A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism by Jussi Suikkanen

Philosophia (2008) 36:141–150
DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9094-4

A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism
Jussi Suikkanen

Received: 30 April 2007 / Revised: 23 July 2007 / Accepted: 7 August 2007 /
Published online: 3 October 2007
# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer the rule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions.
Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems, rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by the rule-consequentialists.
Keywords Rule-consequentialism . Rossian pluralism . Reflective equilibrium test

Introduction
It is likely that a majority of ethicists agree that a crucial test for assessing moral theories is to ask to what extent their prescriptions and permissions cohere with our carefully reflected moral convictions (see, for instance, Daniels 1979; Hooker 1996,
2000a, pp. 9–16; Rawls 1971 pp. 19–21 and pp. 46–51; Ross 1930, p. 40; and
Williams 1985, p. 94). According to this narrow reflective equilibrium test, if of two normative moral theories one coheres better with our moral convictions than the other, we should not accept the second one as the correct normative theory.1
1

This test of narrow

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