Arguments Against Endurantist Essay
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Against Objects
In arguing against the endurantist’s theory of reality—that is, the idea that objects are wholly present and only present in the ‘now’—a bold conclusion is made: that the endurantist contradicts himself in believing an object that has changed is identical to itself in a time before it had changed. The argument is this: endurantists believe that every object is numerically identical to (is the same as) itself at every point in time during its ‘object-hood’ or lifespan. For example, a piano is the same object now as it will be ten years from now. However, if this is true, then it is also true that an object is numerically identical to itself minus a particular part of itself, regardless of the time at which the object is compared to itself—imagine the piano with a missing key. Fair enough, says the anti-endurantist, but if an object is numerically identical to itself, then it must possess all the same properties at both of the points in time being compared. However, an object lacking a part of itself would necessarily …show more content…
have different properties than itself plus its missing part; thus, the argument produces a contradiction between being numerically identical, and not being numerically identical. Although this is a valid argument, it rests on a number of implied assumptions, many of which may not be true.
Yet, there is one assumption among them that is fundamental to a metaphysical view of all objects—that is, that the piano is itself a single, complete object. However, this is a category mistake, one that is likely due to our natural way of thinking about objects. When we think of other persons, things, or places, we instinctively refer to one name: the name of the person, the place, or the thing being referenced. Yet, these nouns are all made up of smaller parts, and by thinking of them only as singular objects we fail to see that there is, in fact, no particular part of the object that we can call “The Piano.” It is only by thinking of the entire collection of parts that make the object do we so name it “The Piano,” and our doing so is only logically sufficient as a nickname—to attempt to use this nickname to think of the object as an independent, indivisible identity, is the category mistake.
So, in the case of the piano, while it is true that the piano with the key and the piano without the key are not identical when compared part-for-part, it would be erroneous to think that the pianos are objects that can be subject to this kind of critique; since we can make any sort of distinction we please by merely calling a particular collection of matter a piano, we can exclude or include anything we want, since our reference, the piano, was never a static, immutable object to begin with—its persistence through time is only imagined, not actual.
Therefore, if we really want to make such an argument against the endurantist, we must look down to the most basic, indivisible parts that cannot be liberally assigned a nickname, since only they are truly objects: the piano has a limited lifespan, but the matter that makes it up is eternally present, both before and after the lifespan of the superficial thing we call “The
Piano.” For the sake of a more consistent stance that is not particularly subject to unpredictable implications, we might consider the atom as the basic building block that we can define as an actual object (although this too is a simplification, used to make such a theory more understandable at the cost of being totally precise). Atoms and the matter that compose them can be followed in important ways that the piano cannot be; first, atoms cannot practically be divided into further parts; second, atoms do persist over time such that if we were all-knowing, we could follow their lifespans throughout all of time; and finally, atoms are the very objects that make up the piano—to attempt to conceive of the piano independently from the atoms that compose it is impossible. Thus, when thinking of concrete particulars, we should remember that such things are easily subject to oddities such as the anti-endurantist argument enumerated above, not necessarily because of something that is wrong with the theory itself, but rather quite possibly because of the imprecise ways that we are used to thinking about such things.
Against Objects
In arguing against the endurantist’s theory of reality—that is, the idea that objects are wholly present and only present in the ‘now’—a bold conclusion is made: that the endurantist contradicts himself in believing an object that has changed is identical to itself in a time before it had changed. The argument is this: endurantists believe that every object is numerically identical to (is the same as) itself at every point in time during its ‘object-hood’ or lifespan. For example, a piano is the same object now as it will be ten years from now. However, if this is true, then it is also true that an object is numerically identical to itself minus a particular part of itself, regardless of the time at which the object is compared to itself—imagine the piano with a missing key. Fair enough, says the anti-endurantist, but if an object is numerically identical to itself, then it must possess all the same properties at both of the points in time being compared. However, an object lacking a part of itself would necessarily …show more content…
have different properties than itself plus its missing part; thus, the argument produces a contradiction between being numerically identical, and not being numerically identical. Although this is a valid argument, it rests on a number of implied assumptions, many of which may not be true.
Yet, there is one assumption among them that is fundamental to a metaphysical view of all objects—that is, that the piano is itself a single, complete object. However, this is a category mistake, one that is likely due to our natural way of thinking about objects. When we think of other persons, things, or places, we instinctively refer to one name: the name of the person, the place, or the thing being referenced. Yet, these nouns are all made up of smaller parts, and by thinking of them only as singular objects we fail to see that there is, in fact, no particular part of the object that we can call “The Piano.” It is only by thinking of the entire collection of parts that make the object do we so name it “The Piano,” and our doing so is only logically sufficient as a nickname—to attempt to use this nickname to think of the object as an independent, indivisible identity, is the category mistake.
So, in the case of the piano, while it is true that the piano with the key and the piano without the key are not identical when compared part-for-part, it would be erroneous to think that the pianos are objects that can be subject to this kind of critique; since we can make any sort of distinction we please by merely calling a particular collection of matter a piano, we can exclude or include anything we want, since our reference, the piano, was never a static, immutable object to begin with—its persistence through time is only imagined, not actual.
Therefore, if we really want to make such an argument against the endurantist, we must look down to the most basic, indivisible parts that cannot be liberally assigned a nickname, since only they are truly objects: the piano has a limited lifespan, but the matter that makes it up is eternally present, both before and after the lifespan of the superficial thing we call “The
Piano.” For the sake of a more consistent stance that is not particularly subject to unpredictable implications, we might consider the atom as the basic building block that we can define as an actual object (although this too is a simplification, used to make such a theory more understandable at the cost of being totally precise). Atoms and the matter that compose them can be followed in important ways that the piano cannot be; first, atoms cannot practically be divided into further parts; second, atoms do persist over time such that if we were all-knowing, we could follow their lifespans throughout all of time; and finally, atoms are the very objects that make up the piano—to attempt to conceive of the piano independently from the atoms that compose it is impossible. Thus, when thinking of concrete particulars, we should remember that such things are easily subject to oddities such as the anti-endurantist argument enumerated above, not necessarily because of something that is wrong with the theory itself, but rather quite possibly because of the imprecise ways that we are used to thinking about such things.