The Impact of Ownership Structure on the Dividend Policy of Japanese Firms with Free Cash Flow Problem Aristotelis Stouraitis Lingling Wu Department of Economics and Finance City University of Hong Kong September 16‚ 2004 * Contact information: Aristotelis Stouraitis (the author who will attend the conference and present the paper)‚ Tel: (852) 2788 8450‚ Fax: (852)2788 8806‚ Email: efstoura@cityu.edu.hk. Lingling Wu‚ Tel: (852)2788 7393‚ Email: 50004340@student.cityu.edu.hk. Address : Department
Premium Dividend Dividend yield Principal-agent problem
Managers are hired to act on behalf of the shareholders of a firm. However‚ this is not always the case as both parties have different objectives. The difference in interests between shareholders and managers ‘derives from the separation of ownership and control in a corporation’ (Berk and DeMarzo‚ 2011: 921). Whereas shareholders are interested in maximising their own wealth‚ managers may have more personal interests which differ to that of the shareholders. Downs and Monsen (no date‚ cited in Chin
Premium Management Corporate governance Stock
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/0307-4358.htm MF 39‚4 Ownership structure‚ capital structure‚ and performance of group affiliation 404 Evidence from Taiwanese group-affiliated firms Received 25 December 2011 Revised 13 September 2012 18 December 2012 Accepted 18 December 2012 Jonchi Shyu Department of Business Administration‚ National Taiwan University of Science and Technology‚ Taiwan‚ Republic of China Abstract
Premium Capital structure Principal-agent problem Financial ratios
ARTICLE IN PRESS Journal of Accounting and Economics 43 (2007) 69–93 www.elsevier.com/locate/jae Executive compensation and capital structure: The effects of convertible debt and straight debt on CEO pay$ Hernan Ortiz-Molinaà Sauder School of Business‚ The University of British Columbia‚ 2053 Main Mall‚ Vancouver‚ BC‚ Canada V6T 1Z2 Received 4 April 2005; received in revised form 22 September 2006; accepted 28 September 2006 Available online 16 November 2006 Abstract I examine how CEO
Premium Bond Principal-agent problem Corporate finance
ACCA Paper P1 Professional accountant Essential text British library cataloguinginpublication data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Published by: Kaplan Publishing UK Unit 2 The Business Centre Molly Millars Lane Wokingham Berkshire RG41 2QZ ISBN 9781847107558 © Kaplan Financial Limited‚ 2009 The text in this material and any others made available by any Kaplan Group company does not amount to advice o
Premium Stock Corporate governance Governance
the agency problems disappears. Therefore‚ we conclude that the incentive effects dominate the agency problems in determining the cost of capital. Well-designed executive compensation can mitigate both agency problems. 1. Introduction The principal-agent relationship has several potential problems in corporate management that so-called agency problems. Due to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers‚ shareholders need to pay substantial costs to alleviate these problems‚ such
Premium Rate of return Cash flow Principal-agent problem
insurance companies. Although there are many side benefits of pursuing such growth strategy like dispersion of the entrepreneurs’ financial risk and gains from the specialised human capital of managers‚ there remains a significant problem: the principle-agent problem. While this problem is largely believed to be a phenomena belonging to transition economies‚ it concerns all economies as it directly affects access to capital hence the performance of businesses. The UK‚ US‚ Germany and Japan demonstrate some
Premium Principal-agent problem Economics Governance
relationship between company and stakeholders Agency theory A contract under which one or more person engage another person or persons to perform some service on their behalf Agency problem rise because of the conflict of interest between principle and agent Three specific problems: Managers try to maximize their wealth at the expense of shareholders Tendency for management to focus on short-term performance Different attitude of managers and shareholders towards risk Corporate governance structures
Premium Corporate governance Governance Principal-agent problem
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics ISSN 1450-2887 Issue 80 (2011) © EuroJournals Publishing‚ Inc. 2011 http://www.internationalresearchjournaloffinanceandeconomics.com An Empirical Study on the Determinants of Dividend Policy in the UK Badar Khalid Al Shabibi Faculty‚ Accounting & Finance‚ Department of Business Studies Ibra College of Technology‚ Sultanate of Oman E-mail: baderkh14@hotmail.com Tel: +968-95142254; Fax: +968-25587950 G Ramesh Faculty‚ Accounting & Finance
Premium Corporate governance Big Four auditors Corporate finance
CENTRE FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND FOUNDATION STUDIES Pre-sessional EAP Programme 2013 RESEARCH WRITING Final Draft Cover Page STUDENT NUMBER STUDENT NAME TUTOR NAME TITLE WORD COUNT I confirm that the material in this assignment is my own work and has not been submitted for any other course of study. I further declare that all source material used in its preparation has been acknowledged appropriately. I also confirm that I have kept a copy of this
Premium Principal-agent problem Management