Challenger Space Shuttle

CHALLENGER SPACE SHUTTLE- CASE ANALYSIS On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger, exploded just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters, insufficient low- temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of proper communication between different levels of NASA management.
ORGANIZATION AND PEOPLE INVOLVED

* Marshall Space Flight Center - in charge of booster rocket development * Larry Mulloy - challenged the engineers' decision not to launch * Morton Thiokol - Contracted by NASA to build the Solid Rocket Booster * Alan McDonald - Director of the Solid Rocket Motors Project * Bob Lund - Engineering Vice President * Robert Ebeling - Engineer who worked under McDonald * Roger Boisjoly - Engineer who worked under McDonald * Joe Kilminster - Engineer in a management position * Jerald Mason - Senior Executive who encouraged Lund to reassess his decision not to launch.

KEY DATES * 1974 - Morton-Thiokol awarded contract to build solid rocket boosters. * 1976 - NASA accepts Morton-Thiokol's booster design. * 1977 - Morton-Thiokol discovers joint rotation problem. * November 1981 - O-ring erosion discovered after second shuttle flight. * January 24, 1985 - shuttle flight that exhibited the worst Oring blow-by. * July 1985 - Thiokol orders new steel billets for new field joint design. * August 19, 1985 - NASA Level management briefed on booster problem. * January 27, 1986 - night teleconference to discuss effects of cold