British Threats To Iraq

Britain dealt with numerous threats to its interests in Egypt and Iraq throughout the interwar period. A growing problem for British rule was the rise of nationalism, which impacted foreign policy as Britain sought to preserve its position. British interests in Iraq and Egypt included the security of the Suez Canal, oil reserves, easy access to India, as well as potential military bases. By retaliating violently to rebellion and making concessions to the nationalists, Britain was able to protect its interests with old Imperial values shifting into modern self-rule. For example, in Egypt Britain maintained control of Suez and protected the shipping of oil and continuation of trade throughout its empire. Similarly, military interests in Iraq
had also been secured by 1930 ensuring that troops could reach India from there very swiftly. As Britain had secured the protection of its main interests, the process of granting independence to both countries was not seen as failure, as it was made on favourable terms for Britain. The ways in which Britain protected its interests within the two counties were in many ways similar, however as was Iraq not being officially formed until 1920, the conditions were vastly different. Even the League of Nations questioned Iraq’s independence and therefore gave British rule a legitimacy perhaps lacking in Egypt. In Iraq, the granting of independence was mutually beneficial, saving Britain money and encouraging Iraq to offer better terms in return for complete independence. In both countries, the agreements to improve the army and in the case of Iraq independence, all aided bilateral agreements which protected British interests. In Egypt under British protectorate, a similar shift was made from coercion to compromise which allowed Britain to maintain its control of the Suez Canal with the 1936 treaty and protect its interests. Overall, throughout the interwar period Britain was successful in safeguarding its interests, despite nationalist fervour and waning international confidence.
In Iraq, Britain’s main interest was the oil reserves and its desire to preserve the territories which had been won from the Ottoman Empire in the great war as military bases. The 100,000 lost lives and £2 million expense meant many in Britain felt these sacrifices gave them ownership of Iraq. This desire to protect their war gains led Britain to formalise its stake in Iraq by defining it in the ‘Mandate of Mesopotamia’ of 1920. The Iraqis did not interpret the temporary guidance of the mandate as steps towards independence but instead as an obstruction to self-rule and a cloak for British imperialism. This reaction triggered the 1920 Arab Revolt, which came as a shock to Britain, which after a recent reduction of its garrison to 34,000, were left struggling to maintain order. Consequent retaliation by Britain demonstrated its desperation to maintain order and benefit from the oil reserves and military bases. Britain dropped 97 tons of bombs, fired 180,000 rounds of ammunition and used poisonous gas on civilians, showing it was prepared to sacrifice civilian life to preserve its imperial stake in Iraq. Unsurprisingly, this example of Britain protecting its interests was a failure. Its retaliation in 1920 cost £40 million, double the yearly budget for Iraq, and was higher than the amount spent in the entire conflict against the Ottoman empire between 1917-1918. The continuation of direct control was becoming an economic burden, which undermined the belief that it was advantageous to directly control Iraq. It forced Britain to reconsider its future in Iraq and realise that to protect its stake it would have to appease the Arabs. However, despite plans for indirect control made at the 1921 Cairo conference, Britain sent reinforcements of 30,000 troops to deter future revolt. This helped ensure that a similar revolt did not re-occur in the period. The revolt marked a shift in British responses and the ways it chose to protect its interests abroad. The ‘carrot and stick’ method that Britain used led to a treaty in October 1922, which attempted to distract from the Iraqi interpretation of the mandate by promising to help them gain membership to the League of Nations. The British policy of giving a little to take a lot was displayed here, as Britain gained more control of financial and administrative proceedings until this unlikely membership was secured. Therefore, what appeared a benevolent gesture concealed the extension of British power in Iraq by 25 years.
Not only did Iraq provide an indispensable way to protect India, the establishment of airbases was also seen as crucial to Britain’s military and foreign policy.
Refuelling posts in Iraq would provide an important link between Egypt and India and mean that the reliance on the Suez Canal was lessened, somewhat alleviating British pressures in Egypt. Additionally, military bases in Iraq would allow emergency troops to be deployed around the world swiftly. These factors made the security of Iraq’s oil reserves strategically important. Since the navy had switched to oil in 1911, use had risen from 270,000 tons a year to 900,000 tons in 1918 and so Britain acted to protect its stake in the reserves. The 1924 treaty attempted to bridge the gap between the British and the Iraqi nationalists by making concessions to the nationalists and alleviating British worries. The treaty was hugely successful for Britain, which could now position its military forces in Iraq, command local armies, and gain full access to the roads, railways and ports to enable swift mobilisation. The treaty also gave Britain control over the Iraqi army, reducing the threat of revolt. Therefore, British interests were successfully protected as bilateral treaties enabled it to make claims that otherwise would have been wholly
rejected.
Before the 1924 treaty was made, Britain faced nationalist fervour and so made a number of concessions to give the impression of power being transferred to the Iraqis. In 1921 the monarchy was established, and Britain guaranteed the protection of its interests by selecting the obliging King Feisal. To create the impression that the Iraqis had the power to choose their own king Britain conducted a rigged plebiscite to ensure he gained legitimacy, with 96% of votes in his favour. However, in reality the British planned to use Feisal as a pawn. Hundreds of former Ottoman army officers were loyal to him, and Britain planned to deploy them in defence of oil fields following the reduction of their own troops. Britain’s appointment of a sympathetic king only offered short-term protection, as after Faisel’s death in 1933 the next in line was an anti-British nationalist. This highlights the fragility of Britain’s attempts to dictate the monarchy as with the ‘wrong’ king they lost control. The introduction of democracy and monarchy to replace military imperialism gave the Iraqis hope that Britain was willing to make compromises. However, a power discrepancy remained as Britain still had the power to ratify the terms of government, as it did during a night session that the opposition did not attend. Britain’s manoeuvring resulted in an unstable constitutional monarchy and an ever-changing government, although to Britain this was not a failure as the government was created on their terms to be favourable to its imperial interests.
After Britain realised that military supremacy would not facilitate direct rule, the decision to give Iraq control of its own army and police force was made.
Britain managed to maintain its level of covert control despite this and so protected its interests and reduced expenses, believing ‘air control, backed with a few armoured cars’ was an ‘infinitely cheaper’ way to protect its interests. Although this cost efficiency was beneficial, it did not provide sufficient protection from invasion from the desert regions and was no use in heavily populated areas. This highlights the success of the treaties of 1924 and 1930 in ensuring Britain’s protection of military interests as they eliminated such threats. The 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty was configured to give Iraq control of its own domestic policy under British terms and acted as a distraction from the continuation of British control. For example, the British ambassador remained senior to any other ambassador in Baghdad. The treaty also allowed the full use of Iraq’s resources in the event of war. Britain was given two military bases and the authority to train and equip the Iraqi army. The result of this 25 year treaty for the British was reassurance that in war or when faced with a threat to India or elsewhere in the region, it would be able to respond quickly in defence of imperial interests. This also appeased Britain’s fear of appearing weak globally, and prevented other colonial countries spotting the decline of the empire
as it maintained military domination of the area. The 1930 treaty was successful in resolving Britain’s fears regarding military interests and the loss of its stake in the country.