Aristotle begins his inquiry into ‘the good’ by proposing that the good is “that for the sake of which the other things are done.”2 Ends pursued for some further purpose, such as wealth, can be said to be incomplete, because they have not yet reached the final goal. And there must be some final goal, or else action would be pointless—as Aristotle points out in chapter 2, if something is not sought for its own sake, there must be some final end, otherwise all such action would “go on without limit, making desire empty and futile.”3 Surely, Aristotle argues, the good must be something complete, that is not desired for some further end. So it seems that the good is the most complete end, which is pursued wholly for itself and at which all other action aims. Aristotle claims that the most complete end is that which is “always choiceworthy in itself,”4 which is just to say that the most complete end is intrinsically valuable.
Aristotle proposes that happiness is most intrinsically valuable, a premise that most would find easy to accept, and probably chosen for that reason. He contrasts happiness with other virtues and intrinsic goods:
“Honor, pleasure, understanding and every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves, since we would choose each of them even if it had no further result, but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy.”5
This evaluation