General staff’s political differences between inter-service and intra-service slowed innovation. Critics who followed military innovation during the interwar period blame the general staffs and service organizations for not appreciating the potential for reform.1 Furthermore, general staffs demonstrated their inability to agree on innovative ways with high-ranking officials and political leaders who failed to provide guidance and proper financial means. In addition, general staffs viewed a way to introduce a new concept to warfare was through the service’s school systems.2 This proved an inadequate means to introduce the new reforms and real operational units that could perform wartime missions proved successful.3 Germany and Soviet Union believed the realities that ground warfare dominated the military culture and general staff organizations.4 Due to this reality, the general staffs focused reform efforts towards the development of armored warfare, therefore limiting innovation to naval and aviation assets. In addition, the intra-service conflict among the German general staff reduced innovation between armored warfare and other ground warfare systems including the infantry, artillery and cavalry. Intra-service rivalry and politics affected aviation innovation is several …show more content…
Government domination over research centers and military technological centers created a negative environment for military innovation to thrive. As a result, political purges and repression sent talented European scientist and technologist into exile thus resulting in a decrease in innovation.6 Furthermore, Japanese armed forces leaders demanded obedience in the name of the Emperor and mobilized a submissive scientific-engineering establishment to military research through official rewards or threat of severe sanctions.7 This authoritative environment blocked creative thinking from civilian innovators and scientist trying to improve military technology. In the United States, military policy differences between military leaders and political leadership delayed innovation for the regular Army. During the time as the Army’s chief of staff, General MacArthur drafted plans for mechanization and motorization in preparation for the next war. Congress fell sympatric to these plans and due to Congress’s great interest in army contracts, the National Guard received faster motorization than the regular Army.8 This difference in one area of military reform caused significant delays to the regular Army’s wartime preparation. Navy forces also divided politicians and admirals over wartime roles.9 The Italian Navy suffered the most from