Assess the View That the Disagreements About the Second Front Were the Most Significant Cause of Tension Between Russia and the West Between 1941-5?
Assess the view that the disagreements about the Second Front were the most significant cause of tension between Russia and the West between 1941-5?
Historians Gaddis and Maisky believe the disagreements about the Second Front were not the most significant cause of tension between Russia and the West between 1941-5.
The Western Allies landing position in Europe, as proposed by Russia, has been branded as a major reason for tension between the USA, Britain and Russia by historians Phillips and Roberts. However, other historians including Vasori, Levering, Lafeber and Tucker have challenged this particular perspective, suggesting that other factors also played a part in causing tension. The conflicting ideology and individual roles and objectives of each of the powers could also be said to have contributed.
The Second Front was, according to Philips and Roberts, a major source of tension between the USA, Britain and Russia during World War II. Philips states “To Stalin the need to open up a Second Front in Western Europe against Germany in order to relieve the pressure on the USSR in the East was a pressing necessity. Yet the refusal of Britain and the USA to do so until the time was right led Stalin to be suspicious of their motives.”[1] Roberts backs up Philips’s argument up by pointing out that there had been numerous failed agreements by the Allies to land troops in order to create a Second Front in 1942, and the issue was discussed in the Tehran conference of 1943[2]. However on closer inspection, neither argument is particularly strong. For example, although Philips points out that Russia was at risk of being invaded by Germany in 1941 and therefore had an strong reason for demanding the Second Front despite the fact that defeating Germany was not the USA’s or Britain’s main concern. Churchill was concerned with the risk of casualties a Second Front would create. He also had military interests in North Africa during 1942[3] and Italy during 1943[4] and
Historians Gaddis and Maisky believe the disagreements about the Second Front were not the most significant cause of tension between Russia and the West between 1941-5.
The Western Allies landing position in Europe, as proposed by Russia, has been branded as a major reason for tension between the USA, Britain and Russia by historians Phillips and Roberts. However, other historians including Vasori, Levering, Lafeber and Tucker have challenged this particular perspective, suggesting that other factors also played a part in causing tension. The conflicting ideology and individual roles and objectives of each of the powers could also be said to have contributed.
The Second Front was, according to Philips and Roberts, a major source of tension between the USA, Britain and Russia during World War II. Philips states “To Stalin the need to open up a Second Front in Western Europe against Germany in order to relieve the pressure on the USSR in the East was a pressing necessity. Yet the refusal of Britain and the USA to do so until the time was right led Stalin to be suspicious of their motives.”[1] Roberts backs up Philips’s argument up by pointing out that there had been numerous failed agreements by the Allies to land troops in order to create a Second Front in 1942, and the issue was discussed in the Tehran conference of 1943[2]. However on closer inspection, neither argument is particularly strong. For example, although Philips points out that Russia was at risk of being invaded by Germany in 1941 and therefore had an strong reason for demanding the Second Front despite the fact that defeating Germany was not the USA’s or Britain’s main concern. Churchill was concerned with the risk of casualties a Second Front would create. He also had military interests in North Africa during 1942[3] and Italy during 1943[4] and
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