Study Program
Forensic psychology has made unique contributions to risk assessment with respect to the potential for violence and dangerousness, the accuracy of eye witness testimony, the dimensions and assessment of legal competency
According to Krauss, Liberman, & Olson, the Texas dealth penalty case Barefoot v. Estelle showed that jurors are more influenced by less scientific clinical expert testimony, and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony. By applying cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) to juror decision-making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for the findings (Krauss, Liberman, & Olson, 2004). Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing (Krauss, Liberman, & Olson, 2004). According to this article, consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed thoroughly.
At issue in the Barefoot case were the pronouncements of a prosecution psychiatrist who did not interview the defendant, but believed that there was ‘‘100% and absolute chance’’ that the defendant would still end up being dangerous. According to Krauss, Liberman, & Olson this testimony was said to be constitutional by the court even though the existing studies of mental professionals’ ability to predict dangerousness suggested that these predictions were wrong two out of three times. A number of studies have showed that jurors’ final decisions are strongly influenced by expert psychological testimony when it is presented on a variety of psycho-legal issues from the inaccuracy of eyewitness identification.
According to Krauss, Liberman, & Olson, the Texas dealth penalty case Barefoot v. Estelle showed that jurors are more influenced by less scientific clinical expert testimony, and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony. By applying cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) to juror decision-making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for the findings (Krauss, Liberman, & Olson, 2004). Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing (Krauss, Liberman, & Olson, 2004). According to this article, consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed thoroughly.
At issue in the Barefoot case were the pronouncements of a prosecution psychiatrist who did not interview the defendant, but believed that there was ‘‘100% and absolute chance’’ that the defendant would still end up being dangerous. According to Krauss, Liberman, & Olson this testimony was said to be constitutional by the court even though the existing studies of mental professionals’ ability to predict dangerousness suggested that these predictions were wrong two out of three times. A number of studies have showed that jurors’ final decisions are strongly influenced by expert psychological testimony when it is presented on a variety of psycho-legal issues from the inaccuracy of eyewitness identification.