AT Coloniality
AT – Coloniality
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AT: Mignolo
Mignolo assumes preexisting binaries and dichotomies which don’t exist- this guts solvency
Michaelsen and Shershow 7 (Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow, Professor of English at Michigan State and Professor of English at UC Davis “Rethinking Border Thinking”, [http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/106/1/39.full.pdf+html]
From this welter of definition, we observe, first, that for Mignolo border ¶ thinking emerges out of an assumed dichotomy. That is, Mignolo postulates the existence of at least two languages, ways of reasoning, ways of ¶ interpreting the world and, in short, at least two radically different modes of ¶ being and knowing. One has been suppressed or subordinated by the work ¶ of “the colonial difference.” Then, with the emergence of border thinking, ¶ the subordinated term of the dichotomy comes forward and, alternately or ¶ simultaneously, absorbs, displaces, battles, or incorporates the master term in ¶ order to fashion something unprecedented and new.¶ The problems with such formulations, at once figural and conceptual, ¶ begin with their initial premise. That which is “dichotomous” has been cut ¶ and divided, split in two, or forked and branched, and implies an original ¶ point of origin—an original wholeness—rather than two separate origins ¶ (see OED, s.vv. “dichotomous,” “dicho-”). In the context of the colonial ¶ situation, the idea of dichotomy would thus imply an original relatedness, ¶ even though such relational identities were forged within a context of deeply ¶ asymmetrical power relations. By using this term, Mignolo thus comes ¶ dangerously close to suggesting a counterthesis to his own, and to aligning himself with something like Anne Norton’s analysis of the “incompleteness” of any particular identity: “Hegel’s account of the dependence of ¶ the identity of the master on the servant draws attention to another sense in ¶ which each identity is partial. Each identity is dependent
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AT: Mignolo
Mignolo assumes preexisting binaries and dichotomies which don’t exist- this guts solvency
Michaelsen and Shershow 7 (Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow, Professor of English at Michigan State and Professor of English at UC Davis “Rethinking Border Thinking”, [http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/106/1/39.full.pdf+html]
From this welter of definition, we observe, first, that for Mignolo border ¶ thinking emerges out of an assumed dichotomy. That is, Mignolo postulates the existence of at least two languages, ways of reasoning, ways of ¶ interpreting the world and, in short, at least two radically different modes of ¶ being and knowing. One has been suppressed or subordinated by the work ¶ of “the colonial difference.” Then, with the emergence of border thinking, ¶ the subordinated term of the dichotomy comes forward and, alternately or ¶ simultaneously, absorbs, displaces, battles, or incorporates the master term in ¶ order to fashion something unprecedented and new.¶ The problems with such formulations, at once figural and conceptual, ¶ begin with their initial premise. That which is “dichotomous” has been cut ¶ and divided, split in two, or forked and branched, and implies an original ¶ point of origin—an original wholeness—rather than two separate origins ¶ (see OED, s.vv. “dichotomous,” “dicho-”). In the context of the colonial ¶ situation, the idea of dichotomy would thus imply an original relatedness, ¶ even though such relational identities were forged within a context of deeply ¶ asymmetrical power relations. By using this term, Mignolo thus comes ¶ dangerously close to suggesting a counterthesis to his own, and to aligning himself with something like Anne Norton’s analysis of the “incompleteness” of any particular identity: “Hegel’s account of the dependence of ¶ the identity of the master on the servant draws attention to another sense in ¶ which each identity is partial. Each identity is dependent