2360: Does NATO Have A Future?

word cound: 2360

Does NATO have a future?

Lately the question about the future of NATO arises more often in media and articles on foreign policy and international security. It is a question about its future "in general" - as the inquiry into the reasons for NATO’s existence in the modern world and the future "in detail", which is a problem for relevance of NATO member states. This last point is referring to the wider NATO mission – to make the classic function of collective defense and expeditionary new tasks undertaken at the end of the Cold War. Constant reflection on the condition of NATO is needed. It is fundamental for the security of the Member States and the stability of their environment to
verify the value and quality of the alliance. Questions about the future of NATO are invariably imposed since 1949. In the opinion of many, it was not right to appear as a real being.
After all this alliance joint the states located on both sides of the Atlantic, experienced in a different ways by the Communist bloc countries, with varied military potentials, political power, aspirations and sensitivities of their populations on military affairs. Subsequent disputes and internal crises of which NATO had plenty in its history were like a living proof that alliance cannot go on. Former NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak, when asked for it as an existential threat to NATO, aptly acknowledged that “for the alliance of free and democratic states dispute is only the evidence of its life and the confirmation of the fact that NATO is just doing its job.
The reflection on this thought is very important today and it does not take in order to downplay or diminish the contemporary challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance, but it is reminding of its role. It is a voluntary commitment of Member States to co-decide on what they have in common.
This quick lesson in real politic alliance, does not praise for the relativization of mutual obligations, but notes that they function in the real world. This world is defined by both the needs and opportunities, as well as existing constraints. It is exactly for their overcome the Atlantic Alliance has developed unprecedented instruments of military consultation and cooperation.
The sum of weakness in the real world does never create strength. Still, the source of strength is to overcome weakness by intelligent co-operation, solidarity, joining the military capabilities and political consensus to act boldly - where there is such a need and this is the will. In the case of NATO, by submitting together the abilities of Europe and America this power has not precedence in history and it is lacking a good alternative for the future. We want to keep it as the greatest, but regardless of how we perceive it; the very existence of NATO is a strategic resource for the Member States. It forces potential opponents thinking about attack to change their calculations. They must take into account in their plans, that any conflict with NATO state is unprofitable, the price will be high, and the scale cannot be maintained in the low-intensity rigors. One may ask: how come we have confidence that mutual guarantee mechanism will work that way, however it is well known that the prudent planner and strategist must assume that this was going to happen and as a result refrain from evil intentions. This mechanism is effective from 63 years and so it is worth to work persistently to preserve that credibility in the future.
One researcher at the beginning of the era of post-Cold War compared NATO to the renowned theater that never gave the show. But craftsmanship acquired in the course of testing and improving the garage meant that no one would challenge his reputation. Using theater parallel, public is now richer for the experience of several allied "performances". They solved the dilemma in post-Cold War questions: “Whether the alliance will have no clear reason for being designated an enemy?”, “Is NATO able to adapt to the uncertain world of multidimensional risks arising outside the North Atlantic region?”, and finally: “Will ambitiously integrating Europe need guarantees and military presence of the United States?”
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, in the airspace of Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea, not only NATO has proved its usefulness, but simply - necessity. It was in fact the only international actor able to support his statement, made in the spirit of a credible military force factor.
It has also opened new areas of cooperation, extending from combat terrorism sources, by removing the effects of natural disasters and reassuring energy security. Moreover it launched a partnership with a large number of countries in the world.
NATO is not looking for the enemy and does not refer to any of hostility. This also applies to Russia, with which the alliance is trying to develop a framework for strategic cooperation for almost two decades now. So far, no breakthrough and understanding of the other side, but not without a slow moving forward. If all of this would be evidence of the weakness of NATO, I wonder how else we can define its strength. Part of the problem stems from the perception that, in today 's world of rapid tabloid analysis and television’s surveys every argument and every such argument may well serve any of the contending parties. One of the examples might be the NATO operation in Libya. It has realized its objectives. Realistically showed correlation ally, the importance of U.S. military capabilities and the directions in which the European allies should develop its military capabilities. Objectively also accelerated decisions and demonstrated the need rational approach to building defense capabilities. Alliance calls it "smart defense", and the European Union "pooling and sharing". In any case, it means "more cooperation" and "more solidarity."
For critics of the NATO operation in Libya, however, has become the ultimate proof of the alliance 's failure, military collapse of its European part and military exposure of U.S. role. One of the journalists compared the situation to Snow White, to who’s skirt kept clutching on 27 dwarfs. Such a Cassandrian visions have been heard before. For example during the task of stabilizing Afghanistan, some analysts put up the terms straight from Hamlet “to be or not to be”. It was the voice of Polish member of The Madeline Albright Group during the preparation of this report prior to the Lisbon NATO strategic concept that restore the right balance and the adequate provision of Afghanistan as a NATO task, and not only focused on finding his raison d 'etre.
The extreme voices on the future of NATO are not missing. It should be sought in these conditions for constructive action - so common, as well as at the national level.
If anyone would doubt why in Poland they realize their ambitious plans for modernization, which is supported by the President and the Prime Minister, one should remember that the essence of the alliance included in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, takes its origins in the work of national described by Article 3 of this very document. The relationship of these records is to some simplification that if state is expecting help from others, it should first do everything it can to ensure a proper defense. Therefore, by making its own, it is worth analyzing what they are doing in this case our allies.
Thinking about the future of NATO you must get rid of demotivating prospects of decline and fall. Not in the name of the official optimism, but well understood and allied national interest. Prior to this year 's May NATO summit in Chicago, editor of The Foreign Policy magazine asked 57 prominent politicians from NATO countries, how they see its future. Their answers are very entertaining. On the question of whether NATO should continue to exist and whether it should be kept U.S. involvement in Europe, all of the respondents answered yes. But the question of what should be its main tasks divided respondents: 14 pointed to collective defense, 2 on out-of-area missions, no one pointed out the global military missions and guarding Russia, 31 postulated combinations of multiple functions, and 13 other issues. The results of this survey in combination with the results of the summit in Chicago strengthen optimistic approach to the future of NATO. Challenges facing it, in my opinion, show two types of issues which the allies will have to face. Firstly, to what type and scale of the tasks in the future use NATO – after all this is not a universal means of any problems in the world. Secondly, what kind of abilities should alliance have to missions in the foreseeable to remain credible, and how to build the desired capacity? The Alliance was created in order to defend its members. Its other functions, as indicated by the NATO Strategic Concept of 2010, to respond to crises and cooperate with partner countries, are designed to achieve the main objective.
Individual allies attach to these features a different weight.
Those, whose position is away from areas where traditional threats may originate, are mainly interested in the stabilization, often far from their own borders. Others want more assurance that the NATO responses to the challenges in their environment will be able to defend them. Therefore, the question of how to find the right balance of these tasks seems to be important today. This applies not only to military direction and political attention, but also a decision aggravating always limited resources. This should be added that the decision pointing to one type of action sometimes affect the availability of funds for others. Even, not always the dilemma is so sharply defined, it is always worth
considering.
NATO’s members have one set of forces, one budget and different needs. So they need to meet them to flowing thus became the guarantee balance and allied source of confidence, which in turn created the political will to support its current mission. NATO also needs strength and resources necessary to conduct high intensity and scale. It is crucial to note that this capability can also be useful for stabilization, far from the territory of the Alliance. Also solicit funds for co-financing of its military infrastructure of importance to collective defense. The idea is that the state was able to take in its own territory assistance from other NATO members. It can also be used to conduct expeditionary missions. Finally, it is necessary that requirements of collective defense were included in the allied training and political exercises.
From this perspective Summit in Chicago came out to meet the members’ expectations. It confirms the collective defense of NATO as an essential function, and made recommendations for further development of defense capabilities, indicating among others the initiatives and tasks on which we depend. For example, the development of interoperability between allied forces, whether regular exercise also allows test scenarios related to collective defense.
Another issue is the effectiveness of NATO 's military. The economic crisis in Europe caused a reduction in the defense budget, along with the allied military capabilities. This applies to both the tasks of collective defense and expeditionary missions. Poland with an increasing of real spending on defense, including the modernization of the armed forces is positive exception in Europe. The key to stop the effects of the reduction in defense spending will be multinational cooperation initiatives like Smart Defense. However, they cannot serve as a pretext for further cuts, or watered down commitments in complex procedures that prevent, or slow down the action. It will also need to encourage the use of jointly acquired the ability, or lending them to other allies
It must be always remembered that the rational approach to multi-national defense capacity building is an art, not a science. Solutions in this matter must fall within the priority needs of Member States, NATO and the EU should work closely together. No less important is to preserve the life of the transatlantic relationship, both politically and militarily. The increasing involvement of the United States in other parts of the world creates the temptation to relax. Therefore less (of U.S. troops in Europe) must mean more effective efforts to achieve interoperability of forces, including exercises and training, and more regional benefit resulting from their presence.
The other side of this process is the development of military capabilities of European countries. Although difficult in the current budget realities, it is necessary to raise the profile of the European Union and the maintenance of the international political and military ties with the United States. The outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recalled this in his farewell address, and the truth of his words confirmed the operational activities of NATO: “In the world of today 's challenges, I am confident about the future of NATO. What it will be depends on the Member States, their ability to combine resources, the wise management of resources, sourcing partners in support of the allied mission in making sense strategy, and perhaps also reduce global ambitions”.
In 2014, NATO will change the tasks carried out in Afghanistan, and significantly reduce the number of its troops in the country. So perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that we will have less and be able to do more, not only in Afghanistan. This is an important call for realism allied strategy. To reduce global ambitions does not mean less global relevance of NATO, especially its usefulness for the Member States. Today 's NATO is not, as the Americans like to say, "Alliance from the times of our fathers," that is in default, it used to be better. However, it is able to make its members safe, protect their growth, save the lives of innocent people threatened by the bloody satraps and make Europe safer and augment its partners.
There is no and will not be in the foreseeable future, an alternative to NATO, capable of ensuring military capabilities for difficult operations.
Let us not forget that it is still attractive for countries striving to join the Alliance. The enlargement process is not complete organization. Thinking about the future of NATO it is crucial to have of all these things in mind.

Bibliography:

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