It is not very often that we can attribute a project failure directly to a culture that management has tried to change but for political reasons finds it impossible to do so. The project failure at Airbus is one such example.
Airbus
When Airbus was founded in 1970 two major objectives prevailed. The first was to create a consortium of existing companies whose facilities had been scattered at sixteen sites in four European countries including France, Germany, Britain, and Spain.
The second was to transform these existing companies into a modern and integrated organization capable of competing more effectively with American companies that included such giants as Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed. Today, the only two surviving commercial aircraft companies are Airbus and Boeing. Airbus now employs about 57,000 people
While this strategy did bringing sixteen organizations together, these disparate business units had trouble functioning as an integrated organization from the very beginning. Even by 2001, it was still seen as a loosely knit organization. A Financial Times article argued that the retention of production and engineering assets by the separate partner companies made Airbus nothing more than a “sales and marketing company” (Kevin, Survey “Europe Reinvented: Airbus has come of age.” Financial Times, February 2, 2001). An article in Aviation Week and Technology contended that while the companies collaborated on design they were unwilling to share financial data and sought to maximize the prices for the goods they provided to other business units in the consortium (Sparaco, Pierre, “Climate Conducive for Airbus Consolidation”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 19, 2001). Unfortunately, there was little evidence that the goals and objectives of the consortium had been met.
Airbus Prepares for the A380
In 2000 Airbus undertook its most ambitious project ever, the A380. It was to be an aircraft designed to usher in a new era