The Democratic Peace theory, known as the “democracies seldom if ever go to war against another” states simply that there is a relative absence of war between states which foster the system of democracy. This thesis has already established itself as an undeniable axiom for the US foreign policy which could be effortlessly traced in the President Clinton’s address of 1994 for the State of the Union: “Democracies don’t attack each other” and “ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.” This theory nurtures the idea that the absence of wars between democracies culminates into the maintenance of peace and security in the international scene. Yet, the concept of democratic peace, like other conspicuous concepts, entails contention; if the democratic peace theory has been valorized by proponents like Bruce Russett, John Owen and Michael Doyle; on the other side, it has not escape the extensive criticism of opponents like Christopher Layne, David Spiro, Henry Farber, Joanne Gowa, Ido Oren, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. If on one side, Russett states that the Democratic Peace Theory is “one of the strongest nontrivial of non-tautological generalizations that can be made about international relations”, on the other side, Christopher Layne counteracts it by: “in a realist world, survival and security are always at risk, and democratic states will respond no differently to democratic rivals than to non-democratic ones.” Thereby, the debate of the Democratic Peace announces more to be an inquisitive contest between realism and liberalism and this essay is going to embark in the task of framing the Democratic Peace Theory by a critical assemblage of the intricate views proposed by both the proponents and opponents of this theory.
Liberalism
According to Michael Doyle, the concept of liberalism is one of the prominent driving forces to have sustained the