Are Constructivist Criticisms on Realism Justified
Are constructivist criticisms on realism justified?
Introduction
In this essay, I will argue that constructivist criticisms on realism are justified, provided that the alternative procedural decision making process that constructivists offer seems plausible. I will argue for this by showing that not only arguments derived from is/ought problem, but also practical problems justify the criticisms constructivist have towards realism.
First of all, one viewpoint that realists and constructivists have in common is, whether moral concepts have truth values. They both hold that moral concepts are truth-apt, so that question is not further analysed in this essay. However, realists and constructivist do not agree on what the function of moral concepts is and what makes moral concepts true. Realists would advocate that moral concepts may have truth values, because moral concepts describe or refer to normative entities or facts that exist independently of those concepts themselves (Korsgaard 2009:302). Metaethical constructivists would argue against the view that all that moral concepts are for, is to describe the reality. Constructivism may be understood as the alternative view that the function of a normative concept is to refer schematically to the solution to a practical problem. A constructivist account of a concept, unlike a traditional analysis, is an attempt to work out the solution to that problem (Korsgaard 2009:302).
So, the main difference between realist and constructivist approaches is the nature of moral concepts. Constructivist criticism revolves therefore mainly around the realist idea that the function of moral concepts is to describe the reality. But added to that, there are some practical criticisms against realist views as well. One question is, which theory describes the moral decision making process better – realism on constructivism. Another is, whether the criticisms one view has against the other are justified. The last, I am going to
Introduction
In this essay, I will argue that constructivist criticisms on realism are justified, provided that the alternative procedural decision making process that constructivists offer seems plausible. I will argue for this by showing that not only arguments derived from is/ought problem, but also practical problems justify the criticisms constructivist have towards realism.
First of all, one viewpoint that realists and constructivists have in common is, whether moral concepts have truth values. They both hold that moral concepts are truth-apt, so that question is not further analysed in this essay. However, realists and constructivist do not agree on what the function of moral concepts is and what makes moral concepts true. Realists would advocate that moral concepts may have truth values, because moral concepts describe or refer to normative entities or facts that exist independently of those concepts themselves (Korsgaard 2009:302). Metaethical constructivists would argue against the view that all that moral concepts are for, is to describe the reality. Constructivism may be understood as the alternative view that the function of a normative concept is to refer schematically to the solution to a practical problem. A constructivist account of a concept, unlike a traditional analysis, is an attempt to work out the solution to that problem (Korsgaard 2009:302).
So, the main difference between realist and constructivist approaches is the nature of moral concepts. Constructivist criticism revolves therefore mainly around the realist idea that the function of moral concepts is to describe the reality. But added to that, there are some practical criticisms against realist views as well. One question is, which theory describes the moral decision making process better – realism on constructivism. Another is, whether the criticisms one view has against the other are justified. The last, I am going to
Bibliography: 1. Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/constructivism-metaethics/ 19.12.2012 2. Korsgaard, C. M “The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology”, Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009. 3. Shafer-Landau, R. “The Constructivist Challenge” in “Moral Realism: A Defence”, chapter 2, Oxford University Press: 2003. 4. Street, Sharon “What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?” Philosophy Compass, vol 4, 2009. ----------------------- [1] Referred through: Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/constructivism-metaethics/ 19.12.2012. [2] Referenced through Shafer-Landau 2003:46.