pattern. Execution.
Even after all the mistakes made during the conception, the execution would fall victim to the ill structured culture that had developed from the beginning of this operation. Upon execution the assets that had been determined to be critical to the success of the mission were noticeably absent. The air support that was expected had no clear cut command element and response to that need was diminished greatly. Ground forces were expecting air cover but what they got would prove to hinder their efforts instead of helping. According to Military (2010) due to a failure in its inertial navigation system, an AC-130 gunship misidentified their location and decimated the column. Then instead of the one hour supporting bombardment they expected, the wounded force witnessed one B1-B drop only six bombs, which proved to be the entirety of the bombardment, due to the 7th bomb getting stuck in the B1’s bomb bay, and confusion among other aircraft over “cease fire” calls from TF Hammer in response to the AC-130 attack.
Now that air support would initially be ineffective the ground forces would encountered another aspect of the ill structured problem. By Grossman (2004) accounts, during the two-week-long fight in the Shahi Kot Valley in early March, more than 1,400 American ground forces encountered 10 times the 150 to 200 enemy troops originally anticipated. Grossman (2004) also stated that the plan to use Afghan troops as the vanguard force fell apart in the opening days of the campaign when they encountered heavy resistance and lost three soldiers. In the days that followed, a fierce battle against al Qaeda fighters hidden in the steep mountainous terrain of southeastern Afghanistan resulted in eight U.S. losses and dozens more wounded. In the continuation of brutal lessons learned during the ill structured Operation Anaconda. Joint forces would learn that failure to have air support intricately involved in the conception of an operation can not only leave forces exposed but can be deadly to those forces as well. Conclusion
According to Wikiversity.org. (2018) ISPs present uncertainty about which concepts, rules, and principles are necessary for the solution and how these should be organized. They require learners to make judgments about the problem and to defend their judgments by expressing personal opinions or beliefs. ISPs possess multiple solutions and solution paths, or may not possess any solutions at all. The US coalition in Afghanistan, would learn many brutal lessons during Operation Anaconda in regards to Ill Structured Problems. Not taking the time to coordinate efforts such as who is in overall command can lead to forces not being prepared and lives being lost. Not insuring that all elements and assets involved are in the conception of the mission leave our forces exposed and increase the possibility for casualties.
Lastly, not making sure that all possible information is obtained before operation execution could lead to a situation where US forces are left vulnerable. It is a true testament to the tenacity of US forces that the casualty numbers were not higher.
An ill structured problem is a situation or dilemma that does not have a clear concise objective or solution, or a clear process to solve it. Operation “Anaconda”, which took place in March 2, 2002 would prove to be one of those problems. The three major reason reasons why Operation Anaconda fit this definition so well is due to failures in several areas. The first area of failure was the Command element, even though there were many joint force commands in the area. The area of conception would be the next area of failure, information is critical. Lastly the area of execution would be the final area of failure, there should never be guess work involved. The US found itself learning many brutal lessons regarding ill structured problems during Operation Anaconda.
Command
According to Wikiversity.org. (2018) ill-structured problems(ISPs) have no initial clear or spelled out goals, set of …show more content…
operations, end states, or constraints. In fact, ISPs often, times have unstated goals and constraints that must be determined by those solving the problem. According to the case study by Fleri, al et (2003), the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander was placed in charge on September 12, 2001, of the joint forces in Afghanistan. This was under the mission heading of Operation Enduring Freedom. During the latter half of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 the lack of resistance started to create the thought to reduce the foot print in Afghanistan. The US was not interested in establishing a large contingency there, it was more to assist the Afghanis.
The occupation in Afghanistan was never thought to be a long term operation. In addition to CENTCOM, there was Combined Air Operation Center (COAC), Joint Force Special Operation Component Commander (JFSOCC) and Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) this is just to name a few. In short every branch of the service and the Afghanis had elements in the area. According to Fleri, al et (2003) case study, CFLCC would release a report that revealed al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan near Kowst and Gardez. Fleri, al et (2003) also states that with further investigation it was found that the enemy forces were in the of the Shahi Kot Valley. Once digesting this information it would stand to reason that maybe CFLCC commander would take charge of any offensive that might be considered. At worst case communicate with all the other elements in the area and figure out who should be in charge.
Our joint forces would learn the brutal lesson, that there should never be an operation even conceived without establishing clear cut command authority. This ill structured problem would only get worse with the conception of the operation. Conception Now that it has been decided that the Shahi Kot valley should be cleared, the conception of the operation met with the same ill structured thought process. One of the task forces (TF Dagger) in the area was given the responsibility of coming up with the best way to accomplish the clearing of the Shahi Kot valley. During the conception of the operation the plan would grow larger than Task Force Dagger had resources to accomplish. Now the plan was going to have to encompass some ground forces as well. In some cases ill structured problems can be made worse when there are assets to use and there is a reluctance to use those assets. According to Fleri, al et (2003) it wasn’t until 1 week before the offensive was due to take place was the CAOC, which controlled air operations, notified of the operation and that was done by e-mail. Intelligence is normally one of the first assets needed when organizing an offensive, or the forces could meet with disastrous results. Intangibles are even taken into consideration when lives are on the line.
Considering all of the other mistakes that were being made, it is a certainty the historic value of the area was down played greatly. Identified by Fleri, al et (2003) the Shahi Kot valley was one of the places that the Afghanis were able to hold off the Soviets in 1980. When dealing with a people of faith, knowing that at one time they were able to hold off such a formidable opponent would motivate them to fight harder. As stated by Military (2010) the enemy had learned well from previous engagements, and proved adept at exploiting the rocky and mountainous terrain. In addition Military (2010) stated, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had picked up intelligence that not only might enemy forces be higher in the mountains instead of in targeted villages in the valley, but also might be three times as numerous as the attacking forces suspected. Unfortunately, due to organizational stovepipes, that information never got to the 10th Mountain
division. Another brutal lesson learned, when our forces are sent on a mission with outdated intelligence casualties are an almost certainty. With the conception of the operation being an ill structured struggle it is no surprise that the execution would follow the same pattern. Execution.
Even after all the mistakes made during the conception, the execution would fall victim to the ill structured culture that had developed from the beginning of this operation. Upon execution the assets that had been determined to be critical to the success of the mission were noticeably absent. The air support that was expected had no clear cut command element and response to that need was diminished greatly. Ground forces were expecting air cover but what they got would prove to hinder their efforts instead of helping. According to Military (2010) due to a failure in its inertial navigation system, an AC-130 gunship misidentified their location and decimated the column. Then instead of the one hour supporting bombardment they expected, the wounded force witnessed one B1-B drop only six bombs, which proved to be the entirety of the bombardment, due to the 7th bomb getting stuck in the B1’s bomb bay, and confusion among other aircraft over “cease fire” calls from TF Hammer in response to the AC-130 attack.
Now that air support would initially be ineffective the ground forces would encountered another aspect of the ill structured problem. By Grossman (2004) accounts, during the two-week-long fight in the Shahi Kot Valley in early March, more than 1,400 American ground forces encountered 10 times the 150 to 200 enemy troops originally anticipated. Grossman (2004) also stated that the plan to use Afghan troops as the vanguard force fell apart in the opening days of the campaign when they encountered heavy resistance and lost three soldiers. In the days that followed, a fierce battle against al Qaeda fighters hidden in the steep mountainous terrain of southeastern Afghanistan resulted in eight U.S. losses and dozens more wounded. In the continuation of brutal lessons learned during the ill structured Operation Anaconda. Joint forces would learn that failure to have air support intricately involved in the conception of an operation can not only leave forces exposed but can be deadly to those forces as well. Conclusion
According to Wikiversity.org. (2018) ISPs present uncertainty about which concepts, rules, and principles are necessary for the solution and how these should be organized. They require learners to make judgments about the problem and to defend their judgments by expressing personal opinions or beliefs. ISPs possess multiple solutions and solution paths, or may not possess any solutions at all. The US coalition in Afghanistan, would learn many brutal lessons during Operation Anaconda in regards to Ill Structured Problems. Not taking the time to coordinate efforts such as who is in overall command can lead to forces not being prepared and lives being lost. Not insuring that all elements and assets involved are in the conception of the mission leave our forces exposed and increase the possibility for casualties.
Lastly, not making sure that all possible information is obtained before operation execution could lead to a situation where US forces are left vulnerable. It is a true testament to the tenacity of US forces that the casualty numbers were not higher.