Aristotle's View on the Nature of Human Life: Is It Correct?

Is life really about the 'money', the 'cash', the 'hoes', who has the biggest gold chain or who drives the shiniest or fastest car, who sells the most albums or who has the most respect? Aristotle challenges views, which are similar to the ones held and shown by rap artists such as Jay-Z and the Notorious B.I.G., by observing that everything in the universe, including humans, has a telos, or goal in life. He states that the goal of a human life is to achieve happiness or eudaimonia. I believe that Aristotle is completely correct in his reasoning of the purpose of human nature. He even explains how happiness is different for every person, and each different type of person has a different idea of eudaimonia. He then goes on to talk about how a person must do all things in moderation, not doing the excess but at the same time doing just enough. This idea, called the "golden mean of moderation" was the backbone support to Aristotle's idea of human telos because it concluded that living a virtuous life must be the same for all people because of the way human beings are built.<br><br>Aristotle argued that the goal of human beings is happiness, and that we achieve happiness when we fulfill our function. Therefore, it is necessary to determine what our function is. The function of a thing, or its telos, is what it alone can do, or what it can do best. Like the function of the eye is to see, Aristotle declared the human being as the "rational animal" whose function is to reason. Thus, according to Aristotle, a happy life for human beings is a life governed by reason. <br><br>Aristotle believed that a person who has difficulty behaving ethically is morally imperfect. His ideal person practices the "golden mean of moderation." He believed that this moral virtue, of which happiness comes from, is a matter of avoiding extremes in behavior and finding the mean between them. Aristotle conceives happiness not primarily as an exercise of virtue in private or with friends, but as