Woodrow Wilson the League of Nations

WOODROW WILSON & THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Michael Tejada
History 2340: US Diplomatic History
May 8, 2012

The world that emerged following World War I and the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles had changed dramatically from the world before the war. Remarkably, this world was not the one that President Woodrow Wilson envisioned. Enjoying unprecedented international acclaim and traveling to France himself, Wilson returned to the United States with a treaty that lacked many of the key provisions for which he had hoped. Wilson had only been able to successfully negotiate the formation of the League of Nations. Unfortunately for Wilson, that would be irrelevant because the Senate never ratified the treaty and the United States never joined the League of Nations. Two more years passed until Germany and the United States signed a peace agreement under President Warren G. Harding. These series of events are quite shocking because Wilson was unable to end the “war to end wars” as he had hoped. Many wonder about Wilson’s inability to have a peace based on the fourteen points he outlined during the war. Though there are many different aspects, American domestic politics and Wilson’s religious zeal for the League of Nations were the deciding factors that denied Wilson his long lasting peace. To understand the dynamics of the peace settlement, it is first necessary to understand what transpired during the course of the war. War broke out on the European continent in July of 1914 shortly after Serbian separatists assassinated the archduke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria-Hungary responded by invading Serbia, which brought in major powers like France, Germany, and Russia because of alliances. Hoping to defeat France quickly, Germany violated Belgium neutrality and that brought the United Kingdom into the conflict. The war on the western front was quickly bogged down in a virtual stalemate fought in trenches. The conflict soon spread into Africa and Asia as countries sought to conquer the colonies of their enemies. In 1917, Lenin and communists would take power and signed a treaty with Germany that removed Russia from the war. Meanwhile, Germany had implemented a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare that sunk both allied and neutral countries shipping in an effort to remove Britain from the war. This policy was a major reason the United States under Wilson entered the conflict in 1917 against Germany. After exhausting fighting and high casualties on both sides, Germany and her allies capitulated and signed an armistice in 1918 and the victorious Allies met in Paris to negotiate a peace treaty. Wilson expressed his desired peace plan quite clearly in a speech he gave before Congress in which he outlined his Fourteen Points. Wilson thought these points would restore order across the globe and secure peace. Wilson proposed many ideas to secure this peace. Among them were the end of secret alliances, freedom of the seas, a general reduction of arms by all countries, and a responsible adjustment of borders and formation of states. However, the most important of all these points was point XIV. Point XIV stated the necessity of “a general association of nations [to] be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike”. This idea resulted in the formation of the League of Nations and Wilson thought its formation was imperative as forum where nations could address any and all issues. Ultimately, it would be one of the reasons the Senate would never ratify the treaty. Despite Wilson’s best efforts, the Treaty of Versailles only included the creation of the League of Nations and lacked many of the other recommendations Wilson had articulated in his speech. French premier Georges Clemenceau and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George were able to dictate much of the terms at Versailles. Pursuant to the treaty, Germany accepted “the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals [had] been subjected.” Much to Wilson’s displeasure, Germany took full responsibility for the war and was forced to “make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property” despite “recogniz[ing] that the resources of Germany [were] not adequate.” Wilson’s call for disarmament also disproportionally affected Germany. Whereas the allies reduced the size of their military because of peacetime, Germany was banned from having air forces and the size of its army and navy were severely restricted.
In addition, Germany forfeited all her oversea colonies and Britain and France controlled these lands in the name of the League of Nations because they needed “assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they [were] able to stand alone” and would become independent. National groups that had previously been under control of Russia or the Central Powers were given states, while those under British or French control were not. This resulted in the creation of Poland and Hungary, yet the British remained in control of Ireland. When examining all the parts of the Treaty of Versailles, it seems clear that the peace was not based on Wilson’s balanced Fourteen Points.
Even though Wilson did not support many of the treaty’s provisions, Wilson justified the treaty because he believed the League of Nations would eventually correct the treaty’s errors. However, the Senate never advised and consented to the treaty and so the United States would never agree to the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson never achieved his peace because he wrongly misplaced such emphasis on the League of Nations. The British and French were able to use the creation of the League as a bargaining chip and Republicans in Congress were able to successfully criticize the League as contrary to the United States’ interests.
Clemenceau and Lloyd George successfully negotiated with Wilson to make him compromise on issues in exchange for the creation of the League of Nations. In a memorandum sent from American Paul Cravath to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance, Cravath reminds the Allies that they had “declare[d] there willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany based on the terms of peace laid down in the President 's address to Congress in January, 1918 (‘the Fourteen Points’).” Cravath also expresses great fear about the amount of reparations France and Britain were claiming because it was contrary to the spirit of the Fourteen Points. Wilson understood that after five years of war, there would be payments from Germany to the Allied governments. However, his government was worried that “the French Government will be disposed to claim indemnities upon a much more liberal scale than is here advocated.” This communication clearly shows Wilson was aware that the allies, and especially France, were being overzealous in reparations.
Britain and France were able to persuade Wilson on the reparations and other matters because they realized Wilson’s strong desire for the League. In a meeting of the British Imperial War cabinet just before the meeting of Versailles, British leaders acknowledge Wilson would “agree ultimately, though possibly under protest, to the things to which [the British government] attached importance, providing he could secure his League of Nations, which, politically, was a matter of life and death to him.” Lloyd George and Clemenceau knew Wilson wanted the League and that France and the United Kingdom needed to participate if it were to be successful. To European leaders, “the European balance of power would remain fundamental, whether or not a league of nations were established” France and Britain, therefore, placed great importance in weakening Germany so that the European balance of power favored the victors. Following the war, the United States was also in a unique position when compared to the rest of European countries. The United States had absorbed minimal casualties when compared to those of the other Allied powers. Britain formally declared it had lost 908,371 men and 2,090,212 had been wounded. Nearly 1,385,300 Frenchmen lost their lives or were missing after the war. Meanwhile, the United States declared only 115,660 Americans had been killed and 205,690 had been wounded. Not to diminish from the sacrifice of those men, but the total number of Americans lost was significantly less than the number of British or French soldiers killed. This factor served as leverage when Lloyd George and Clemenceau discussed the peace settlement because “if President Wilson should, in the last resort, prove obstinate, then the sacrifices of France and Great Britain were such that they were entitled to have a final say.” After enduring the brunt of Allied casualties and fighting three years longer than the United States had, Clemenceau and Lloyd George were determined on peace treaty that served their interests. Wilson’s Fourteen Points did not serve their interests and they realized they could achieve their goals by bargaining with the League of Nations.
It is important to note that it was not solely Britain and France’s significantly larger amount of casualties that allowed them to pressure Wilson. Though it emboldened them, the casualties did not cause Wilson to capitulate on most of his Fourteen Points. Clemenceau and Lloyd George were able to force Wilson to agree to their demands because of the League of Nations. Wilson felt that the League would solve current and future issues and that, eventually, the League would adopt all the remaining parts of the Fourteen Points. As long as the League of Nations was established, Wilson was willing to make major concessions to Britain and France and their respective leaders knew this and used it to their advantage.
All of Wilson’s negotiating would prove fruitless because the Senate, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, refused to ratify the treaty because they feared the League of Nations’ covenant infringed on the United States’ sovereignty. In a speech, Lodge articulated that he worried of an “obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations -- whether members of the League or not -- under the provisions of Article X” In addition to the fear of losing sovereignty, article X had domestic political implications. Article X stated all members “undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members.” The meaning of this article was slightly ambiguous and Republicans were able to argue that it may become the United States’ duty to help preserve the British Empire from. This idea frustrated many Americans, especially the growing Irish-American community who deeply resented the British control of Ireland, and Republicans brought it to the public’s attention. Partisanship surely motivated Republicans against ratifying the Treaty of Versailles; Wilson’s delegation to Paris did not include any prominent Republican. However, it was the League of Nations and its requirements that allowed Republicans to criticize Wilson and prevented the treaty’s ratification.
People all across Europe initially celebrated Woodrow Wilson as a savior whose reason would lead to an honest peace. Wilson thought Europe could achieve a lasting peace if nations adopted his Fourteen Points. Wilson clearly communicated this with other leaders, yet he was ultimately unable to achieve this goal. Clemenceau and Lloyd George realized the importance Wilson placed on the League of Nations and they used it as leverage during negotiations in Paris. The treaty with which Wilson returned was dissimilar in many ways from the proposals and spirit of the Fourteen Points. He only justified it because he believed the League of Nations was imperative to the future of international relations. However, Republican politicians attacked the treaty specifically because the League threatened American sovereignty. After the carnage of the First World War, the prevailing American consensus was to remove the country from international politics. In both Paris and Washington, it was the League of Nations that prevented the peace Wilson desired. Though it is difficult to speculate whether World War II could have been avoided, perhaps the conflict may never have happened if peace was established based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

Bibliography

Covenant of the League of Nations, 1924 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp Cravath, Paul “Memorandum by the Advisory Counsel of the American Mission to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance”, Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/1 584-605

Egerton, George W. "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal ': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920." Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (1978): 885-911. JSTOR Arts & Sciences II, EBSCOhost (accessed May 5, 2012).

Henry Cabot Lodge, (1850-1924), and (1859-1934) Gilbert Monell Hitchcock. "Reservations to treaty of peace with Germany." (1920): 15p. LexisNexis U.S. Serial Set Digital Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed May 7, 2012).

Imperial War Cabinet minutes, I.W.C., 31 Dec. I9I8, Cab. 23/42, Public Record Office. http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/large/cab-23-42.pdf

Throntveit, T. "The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination." Diplomatic History 35, no. 3 (n.d.): 445-481. Arts & Humanities Citation Index, EBSCOhost (accessed May 6, 2012).

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 1919 http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versailles.html

UK War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920 (London, UK, 1922)

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[ 1 ]. Woodrow Wilson and House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 1918. "Address of President of U.S. to Congress, January 8, 1918, on fourteen-point peace program."
[ 2 ]. Trygve Throntveit ,"The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination," Diplomatic History 35, no. 3 (June 2011): 471
[ 3 ]. Wilson "Address of President of U.S. to Congress, January 8, 1918, on fourteen-point peace program."
[ 4 ]. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 1919, Article 231
[ 5 ]. Ibid, Article 232
[ 6 ]. Ibid, Article 198
[ 7 ]. Ibid, Article 119
[ 8 ]. Covenant of the League of Nations, Article XXII
[ 9 ]. Paul Cravath “Memorandum by the Advisory Counsel of the American Mission to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance”, Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/1, p. 584
[ 10 ]. Ibid, p. 588
[ 11 ]. Imperial War Cabinet minutes, I.W.C., 31 Dec. I9I8, Cab. 23/42, Public Record Office. p.194
[ 12 ]. George W. Egerton "Britain and the “Great Betrayal”: Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle For United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles,” Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (1978): p. 886
[ 13 ]. UK War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920 (London, UK, 1922), p. 234
[ 14 ]. Ibid., p. 346
[ 15 ]. Ibid., p. 347
[ 16 ]. Imperial War Cabinet minutes, p. 194
[ 17 ]. Henry Cabot Lodge and Gilbert Monell Hitchcock. 1920. "Reservations to treaty of peace with Germany."
[ 18 ]. Covenant of the League of Nations, Article X
[ 19 ]. Throntveit, p. 445

Bibliography: Covenant of the League of Nations, 1924 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp Henry Cabot Lodge, (1850-1924), and (1859-1934) Gilbert Monell Hitchcock. "Reservations to treaty of peace with Germany." (1920): 15p. LexisNexis U.S. Serial Set Digital Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed May 7, 2012). Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 1919 http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versailles.html UK War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920 (London, UK, 1922) -------------------------------------------- [ 1 ]. Woodrow Wilson and House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 1918. "Address of President of U.S. to Congress, January 8, 1918, on fourteen-point peace program." [ 2 ] [ 3 ]. Wilson "Address of President of U.S. to Congress, January 8, 1918, on fourteen-point peace program." [ 4 ] [ 13 ]. UK War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920 (London, UK, 1922), p. 234 [ 14 ] [ 17 ]. Henry Cabot Lodge and Gilbert Monell Hitchcock. 1920. "Reservations to treaty of peace with Germany." [ 18 ]