Rawls Criticism of Plato’s Ideal City
Rawls Criticism of Plato’s Ideal City
Plato and Rawls both developed a framework for creating ideal and just societies. This paper will argue that Rawls would disagree with aspects of Plato’s society and Rawls’ criticism of Plato’s vision of a just society is persuasive. First, it will summarize Plato’s vision of a just society, the ideal city. Then, it will outline Rawls’ idea of a just society and show that Rawls criticizes Plato’s idea of rule by the guardians by arguing that man will always be self-interested, individuals should have equal opportunities, and has individual rights that should be protected. It will also assert that Rawls’ arguments against Plato’s vision are persuasive.
In Plato’s Republic, Plato claims that the ideal city should use a model of justice as harmony, because each person doing one’s own job and not interfering creates justice and keeps the city running in harmony. He states, “The result, then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of the others” (Plato 45). In saying this, he shows that he believes that separation of duties is the best way to create a just city. There are three distinct classes of people, the producers, auxiliary, and the guardians, and each class has its own singular purpose. Plato argues the guardians are the only class that is fit to rule, because they have the knowledge of the good, and can choose what is best for the city.
Rawls presents a different view of a just society, with the idea of justice as fairness. Rawls first criticism of Plato’s ideal city is that the guardians have exclusive control over the rest of the community because humans are self-interested and therefore would base political decisions on what would create the best outcome for themselves. Rawls claims that “the principle for an individual is to advance as far as possible
Plato and Rawls both developed a framework for creating ideal and just societies. This paper will argue that Rawls would disagree with aspects of Plato’s society and Rawls’ criticism of Plato’s vision of a just society is persuasive. First, it will summarize Plato’s vision of a just society, the ideal city. Then, it will outline Rawls’ idea of a just society and show that Rawls criticizes Plato’s idea of rule by the guardians by arguing that man will always be self-interested, individuals should have equal opportunities, and has individual rights that should be protected. It will also assert that Rawls’ arguments against Plato’s vision are persuasive.
In Plato’s Republic, Plato claims that the ideal city should use a model of justice as harmony, because each person doing one’s own job and not interfering creates justice and keeps the city running in harmony. He states, “The result, then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of the others” (Plato 45). In saying this, he shows that he believes that separation of duties is the best way to create a just city. There are three distinct classes of people, the producers, auxiliary, and the guardians, and each class has its own singular purpose. Plato argues the guardians are the only class that is fit to rule, because they have the knowledge of the good, and can choose what is best for the city.
Rawls presents a different view of a just society, with the idea of justice as fairness. Rawls first criticism of Plato’s ideal city is that the guardians have exclusive control over the rest of the community because humans are self-interested and therefore would base political decisions on what would create the best outcome for themselves. Rawls claims that “the principle for an individual is to advance as far as possible
Cited: Plato. The Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Rev, C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Original Edition. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971.