President Hindenburg appointed Hitler to the post of Chancellor in January 1933. Hitler then moved quickly to consolidate his power and turn Germany in to a single party state. It is undeniable that Nazi ideology appealed to a significant number of the German population and that Hitler, a skilful orator, was able to rally the masses to the Nazi banner. However, Hitler still only rose to power as he was able to capitalise on favourable circumstances and was willing to jettison certain aspects of early Nazi policy to appeal to a broader base. Many Germans, still smarting from the many humiliations of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and reeling from the effects of the Great Depression, were happy to see the Weimar Republic fall. Thus, we can see that it was by a combination of some popular promises, personal appeal and clever seizure of favourable circumstance that Hitler rose to power. Kershaw has argued that there was a profound cultural crisis building upon a deep-seated feeling of national humiliation which came to the fore in the depression years and that Hitler gained increasing support for his vision as people lost faith in democracy
Despite being driven by his ideology Hitler was willing to be pragmatic in his rise to power if it would suit his long term goals
After the failure of the Beerhall Putsch, November 1923, Hitler decided to pursue power by legal(ish) means
Hitler, it would be necessary to “hold our noses and enter the Reichstag alongside Marxist and Catholic deputies”
Hitler retreated from earlier socialist policies, as contained in the 25 points and espoused by Nazis such as the Strasser brothers, to appeal to middle class interests, putting increased emphasis on the nationalist elements of his programme
However, Hitler was not, as in the classic Marxist interpretation, simply the tool of capitalist interests
As Mason has shown, business interests took a backseat to wider ideological goals
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