With the premise that “torture is justifiable only to save lives,” Levin illustrates three cases where torture might be justifiable. In the first, he describes a terrorist holding a city of millions hostage to an atomic bomb; the second, a terrorist who has implanted remote-controlled bombs on a plane; and the third, a terrorist who has kidnapped a baby.
In each of these cases, Levin draws hyperbolic situations where it is insinuated that the extreme violence of certain crimes justifies discarding the constitutional rights of individuals. Levin essentially appeals to fear as a way of rationalizing cases where the rights of the individual should not hold for the supposed greater good of the society. Levin does not clearly limit the use of torture to these three extraordinary examples, but rather suggests that any number of cases may require the violation of individual rights, and thereby the constitution. For instance, in his hyperbolic examples, Levin uses saving lives of citizens as necessary to preserve order. However, stifling dissent may also be deemed as necessary to preserve order. Although the torture of