Battle Of Kursk Analysis
“Overlooked and Misunderstood: Putting Kursk in Perspective”
“Introduction”
The Battle of Kursk started in July 4, 1943 between Russia and Germany during World War II. The battle of Kursk is widely known as the largest tank battle in the history of the world and its importance is often overlooked, partially because Russian documents along with facts and figures were not known in any official capacity until the end of the Cold War. The Battle of Kursk would turn the tide of War on the eastern front and Hitler’s forces would never regain a stronghold or be on the offensive against Russia. The sheer numbers that participated in this battle are staggering.
“The Numbers”
German offensive forces consisted …show more content…
of 2700 tanks and assault guns, 10,000 field guns, 567,000 men and 2,500 aircraft as compared to the Russian defensive force consisting of; 3,300 tanks and assault guns, 20,200 field guns, 1,272,000 men and 2,650 aircraft, the Russians also had a reserve force of 1,600 tanks and 573,000 men just to the east.1 It is important to note that Hitler committed the entire strategic reserve of the Eastern Front, leaving nothing to defend Germany from a Russian counterattack if Operation Citadel were to fail.
“The Eastern Front”
Sometime in 1940, Hitler had decided to attack Russia; this would open up a second front of war: The Eastern Front. Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and enjoyed overwhelming success early on against Russian forces that were largely unprepared and under equipped, mainly due to Joseph Stalin ignoring the obvious signs of the coming invasion and his Purge of most of the top Russian military leaders due to his insecurities and fear of losing power to a coup. The early success and advantages Germany had, would soon evaporate due to an overextended supply line, coupled with horrible weather and impassible terrain, the German forces would be to be stopped just miles from Moscow and the possible collapse of Russia. German forces would then face a horrendous winter with the extreme cold that they were completely unprepared for. This was due to a bit of arrogance and the short sightedness of Hitler and his generals believing that war with Russia would be a rather short campaign. Throughout 1942, Hitler’s forces fighting on the eastern front were unable to secure Russia’s defeat and in the winter of 1942-1943 they saw ever increasing counter attacks from Russian forces and were losing ground all across the front. Germany recognized a need for a major offensive and began planning for a major offensive late in the year of 1942.
“Operation Citadel” The German offensive or Operation Citadel as it would come to be known was one last big chance at conquering Russia and closing the Eastern Front, Hitler’s Generals knew that they would no longer be able to match the materials, men or armament starting to build up in Russia. Germany’s Generals also knew that at some point in the near future that The United States and Great Britain would invade and open up a large scale Western Front or a second front in which they would have to defend. The resources in terms of men, material and armament that Germany now enjoyed on the eastern front would at some point have to be diverted to a second front.
Hitler did not know the scale in which the United States was providing aid to Russian Forces. The theory put forth by German leadership was; if they could push the Russian forces back and capture the Caucasus oil fields, Russia would have to surrender. They felt that without these oil fields, Russia would not be able to maintain production of supplies and would be unable to wage war any longer. Hitler was not aware that the United States and Great Britain were committed to keeping Russia in the war at all costs, for they knew that if Russia was defeated, the full force of Nazi Germany would come to bear on not only Great Britain but possibly the United States as well. The Allied forces were also unsure if they could beat Nazi Germany without the help of Russia. Part of the strategy of Germany was that they too desperately needed more oil supplies to continue the war, largely overlooked by people today, these oil fields were part of the decision to go to war with Russia in the first place.
Operation Citadel was concentrated in and around the Russian city of Kursk, 400 miles south of Moscow, where Russian forces had notably pushed back the German front lines.2 Operation Citadel was supposed to happen in the spring of 1943. When May 1943 arrived, it was obvious to the German forces that Russia not only knew about the planned attack but was creating huge defensive fortifications all around Kursk. Colonel General Walter Model, commander of the Ninth Army decided to delay the attack in hopes that his forces, not at full combat strength, would be reinforced before launching Operation Citadel.3 Operation Citadel’s objective was no less ambitious than that of the failed Barbarossa’s; Citadel was to be launched on a five-hundred mile front, it would create a bulge of over thirteen hundred miles and in doing so would shrink rail networks in use by Russian forces for supplies.4
1942 witnessed German forces bleeding supplies especially on the Eastern Front as Showalter describes below:
In 1942, the Eastern Front alone had cost the army an average of more than a hundred thousand dead each month. Not counting the completely unfit and the indispensable war workers, as of March 1943 the Reich was down to its last half million warm bodies not yet in uniform. In 1942, the Eastern Front had also cost fifty-five hundred tanks, eight thousand guns, and almost a quarter-million motor vehicles. Two-thirds of the twenty thousand written-off aircraft had been lost in Russia. These material losses were being successfully replaced—but for how long? (40)
Hitler knew the urgency and overall importance of operation Citadel and the consequences it would have if they were defeated.
The main objective of Operation Citadel was to pinch off the bulge that Russian forces had created in the German offensive line and take the Caucasus oil fields. Operation Citadel, if successful would see Russia defeated and would allow Hitler to unleash all of Nazi Germany against Great Britain and the United States.
“Outcome”
With Russian Intelligence gathering enough information to determine the exact attack date of July 4, 1943 by Operation Citadel, they released a large artillery attack on German forces and created chaos for the Germans right as they began attacking. The Germans were unable to coordinate one massive attack like they wanted and their attack plan was mostly ineffective. In the north they had very limited penetration of the Russian lines, Russian forces were just too heavy and the area was too well defended. The success that the German’s did see, although short lived, was in the south where they had pushed towards Prokhorovka and on July 12, 1943, Russian forces had to commit a large part of their reserves to stop the advance. By committing part of their reserve they were successful in stopping the advancing German force. While the initial attack’s at Kursk by German forces had some success, Russian forces were just too many and too well dug in and fortified. By July 24, 1943 the Germans had lost all ground that they had …show more content…
gained with Operation Citadel and were at that point, unable to stop any counterattack that the Russians would launch.
“Conclusion”
From most accounts of recent history, the importance of the Battle of Kursk and its overall impact on World War II is starting to be realized.
With Hitler committing all of his reserves to Operation Citadel, one must conclude that either he knew that this battle was all or nothing for Germany, or he was so confident that this Operation would succeed that he wanted to commit all of his reserves so that the ultimate surrender of Russia would happen as quickly as possible so that he could then prepare to defend against Great Britain and the United States. The failure of Operation Citadel left Germany unable to defend the Eastern Front and more importantly the homeland against Russia, the Battle of Kursk played a large part in how quickly the war would be over, and it deserves its proper place in history. After Kursk Russian Forces would push hard into Germany and the defeat of Nazi Germany was just a matter of
time.
Bibliography
Hill, Alexander. "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45." In The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45, by Alexander Hill, 361. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009.
Miranda, Joseph. Strategy and Tactics Press. 2008. http://www.strategyandtacticspress.com/library-files/ST253-Web.pdf (accessed 12 2,2013).
Newton, Steven H. Kursk the German View. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002.
Roberts, Andrew. "WWII 's Greatest Battle: How Kursk Changed the War." The Daily beast. 8 31, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/31/wwii-s-greatest-battle- how-kursk-changed-the-war.html (accessed 11 30, 2013).
Showalter, Dennis. Armor and blood: the battle of Kursk: the turning point of World War II. New York: Random House, 2013.
Simms, Benjamin R. "Analysis of the Battle of Kursk." Armor Magazine, 2003: 7-12.
“Introduction”
The Battle of Kursk started in July 4, 1943 between Russia and Germany during World War II. The battle of Kursk is widely known as the largest tank battle in the history of the world and its importance is often overlooked, partially because Russian documents along with facts and figures were not known in any official capacity until the end of the Cold War. The Battle of Kursk would turn the tide of War on the eastern front and Hitler’s forces would never regain a stronghold or be on the offensive against Russia. The sheer numbers that participated in this battle are staggering.
“The Numbers”
German offensive forces consisted …show more content…
of 2700 tanks and assault guns, 10,000 field guns, 567,000 men and 2,500 aircraft as compared to the Russian defensive force consisting of; 3,300 tanks and assault guns, 20,200 field guns, 1,272,000 men and 2,650 aircraft, the Russians also had a reserve force of 1,600 tanks and 573,000 men just to the east.1 It is important to note that Hitler committed the entire strategic reserve of the Eastern Front, leaving nothing to defend Germany from a Russian counterattack if Operation Citadel were to fail.
“The Eastern Front”
Sometime in 1940, Hitler had decided to attack Russia; this would open up a second front of war: The Eastern Front. Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and enjoyed overwhelming success early on against Russian forces that were largely unprepared and under equipped, mainly due to Joseph Stalin ignoring the obvious signs of the coming invasion and his Purge of most of the top Russian military leaders due to his insecurities and fear of losing power to a coup. The early success and advantages Germany had, would soon evaporate due to an overextended supply line, coupled with horrible weather and impassible terrain, the German forces would be to be stopped just miles from Moscow and the possible collapse of Russia. German forces would then face a horrendous winter with the extreme cold that they were completely unprepared for. This was due to a bit of arrogance and the short sightedness of Hitler and his generals believing that war with Russia would be a rather short campaign. Throughout 1942, Hitler’s forces fighting on the eastern front were unable to secure Russia’s defeat and in the winter of 1942-1943 they saw ever increasing counter attacks from Russian forces and were losing ground all across the front. Germany recognized a need for a major offensive and began planning for a major offensive late in the year of 1942.
“Operation Citadel” The German offensive or Operation Citadel as it would come to be known was one last big chance at conquering Russia and closing the Eastern Front, Hitler’s Generals knew that they would no longer be able to match the materials, men or armament starting to build up in Russia. Germany’s Generals also knew that at some point in the near future that The United States and Great Britain would invade and open up a large scale Western Front or a second front in which they would have to defend. The resources in terms of men, material and armament that Germany now enjoyed on the eastern front would at some point have to be diverted to a second front.
Hitler did not know the scale in which the United States was providing aid to Russian Forces. The theory put forth by German leadership was; if they could push the Russian forces back and capture the Caucasus oil fields, Russia would have to surrender. They felt that without these oil fields, Russia would not be able to maintain production of supplies and would be unable to wage war any longer. Hitler was not aware that the United States and Great Britain were committed to keeping Russia in the war at all costs, for they knew that if Russia was defeated, the full force of Nazi Germany would come to bear on not only Great Britain but possibly the United States as well. The Allied forces were also unsure if they could beat Nazi Germany without the help of Russia. Part of the strategy of Germany was that they too desperately needed more oil supplies to continue the war, largely overlooked by people today, these oil fields were part of the decision to go to war with Russia in the first place.
Operation Citadel was concentrated in and around the Russian city of Kursk, 400 miles south of Moscow, where Russian forces had notably pushed back the German front lines.2 Operation Citadel was supposed to happen in the spring of 1943. When May 1943 arrived, it was obvious to the German forces that Russia not only knew about the planned attack but was creating huge defensive fortifications all around Kursk. Colonel General Walter Model, commander of the Ninth Army decided to delay the attack in hopes that his forces, not at full combat strength, would be reinforced before launching Operation Citadel.3 Operation Citadel’s objective was no less ambitious than that of the failed Barbarossa’s; Citadel was to be launched on a five-hundred mile front, it would create a bulge of over thirteen hundred miles and in doing so would shrink rail networks in use by Russian forces for supplies.4
1942 witnessed German forces bleeding supplies especially on the Eastern Front as Showalter describes below:
In 1942, the Eastern Front alone had cost the army an average of more than a hundred thousand dead each month. Not counting the completely unfit and the indispensable war workers, as of March 1943 the Reich was down to its last half million warm bodies not yet in uniform. In 1942, the Eastern Front had also cost fifty-five hundred tanks, eight thousand guns, and almost a quarter-million motor vehicles. Two-thirds of the twenty thousand written-off aircraft had been lost in Russia. These material losses were being successfully replaced—but for how long? (40)
Hitler knew the urgency and overall importance of operation Citadel and the consequences it would have if they were defeated.
The main objective of Operation Citadel was to pinch off the bulge that Russian forces had created in the German offensive line and take the Caucasus oil fields. Operation Citadel, if successful would see Russia defeated and would allow Hitler to unleash all of Nazi Germany against Great Britain and the United States.
“Outcome”
With Russian Intelligence gathering enough information to determine the exact attack date of July 4, 1943 by Operation Citadel, they released a large artillery attack on German forces and created chaos for the Germans right as they began attacking. The Germans were unable to coordinate one massive attack like they wanted and their attack plan was mostly ineffective. In the north they had very limited penetration of the Russian lines, Russian forces were just too heavy and the area was too well defended. The success that the German’s did see, although short lived, was in the south where they had pushed towards Prokhorovka and on July 12, 1943, Russian forces had to commit a large part of their reserves to stop the advance. By committing part of their reserve they were successful in stopping the advancing German force. While the initial attack’s at Kursk by German forces had some success, Russian forces were just too many and too well dug in and fortified. By July 24, 1943 the Germans had lost all ground that they had …show more content…
gained with Operation Citadel and were at that point, unable to stop any counterattack that the Russians would launch.
“Conclusion”
From most accounts of recent history, the importance of the Battle of Kursk and its overall impact on World War II is starting to be realized.
With Hitler committing all of his reserves to Operation Citadel, one must conclude that either he knew that this battle was all or nothing for Germany, or he was so confident that this Operation would succeed that he wanted to commit all of his reserves so that the ultimate surrender of Russia would happen as quickly as possible so that he could then prepare to defend against Great Britain and the United States. The failure of Operation Citadel left Germany unable to defend the Eastern Front and more importantly the homeland against Russia, the Battle of Kursk played a large part in how quickly the war would be over, and it deserves its proper place in history. After Kursk Russian Forces would push hard into Germany and the defeat of Nazi Germany was just a matter of
time.
Bibliography
Hill, Alexander. "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45." In The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45, by Alexander Hill, 361. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009.
Miranda, Joseph. Strategy and Tactics Press. 2008. http://www.strategyandtacticspress.com/library-files/ST253-Web.pdf (accessed 12 2,2013).
Newton, Steven H. Kursk the German View. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002.
Roberts, Andrew. "WWII 's Greatest Battle: How Kursk Changed the War." The Daily beast. 8 31, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/31/wwii-s-greatest-battle- how-kursk-changed-the-war.html (accessed 11 30, 2013).
Showalter, Dennis. Armor and blood: the battle of Kursk: the turning point of World War II. New York: Random House, 2013.
Simms, Benjamin R. "Analysis of the Battle of Kursk." Armor Magazine, 2003: 7-12.