Assess the View That Lyndon Johnson (Lbj) Had No Choice but to Send Us Troops to Vietnam in 1965.
Assess the view that Lyndon Johnson (LBJ) had no choice but to send US troops to Vietnam in 1965.
Word Count: 304
Word Count: 304
Hess argues that the threat of the USSR and Communism “left the US no choice but to stand up to the challenge posed by Vietnam”. Direct confrontation was impossible as the USSR was a nuclear power, therefore the only choice available was “a policy of containment”; previous success in Korea gives validity to this view. Hess states Vietnam was the centre of the “Domino Theory”, that a communist Vietnam “would inexorably lead to the collapse of other non-communist states”. All communist states were believed to be puppets of the USSR so an increase in Soviet allies would tip the global power balance against the US. Morris supports Hess, saying Johnson believed “the USA faced a communist conspiracy to extend communism across the globe”. Previous Soviet annexation of Eastern Europe gave evidence that a similar expansion would be repeated in South East Asia. The Red Scares of the 1950s showed how the US population considered the USSR an aggressive threat as policy matches public opinion containment was essential. Supporting this view, LBJ stated the US was to “assist the people and government of that country [South Vietnam] to win their contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy.” Ostensibly this argument is valid as Marxism is an expansionist ideology. However the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was predominantly nationalist, acting independently from the Kremlin, with Ho Chi Mihn believing that “nothing is more important than Independence and Liberty”. Evidently this language is far closer to that of American Enlightenment than Leninist Bolshevism, thus suggesting LBJ did have a choice as Vietnam posed little threat. However this cannot invalidate the Domino Theory which has overwhelming sources in support: as Robert McNamara stated, “The Domino Theory… was the primary factor motivating the actions of both the
Word Count: 304
Word Count: 304
Hess argues that the threat of the USSR and Communism “left the US no choice but to stand up to the challenge posed by Vietnam”. Direct confrontation was impossible as the USSR was a nuclear power, therefore the only choice available was “a policy of containment”; previous success in Korea gives validity to this view. Hess states Vietnam was the centre of the “Domino Theory”, that a communist Vietnam “would inexorably lead to the collapse of other non-communist states”. All communist states were believed to be puppets of the USSR so an increase in Soviet allies would tip the global power balance against the US. Morris supports Hess, saying Johnson believed “the USA faced a communist conspiracy to extend communism across the globe”. Previous Soviet annexation of Eastern Europe gave evidence that a similar expansion would be repeated in South East Asia. The Red Scares of the 1950s showed how the US population considered the USSR an aggressive threat as policy matches public opinion containment was essential. Supporting this view, LBJ stated the US was to “assist the people and government of that country [South Vietnam] to win their contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy.” Ostensibly this argument is valid as Marxism is an expansionist ideology. However the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was predominantly nationalist, acting independently from the Kremlin, with Ho Chi Mihn believing that “nothing is more important than Independence and Liberty”. Evidently this language is far closer to that of American Enlightenment than Leninist Bolshevism, thus suggesting LBJ did have a choice as Vietnam posed little threat. However this cannot invalidate the Domino Theory which has overwhelming sources in support: as Robert McNamara stated, “The Domino Theory… was the primary factor motivating the actions of both the
Bibliography: N. Chomsky, Vietnam: How Government Became Wolves, 1972. http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19720615.htm N. Chomsky The Legacy of the Vietnam War, 1982 http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/198210--.htm T M.K. Hall, The Vietnam War, 2008 G.R M.H. Hunt , A Vietnam War Reader, 2010 F D. Murphy + T. Morris, International Relations 1879-2004, 2008 V R. Schulzinger, A Time for War, 1997 Choices The limits of Power: The United States in Vietnam www.choice.edu/ [ 1 ]. G.R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 2008 Page 31 [ 2 ] [ 3 ]. G.R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 2008 Page 31 [ 4 ] [ 5 ]. D. Murphy + T. Morris, International Relations 1879-2004, 2008 Page 160 [ 6 ] [ 7 ]. Cited in T. Harmer, The Cold war in Asia and America, 20th Century History Review , 2006 Page 30 [ 8 ] [ 9 ]. N. Chomsky, Vietnam: How Government Became Wolves, 1972 http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19720615.htm [ 10 ] [ 11 ]. N. Chomsky, Vietnam: How Government Became Wolves, 1972 http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19720615.htm [ 12 ] [ 13 ]. G.R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 2008 Page 31 [ 14 ] [ 15 ]. M.K. Hall, The Vietnam War, 2008 Page 15 [ 16 ] [ 17 ]. V. Sanders, The USA and Vietnam 1945-75, 2007 Page 84 [ 18 ] [ 19 ]. Cited in V. Sanders, The USA and Vietnam 1945-75, 2007 Page 84 [ 20 ] [ 21 ]. R. Schulzinger, A Time for War, 1997 Page 175 [ 22 ] [ 23 ]. R. Schulzinger, A Time for War, 1997 Page 175 [ 24 ] [ 25 ]. D. Murphy + T. Morris, International Relations 1879-2004, 2008 Page 164 [ 26 ] [ 27 ]. D. Murphy + T. Morris, International Relations 1879-2004, 2008 Page 162 [ 28 ] [ 29 ]. F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, 2001 Page 89 [ 30 ] [ 31 ]. V. Sanders, The USA and Vietnam 1945-75, 2007 Page 85 [ 32 ] [ 33 ]. Cited V. Sanders, The USA and Vietnam 1945-75, 2007 Page 84 [ 34 ] [ 35 ]. V. Sanders, The USA and Vietnam 1945-75, 2007 Page 92 [ 36 ] [ 39 ]. M.K. Hall, The Vietnam War, 2008 Page 27 [ 40 ] [ 41 ]. N. Chomsky, The Legacy of the Vietnam War, 1982 http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/198210--.htm [ 42 ] [ 43 ]. N. Chomsky, The Legacy of the Vietnam War, 1982 http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/198210--.htm [ 44 ] [ 45 ]. N. Chomsky, The Legacy of the Vietnam War, 1982 http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/198210--.htm [ 46 ] [ 47 ]. G.R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 2008 Page 31 [ 48 ] [ 49 ]. N. Chomsky, The Legacy of the Vietnam War, 1982 http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/198210--.htm [ 50 ] [ 51 ]. R. Schulzinger, A Time for War, 1997 Page 175 [ 52 ] [ 53 ]. F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, 2001 Page 89 [ 54 ] [ 55 ]. V. Sanders, The USA and Vietnam 1945-75, 2007 Page 92 [ 56 ] [ 57 ]. F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, 2001 Page 89