Asif is liable for theft. This can be seen in the Theft Act 1968 amended by Theft Act 1978. Under s.1 (1) Theft Act 1968, ‘A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it.’ However the Actus reus and the Mens rea have to be taken into account when dealing with Theft. The Actus reus is appropriating property belonging to another. The Mens rea is dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive. In this case Asif commits the actus reus by appropriating the property but does not have the mens rea, as he is confident that he will be able to replace it without his colleague noticing.
In s.3 Theft Act 1968, it states, ‘any assumption of the …show more content…
rights of the owner amounts to an appropriation.’ To show there has been appropriation something must be taken, destroyed, used in an unauthorised way, offered for sale, sold, refused to be returned. Assuming any one of these rights is enough for appropriation, we can see this in case examples. R v Morris (1984) the defendant had taken some goods from a supermarket shelf and substituted lower price labels. He then went to the checkout desk, paid the lower price and was arrested. The House of Lords decided that they had assumed at least one of the rights of the real owners of the store by switching the labels on the goods and this action was sufficient to amount to an appropriation. The rule therefore is ‘assuming any one of the owners’ rights is sufficient to amount to appropriation’. This will include damaging, selling, keeping or destroying the property.
In the case Gomez (1993) we can see at what point appropriation takes place. Gomez worked at an electrical goods shop. His friend asked him to supply goods for stolen cheques. The Manager asked Gomez to confirm with the bank that the cheque was acceptable. He told the Manager that he did it but he didn’t. The fact that the owner consented to the handling of the property was irrelevant. HL held appropriation and this takes place the moment the offender assumes any of the rights. This case implies that there does not need to be a taking for an appropriation.
Even if the owner consents there can still be an appropriation, this can be seen in the case Lawrence (1972). An Italian student (Lawrence) spoke very little English; he gave a taxi driver piece of paper with an address. The driver claimed it was a longer journey than it actually was. The fare was £1, the student opened his wallet and the driver took £6. There can still be an appropriation even though the owner has consented to the property being taken.
Under s.4 Theft Act 1968, ‘Property’ includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property. In the case Oxford v Moss (1978), he was charged with stealing confidential information. A student obtained a copy of an exam paper he was due to sit; he copied it and returned it. D was acquitted as there was no proof that he intended to permanently deprive the University of it. S.4 (3) ‘A person who picks mushrooms growing wild on any land, or who picks flowers, fruit or foliage from a plant growing wild on any land, does not (although not in possession of the land) steal what he picks, unless he does it for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose.’
Under s.5 Theft Act 1968, ‘Property shall be regarded as belonging to any person having possession or control of it, or having in it any proprietary right or interest’. It can belong to more than one person at a time and people can steal their own property, as seen in the case R v Turner (1971). S.5 (3) states, ‘Where a person receives property from another and is under obligation to retain or deal with that property or its proceeds in a particular way, the property is still regarded as belonging to another, e.g. holding money for a particular purpose. In Davidge v Bennet (1984) the defendant was given money by flatmates to pay gas bill. She spent the money on Christmas presents and was found guilty of theft. There must be a clear obligation to deal with the money or proceeds in a particular way. In Dyke and Munro (2001) they were charged with stealing monies belonging to a person or persons unknown (meaning the public that donated the money, rather than the charity). Once money is put into the collection tin it is property of the charity. Under s.5 (4) you can still be charged with theft by receiving property by mistake. So you must restore the property to its rightful owner or you have the intention to deprive the other of it.
S.2 of the Theft Act 1968 says there is no definition of dishonest, ‘it is immaterial whether the appropriation is made with a view to gain or the thief’s own benefit’ – the motive is irrelevant. There are 3 situations which are not dishonest: Honest belief he has a right in law- Holden (1991) the defendant was found not guilty of stealing scrap tyres from Kwik-Fit after others had taken them with supervisor’s permission. Belief that would have others consents. Owners cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. The case Ghosh (1982) set the 2 stage test for dishonesty: Is it dishonest according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people? If so, did the defendant realise what he was doing was dishonest by those standards? However, even if the defendant may be willing to pay for the property or take property and leave money for it, this does not prevent him from being dishonest. S.2 (2) of the Theft Act 1968 states, ‘appropriating property belonging to another may be dishonest notwithstanding that he is willing to pay for the property.’ This shows that Asif would be found guilty because even if he is willing to pay the £300 back, under s.2 (2) of the Theft Act he would be found guilty of theft.
Robbery
Under section 8 of the theft act 1968 robbery is defined as: “A person is guilty of robbery if he steals and immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, he uses force on any person or seeks to put them in fear of being then and there subjected to force”. Robbery is basically theft with force; you have to establish all the elements of theft under section 1-6 THEFT Act and show that force was committed immediately before or at the time of the theft or the threat or the threat of force was used, in order to gain a conviction under s8 for robbery. Always remember – if the defendant has not committed theft, he cannot be convicted of Robbery even though he uses force to deprive the victim of the property.
In Robinson (1977) the Defendant approached a man who owed his wife some money, brandishing a knife. After a struggle, the defendant grabbed a £5 note. His conviction for robbery was quashed as he had honestly believed that he was entitled to the property, and therefore was not dishonest. Under Section 8(2) – it states that the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. A life sentence will automatically be imposed when an offender is convicted of their second serious offence. Robbery involving a firearm or imitation firearm is included in the category of serious offences. Shaz and Jen would not receive a life sentence because they did not commit a serious offence because they did not use a firearm or imitate a firearm. To make it a robbery, use or threat of force must be used. In R v Dawson (1976) the two defendants approached the victim; the two of them nudged the victim from side to side while the third took the victim’s wallet from his pocket. The Court of Appeal affirmed their conviction for robbery; the amount of force used or threatened may have been small, and it is up to the jury to decide whether it was enough to constitute robbery. The defendant must have used force or threatened to do so. This is a question of fact for the jury to determine. It is not necessary that the intended victim actually fears force – the offence only requires that the defendant seeks to put his victim in fear of force, not that the victim is afraid. In B and R v DPP (2007) a 16 year old school boy was surrounded in a street by a group of boys who demanded that he hand over his phone and wallet. When the victim refused they searched his pockets and took the items. He admitted that he did not feel particularly threatened or scared and he had not been physically assaulted. Held – a threat of force can be express or implied – that is implied from other words or conduct. In this case there was an implied threat of force. It would not be robbery if force is used first and then the offender decides to steal, e.g. where the offender attacked another who made derogatory remarks about him and then when the victim was lying unconscious, stole his wallet.
In robbery there is a continuing act or ‘The HALE principle. A case example to illustrate this principle would be R v Hale (1978). The D’s entered V’s house wearing masks. D1 put his hand over V’s mouth while D2 went upstairs for V’s jewellery. Before they left, they tied up V and threatened to harm her child if she phoned the police. D’s argued that theft was complete as soon as D2 laid his hands on the jewellery box, and that any force used when tying up the victim was irrelevant. Dismissing their appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal said the theft was a continuing act, and did not come to an end once the jewellery had been seized; the jury were entitled to find that D’s had used force at the time of the theft in order to enable them to complete the theft. Everleigh LJ stated that “the act of appropriation … is a continuing act and it is a matter for the jury to decide whether or not the act of appropriation has finished”.
When deciding whether Jen and shaz used force alongside theft, this depends on the interpretation of ‘force’. The Criminal Law Revision Committee, when devising this section, had made it clear that there needed to be more than mere snatching of property from an unresisting owner before it became robbery. The courts however, have decided that the definition is satisfied provided that some resistance to the taking has been shown. Prior to the 1968 Act, robbery required that force be used to overpower the victim or to make them give up the property. This is no longer the case.
In Clouden (1987) – D used both hands to wrench a shopping bag from the victim – held this was sufficient for force. The Court of Appeal decided that by applying force to the bags, D was taken to applying force to the woman as well.
Also in Dawson (1976) Held that “jostling” the victim so that they had difficulty keeping their balance was sufficient to amount to force. Prior to the 1968 Act, robbery required that force be used to overpower the victim or to make them give up the property. This is no longer the case.
Also Shaz and Jen would’ve needed to complete the offence to be found guilty of robbery. The offence of robbery is completed; in other words when a person is liable for robbery and not just attempted robbery – when the appropriation is complete. A case example of this is Corcoran v Anderton (1980) Two D’s tried to take a woman’s handbag by force. they managed to grab hold of the bag, but then dropped it and ran off. The court held that the appropriation was complete the D’s got hold of the bag, and therefore decided that they were guilty of robbery, and not just attempted robbery, regardless of the fact that they failed to get hold of the bag.
Burglary
Asif can be charged with burglary is his offence is committed at the time of entry into the property (the point of trespass).
In Section 9 Theft Act 1968: under s9(1)(a) the crime is committed where: the defendant enters a building or part of one as a trespasser with the intent to steal, inflict GBH, or do unlawful damage to the building or anything inside it. This offence is committed at the time of entry into the property (the point of trespass).
The crime of rape and trespass used to be included here but it is now a separate offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Under s9(1)(b) of the Theft Act. The offence is committed where: a person steals or inflicts GBH on another, after he has entered as a trespasser, or attempts to do either of these two things. This offence is committed not at the time of entry but at the time of committing the ulterior offence.
The difference between section (a) and (b) is under subsection (a), the offender must intend to steal or commit other offences laid down at the time he trespasses. Under subsection (b) the intent to steal can be formed after the trespass. Section 9(1)(b) only applies to theft and GBH, but unlike s9(1)(a), also includes attempts to do either of these things. The maximum sentence is laid down in s9(3) and is 14 years imprisonment when committed in respect of a …show more content…
building.
There are 4 elements of burglary: Effective entry, entry, trespass and building. In Collins (1973) The Defendant was 19, had seen the girl in question when he worked near her house, and after drinking a considerable amount had decided to visit the premises. He stripped his clothes and climbed into her bedroom using a ladder. The girl woke up as he was climbing in. And she got up and embraced him and pulled him towards the bed and had sexual intercourse with him. She believed that her boyfriend had come to visit during the night and doubted this during the intercourse. Collins was later convicted of burglary. The girl argued that she would not have agreed to the intercourse if she had known that the man was not her boyfriend. The D claimed that he would never have entered her room if the girl had not beckoned him in. He was convicted but later appealed on the basis that he had not entered as a trespasser.
The Court of Appeal decided that there had to be an entry into the building.
Secondly, the Defendant needed to have entered as a trespasser, which was far more difficult to decide upon. Lastly, he had to have intended, at the time of entry to commit rape. The court stated that “unless the jury were satisfied that the Defendant made an effective and substantial entry into the bedroom without the complainant doing or saying anything to cause him to believe that she was consenting to his entering it, he ought not to be convicted of the offence charged. The point is a narrow one, as narrow as maybe the window sill which is crucial to this case. But this is a criminal charge of gravity and, even though one may suspect that his intention was to commit the offence charged, unless the facts show with clarity that he in fact committed it he ought not to remain
convicted”.
Usually, it is easy to show that the D is trespassing, but occasionally there may be difficulties, as, for example, when the D claims that he has a right to be there. Jones and Smith (1976)- The D’s removed two television sets from the home of Smith’s father during the night and were convicted of burglary. At the trial, the father had tried to protect his son by arguing, that he was not a trespasser because he had unreserved permission to enter the house. The Court of Appeal was not prepared to accept this and decided that the word “trespasser” also covered cases where a person acts in excess of the permission given – “when you invite a person into your house to use the staircase, you do not invite them to slide down the banisters”. The appeals were therefore dismissed. The Court made it clear that a person is a trespasser if he enters premises of another knowing that he is entering in excess of the permission that has been given to him, or being reckless as to this fact.
For building, there is no definition of this word in the Act but s9 (4) states that the word includes an inhabited vehicle and a vessel, even if they are not inhabited at the time of the offence. Norfolk Constabulary v Seekings and Gould (1986) however, the courts were not prepared to widen the definition to include two lorry trailers; these remained as mere vehicles.
A temporary, prefabricated structure would probably be a “building”; a tent is not.
It is sufficient that D enters part of a building as a trespasser. D may have permission to enter some parts of a building but not others; they may commit burglary if they enter those other parts. For example, a guest in a hotel can enter their own room and communal parts of a building, but if they entered another guest’s room or the manager’s office to steal, they would be committing burglary.
In Walkington (1979) the Defendant entered Debenhams and entered the counter area, opened the partially opened till, found it empty and slammed it shut. He was convicted of burglary (entry with intent to steal).
In section 9.1.A, it must be proved that D, when entering a building or part of a building, had the intention to commit one of the offences referred to under the Act: Theft, Criminal damage (strictly the 1968 Act refers to “unlawful damage” but this presumably means the offence of criminal damage, which was only introduced by the Criminal Damage Act 1971) and GBH. In relation to the trespass, the D must have intended to trespass or have been reckless in his knowledge of the trespass.
The prosecution must prove all the elements of the actus reus of a section 9(1)(a) offence, and in addition prove that the actus reus of the ulterior offence (in this case stealing, attempting to steal, inflicting or attempting to inflict GBH) has been carried out.
This offence is committed not at the time of entry but at the time of committing the ulterior offence.
As for the section 9(1)(a) offence, the prosecution must prove intention or recklessness as to the trespass. In addition, they must prove the mens rea of the ulterior offence. The D need not have the mens rea of this ulterior offence at the time of entry, but must have it when the ulterior offence is committed.
However, people can trespass with intent to commit a sexual offence. Section 63(1) Sexual Offences Act 2003 abolishes the type of burglary under s9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968 where D enters a building (or part of a building) with intent to rape anyone within (the crime with which Collins was charged). It is replaced with this new offence – trespass with intent to commit a sexual offence.
Under the new offence, D is guilty if he trespasses on any premises with intent to commit a relevant sexual offence on the premises. D must know or be reckless as to the trespass.