The case study here will illustrate how business adapted to the multilayered lobbying coalition in response to the EU policy-making. The EU Commission introduced the policy on the End of Life Automobile debate in 1994 upon receiving recycling proposals on waste management from the EU Council and EP in 1990 and 1992 respectively. Moreover, the Commission was facing pressure from policy groups, influence from Council of Minister, EP, and the Court of Justice in regards to its responsibility in responding to issues (McCormick, 2001). Therefore, the directive negotiations in 2000 involving the liability for ecological disposal of automobiles embodied the example of how business adapted to the policy …show more content…
The firms partnered with ACEA and lobbied the Commission directly with the argument that the directive should apply to new automobiles only. Nonetheless, the Commission was unwilling and further backed the directive. With the EP showing initial support towards the directive, Volkswagen and other German manufacturers changed their lobbying target and gain national support through increasing the pressure on German government by stressing the cost to the German automobile sector. As a result, the immense domestic pressure prompted the German environmental minister to cancel the planned Council of Ministers Environmental talks in 1999 and decelerated the policy-formulation procedure. Therefore, this strategic move proved the credibility of opting for the national option and that it was largely effective in reformulating EU directives (Tenbucken, …show more content…
It heightened the business influence in politics of inter-Director General competition, and also provided them supposedly policymaking and plan-setting prestige in respective strategic zones (Richardson, 2001). Although the increasingly divisive political targets of large organizations contributed to the pressure for forming new coalitions and political parties, it was also important to clarify that competition between Director Generals (DG) spurred the formation of meetings and networks. The benefit of specialists’ forums was that it allowed the individual Commissioners with their own political and economic communities within Brussels and member states (Broscheid and Coen, 2003). Examples include Liikanen’s Enterprise and Innovation groupings on EU enterprise, competition, growth and employment and Prodi’s e-Europe