Analysis Of Original Trial In R V. Stone And Dobinson

Original Trial
In R v. Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 Q.B. 354, the verdict of manslaughter, and its upholding on appeal, is well justified by the facts. In the trial, there was no dispute that the actions of the defendants resulted in Fanny Stone’s death – she was unable to care for herself, and they neglected to care for her – constituting actus reus. However, there was a question of their duty of care for her, and therefore whether their inaction to care for her constituted mens rea for the crime. It was considered that they did, as they were her closest relatives, knew about her condition and tried, half-heartedly, to help her. Their dismissal of Fanny’s need for their care was reprehensible and constituted reckless negligence on their part,
However, as Justice Geoffrey Lane of the Court of Appeal said, Fanny was a blood relative of Stone’s; this alone suggests a reasonable expectation of some duty of care for Fanny to fall on the defendants; but also as Dobinson attempted, unsuccessfully, to wash and feed Fanny they had accepted responsibility for her care and considered her welfare at the time. At the time of the trial and appeal, duty of care was established by the neighbour principle of Donoghue V. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, wherein Lord Atkin established that there is an inherent duty to not do anything “which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour”, a neighbour being anyone close enough that they could be foreseen to be affected. By this test it’s clear that Stone and Dobinson have a duty of care over Fanny, whose refusal to take adequate nourishment should have been a cause for concern, as they were aware of her condition and inability to care for herself, and by their inaction as her closest relatives, landlords and essentially her carers, they could reasonably foresee that her health and wellbeing would be in serious
The defence refers to R v. Lowe [1973] Q.B. 702, in which Phillimore L.J. stated that it was questionable that an omission “which is wilful solely in the sense that it is not inadvertent” should be considered grounds to convict when someone dies as a result of the person not foreseeing the possible consequences of that omission. The defence argued that this was valid in this case as Stone and Dobinson’s inaction, while not due to inadvertence, was also not intended by them to cause her death. The court rightly dismissed this argument as they believed it was only intended as guidance to ensure a high degree of recklessness occurred, not an intention to harm. Unless the defence could have argued that Stone and Dobinson were of low enough intelligence that they would not have been able to foresee Fanny’s death, this argument is a misrepresentation of the defendants’ wilfulness in disregarding Fanny’s