William Baxter’s Anthropocentric Justification Regarding Regulation of Pollution
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Alex Hallam
Philosophy 252: Contemporary Moral Problems
3 December 2012
William Baxter’s Anthropocentric Justification Regarding Regulation of Pollution
Introduction:
William Baxter addresses the issue of pollution, using a human-oriented method by which all value assigned to flora and fauna is dependent on each entity’s benefits to humans. In this essay I will briefly explain Baxter’s anthropocentric approach, attempt to show the flaws in Baxter’s arguments, examine his possible recourse after revisiting these points, and then conclude by restating my stance regarding the importance of flora and fauna and the immorality of environmental pollution. Pollution is immoral not only because we have a duty to preserve the environment, but because according to Baxter’s own argument it in humanity’s necessary interests.
Overview of Baxter’s Anthropocentricity: Baxter’s anthropocentric viewpoint hinges on four points: 1) Spheres of Freedom, 2) waste is a bad thing, 3) every human should be an end and not a means; and 4) both incentive and opportunity to improve a man’s satisfaction should be preserved (Timmons, 615). Spheres of freedom are such that a man can act as he desires as long as his actions do not interfere with the rights and intentions of another. He proposes waste is a bad thing because all resources are limited, and there is never enough of any one resource to appease the satisfaction of every human. Because his focus is that of humans solely, waste of any one entity that could limit human satisfaction is immoral. He also postulates the Kantian humanity formulation in that all humans have essential intrinsic value and should therefore be elevated above any other alternative as the end to any goal rather than the means to satisfy another. Lastly, he favors redistribution of wealth in that every man should be given at least opportunity to better his life and satisfaction by preservations of these incentive values. He qualifies these
Alex Hallam
Philosophy 252: Contemporary Moral Problems
3 December 2012
William Baxter’s Anthropocentric Justification Regarding Regulation of Pollution
Introduction:
William Baxter addresses the issue of pollution, using a human-oriented method by which all value assigned to flora and fauna is dependent on each entity’s benefits to humans. In this essay I will briefly explain Baxter’s anthropocentric approach, attempt to show the flaws in Baxter’s arguments, examine his possible recourse after revisiting these points, and then conclude by restating my stance regarding the importance of flora and fauna and the immorality of environmental pollution. Pollution is immoral not only because we have a duty to preserve the environment, but because according to Baxter’s own argument it in humanity’s necessary interests.
Overview of Baxter’s Anthropocentricity: Baxter’s anthropocentric viewpoint hinges on four points: 1) Spheres of Freedom, 2) waste is a bad thing, 3) every human should be an end and not a means; and 4) both incentive and opportunity to improve a man’s satisfaction should be preserved (Timmons, 615). Spheres of freedom are such that a man can act as he desires as long as his actions do not interfere with the rights and intentions of another. He proposes waste is a bad thing because all resources are limited, and there is never enough of any one resource to appease the satisfaction of every human. Because his focus is that of humans solely, waste of any one entity that could limit human satisfaction is immoral. He also postulates the Kantian humanity formulation in that all humans have essential intrinsic value and should therefore be elevated above any other alternative as the end to any goal rather than the means to satisfy another. Lastly, he favors redistribution of wealth in that every man should be given at least opportunity to better his life and satisfaction by preservations of these incentive values. He qualifies these
Cited: * Timmons, Mark. Disputed Moral Issues: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011. Book.