An Era of Naval Disarmament: the 1922 Five Power Treaty
An Era of Naval Disarmament:
The 1922 Five Power Treaty
The Five Power Treaty of 1922 ended the race of naval armament when it was signed on 6 February 1922. The fundamentals of the treaty were an agreement to get rid of a large number of battleships and cruisers as well as to create a ten-year period in which the signatory powers would build no new capital ships. President Warren G. Harding sent a formal invitation on 11 August 1921 to Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and France which had objectives for an international naval conference. The two main objectives were distinct, including limiting armament and answering Pacific and Far Eastern questions, namely an increasingly militant Japan. There were also economic concerns, as delegates had to please the legislators who were unwilling to spend more on shipbuilding. The ideology adhered to the American policy of negotiating at conferences, which would have worldwide repercussions. President Harding had faith in the long lasting effects of the treaty. “This conference has wrought a truly great achievement…[it] will mark the beginning of a new and better epoch in human progress.” His faith was warranted at the time, but due to the all-encompassing nature of the treaty there were a few unpredictable consequences. In actuality, the treaty not only affected the naval doctrine of U.S. forces over the next few decades, but also strategy in World War II.
In 1917, disposing of Germany’s Pacific empire was a major source of friction between the countries involved in World War I. As the countries contemplated a German loss, covert agreements were made that only amplified the pressure. “Britain secretly agreed in 1917 to support Japan’s claims to German islands…in return for Japanese support of the British empire’s acquisition of Germany’s much smaller south Pacific holdings.” The agreement was not a secret as time passed, but it was not intensely publicized. Nevertheless, it increased international tensions
The 1922 Five Power Treaty
The Five Power Treaty of 1922 ended the race of naval armament when it was signed on 6 February 1922. The fundamentals of the treaty were an agreement to get rid of a large number of battleships and cruisers as well as to create a ten-year period in which the signatory powers would build no new capital ships. President Warren G. Harding sent a formal invitation on 11 August 1921 to Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and France which had objectives for an international naval conference. The two main objectives were distinct, including limiting armament and answering Pacific and Far Eastern questions, namely an increasingly militant Japan. There were also economic concerns, as delegates had to please the legislators who were unwilling to spend more on shipbuilding. The ideology adhered to the American policy of negotiating at conferences, which would have worldwide repercussions. President Harding had faith in the long lasting effects of the treaty. “This conference has wrought a truly great achievement…[it] will mark the beginning of a new and better epoch in human progress.” His faith was warranted at the time, but due to the all-encompassing nature of the treaty there were a few unpredictable consequences. In actuality, the treaty not only affected the naval doctrine of U.S. forces over the next few decades, but also strategy in World War II.
In 1917, disposing of Germany’s Pacific empire was a major source of friction between the countries involved in World War I. As the countries contemplated a German loss, covert agreements were made that only amplified the pressure. “Britain secretly agreed in 1917 to support Japan’s claims to German islands…in return for Japanese support of the British empire’s acquisition of Germany’s much smaller south Pacific holdings.” The agreement was not a secret as time passed, but it was not intensely publicized. Nevertheless, it increased international tensions
Cited: Andrade Jr., Ernest. “The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922-1936,” Military Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 113-120. Braisted, William. The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971). Dingman, Roger. Power in the Pacific : the origins of naval arms limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). Holcombe, Arthur. “The Future of the Washington Conference Treaties,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jun 1932), pp. 439-451. Love, Robert. History of the U.S. Navy (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1992). Love, Robert. The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980). Vinson, J. Chal. “Parchment Peace: The Senate Defense of the Four-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Sep 1952), pp. 303-313. Wheeler, Gerald. Prelude to Pearl Harbor; the United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1963). Wright, Quincy. “Notes on International Affairs,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1922), pp. 285-293.