Bp Gulf Mexico
1. Do you agree or disagree with Tony Hayward’s quote at the end of the case? Was this disaster strictly a BP failure or an industry accident? (One of my biggest mistakes was that I allowed myself to become the lightning rod for hatred and anger.” He went on to say, “I genuinely feel that this could have happened to anyone. This is not BP. It is an industry accident.)
I mostly agree with Tony Hayward because an accident of that size is a result of a complex combination of mechanical failures, human decisions, problems in engineering design and operational difficulties.
It is true that the problema could be avoided by a better performance of BP, but on the other hand there are regulators that allow that company’s behavior.
2. What were the most significant flawed decisions made by BP and its partners in this case? During the production casing BP use a long string system which was more risky than more expensive systems which implied more safety.
The company blame the employees for the mistakes made that caused the accident.BP didn’t review properly the laboratorty results of the cement mixture.
Using only six centralizers
Not waiting for cement stability test results and/or redesigning the cement mixture.
Dismissing Schlumberger personnel, rather than having them perform cement testing.
Using the spacer made from lost circulation fluids to avoid disposal issues.
Displacing mud before putting the cement plug in place.
Planning to set the cement plug in seawater 3,000 feet below the mud line.
Choosing not to install additional physical barriers to hydrocarbon flow during temporary abandonment.
Not probing further after anomalous results of negative pressure tests.
Multi-tasking during the process of displacing mud from the well.
Turn off the alarm because it woke up workers at 3am.
3. How did BP’s history and culture shape decision-making on the Deepwater Horizon rig? How did the political and regulatory environment affect
I mostly agree with Tony Hayward because an accident of that size is a result of a complex combination of mechanical failures, human decisions, problems in engineering design and operational difficulties.
It is true that the problema could be avoided by a better performance of BP, but on the other hand there are regulators that allow that company’s behavior.
2. What were the most significant flawed decisions made by BP and its partners in this case? During the production casing BP use a long string system which was more risky than more expensive systems which implied more safety.
The company blame the employees for the mistakes made that caused the accident.BP didn’t review properly the laboratorty results of the cement mixture.
Using only six centralizers
Not waiting for cement stability test results and/or redesigning the cement mixture.
Dismissing Schlumberger personnel, rather than having them perform cement testing.
Using the spacer made from lost circulation fluids to avoid disposal issues.
Displacing mud before putting the cement plug in place.
Planning to set the cement plug in seawater 3,000 feet below the mud line.
Choosing not to install additional physical barriers to hydrocarbon flow during temporary abandonment.
Not probing further after anomalous results of negative pressure tests.
Multi-tasking during the process of displacing mud from the well.
Turn off the alarm because it woke up workers at 3am.
3. How did BP’s history and culture shape decision-making on the Deepwater Horizon rig? How did the political and regulatory environment affect