Amar and Amar discuss how this federal succession statute could be unconstitutional due to the conflict of interest that resides within the branches of government that Madison discussed in Federalist 51. If the Speaker of the House was to become president, than there would be a shift in the power dynamic of the Branches. Essentially, the legislative branch of the government would have the ability to choose the president, successfully having more power in both the executive and legislative branches, which may create tyranny and bias within that branch. Amar and Amar distinguish this when discussing the implications of the Incompatibility Clause in that no sitting Senator or Representative could hold Executive or Judicial Office. If someone from another branch of government were to take power of the executive branch, then the rejected British-style of the government would be implemented. Madison clearly states in federalist 51 how there needs to be a separation of branches so there is not a creation of oppressive rulers, which in Amar’s case is discussed by the British-style of government. If the government were to combine together through the succession of the legislative branch into the executive branch, the American system of self-government could become biased, and liberty would be
Amar and Amar discuss how this federal succession statute could be unconstitutional due to the conflict of interest that resides within the branches of government that Madison discussed in Federalist 51. If the Speaker of the House was to become president, than there would be a shift in the power dynamic of the Branches. Essentially, the legislative branch of the government would have the ability to choose the president, successfully having more power in both the executive and legislative branches, which may create tyranny and bias within that branch. Amar and Amar distinguish this when discussing the implications of the Incompatibility Clause in that no sitting Senator or Representative could hold Executive or Judicial Office. If someone from another branch of government were to take power of the executive branch, then the rejected British-style of the government would be implemented. Madison clearly states in federalist 51 how there needs to be a separation of branches so there is not a creation of oppressive rulers, which in Amar’s case is discussed by the British-style of government. If the government were to combine together through the succession of the legislative branch into the executive branch, the American system of self-government could become biased, and liberty would be