Characteristics Of A Democratic National Assembly And Its Role In Combating Corruption

Characteristics of a Democratic National Assembly and its Role in Combating Corruption

By

Cornelius Yamai Zidyep Ayuba
National Assembly Budget & Research Office [e-mail] Being an assignment submitted to the World Bank Institute in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Course “Parliaments and Anticorruption”.

February, 2015

Introduction
The National Assembly (Legislature or parliament) is the arm of Government saddled with the responsibility of making laws. As Nwabueze has noted, the Legislature is the distinctive mark of a country’s sovereignty, the index of its status as a state and the source of much of the power exercised by the executive in the administration of government. The sovereign power of the state is therefore identified in the organ that has power to make laws by Legislation, and to issue “commands” in the form of Legislation binding on the community.
The legislature by virtue of its constitutional responsibilities is the principal institution of anticorruption, accountability, and probity. As the bulwark of representative democracy, it is germane to the consolidation of democracy. The legislature is constitutionally and strategically positioned to undermine authoritarian tendencies on the part of the executive, engender government effective and adequate response to the delivery of public goods and services, and enhance strict adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law. Therefore, the legislature is critical to the sustenance of popular trust in governance processes, institutions, and improving government legitimacy. Obviously, the state of the legislature of a nation at any particular point in time is a significant pointer to the health of the social contract between the government and its citizens.
The legislature as a significant institution of democracy consists of elected representatives of specific political constituencies constitutionally empowered to make laws and oversee the government (Lafenwa, 2009; Loewenberg, 1995). Considering that the legislature is ‘the collective defender and watch dog of the aspirations, ideals and collective will of the people’ (Odinga, 1994:124), it suffices that ‘any attack against the organization, composition or functioning’ (Bello-Imam, 2004: 408) of the legislature poses serious obstacle to democracy.
This paper seeks to examine some of the characteristics of the National Assembly and the roles they play in fighting corruption.
Characteristics of the National Assembly and its role in fighting corruption
Generally, the legislature differs in composition, structure and function globally; however it’s representational, lawmaking, appropriation and oversight functions are universal and germane to deepening democracy (Lafenwa, 2009). Some of the characteristics of the National Assembly as they relate with corruption include:
a. Legislative Role
Of the core roles of parliament, it is likely that the legislative role is the best understood and most similar among countries. Parliaments, constrained only by their constitutions, have the authority to enact any laws they wish and can therefore create the necessary legal framework to prevent and curb corruption. They can enact laws to address what they consider inappropriate behavior by citizens, businesses, and other organizations, and they can provide for surveillance and penalties. In addition, parliaments can focus on bolstering integrity in governance—a broader perspective than fighting corruption—by establishing not only incentives to encourage appropriate private sector behavior but also regimes for financial and public service management, transparency, and accountability in the government sector. Thus, to the extent that better laws would solve the problem of corruption, parliaments—if they reflect well the interests of the citizens and are not captured by other forces—can be part of the solution.
However, while appropriate laws may be a necessary component in a country’s arsenal of policies and interventions to curb corruption, they are never sufficient. If they were, corruption could be easily eradicated. As Jeremy Pope points out, it rarely is a lack of anti-corruption legislation that impedes such efforts; rather, it is often the weak qualitative formulation and the lack of implementation of such laws that need special attention. Legislation must follow a key set of principles— such as compliance with human rights standards—in clear language, minimizing areas of discretion and adapted to the local circumstances. In civil as well as criminal law, parliaments should address some particularly relevant issues—such as conflicts of interest, nepotism, and statutes of limitation—not only to provide for the necessary punitive measures but also to promote an administrative and social environment adverse to corruption.
However, depending on how laws are enacted and the credibility of the electoral process, the laws might be seen as more or less legitimate. Moreover, an appropriate legislative base might not be enacted if the public and parliamentarians are unaware of the costs and benefits of doing so. In addition, the government might well be able to put pressure on parliament—or on a sufficient number of parliamentarians—to impede the enactment of certain legislation. Finally, parliament will have to oversee the implementation of the legislation by the executive.

b. Oversight
Parliaments can also curb corruption by fulfilling another key responsibility: holding the government accountable. This can be achieved through effective participation in the budgetary process, the exercise of parliamentary oversight through anticorruption commissions, cooperation with supreme audit institutions, and promoting a media-friendly environment.
c. Financial Control
Because financial integrity is central to anti-corruption efforts, it is helpful to devote direct attention to parliament’s role in the budget cycle. The budget cycle, which involves the government, public service, civil society, and the legislature, comprises four stages: drafting, legislation, implementation, and audit. In most countries, the ultimate control over the national budget rests with parliament, which may delegate responsibility to government for budget formulation. This “power of the purse” constrains governments to tax and spend in only specific ways and seeks to ensure disciplined management of funds, disciplined reporting, and transparency. It is one of the most powerful parliamentary tools for holding governments to account. It also provides a means for parliamentarians to be heard on how (and how much) money is to be obtained and spent.
Once the budget has been allocated, the parliament—and its specialized committees (such as the public accounts committee) considers the audit findings provided by supreme audit institutions and provides recommendations for the next budget. To ensure transparency and accountability, such a budget cycle must fulfill three conditions. First, there must be a disciplined and transparent assignment of authority for the disbursal of funds granted by parliament. Second, there should be a requirement for clear standards of expenditure measurement, their application, and the results associated with those expenditures—all in relation to the authorities granted and the commitments made when the authorities were granted. Third, there should be publicly accessible controls. Such a regime of parliamentary financial control is a key part of integrity in governance.
These powers are important, but even in mature democracies, parliamentarians lament their loss of influence in financial and budgetary matters. Their power varies, depending not only on the constitutional provisions regarding its role but also on a number of other factors. Typically, an enormous amount of money is being processed, the expertise and detailed information on its application and use rest within the executive, extremely complex financial instruments are applied, and pressures to employ shortcuts to respond to crises are compelling. In addition, in some countries, finances are so stressed that financial management is reduced to cash flow management. Apart from issues of sufficient material and human resource, there is the question of the timing of the budget. It should be tabled sufficiently in advance of the fiscal year to allow for effective scrutiny and analysis.
Another variable is the access to information, which is crucial for parliament to exercise its financial control function, because only accurate, reliable, and timely information can guarantee a proper analysis and evaluation of proposals. Political dynamics and power relationships between the executive and the legislative and between government and the opposition constitute a final important variable. For all these reasons, parliamentarians struggle to understand the application and use of public resources, to influence their use, and to communicate financial matters and any concerns to their constituents. This leads directly to other oversight practices employed by parliament, including the work of parliamentary agents (such as auditors and ombudsmen), mandatory executive reporting on certain operations and performance, or the direct authority to question ministers publicly on the operations of their departments.
This also includes the authority to review departmental and program performance (usually by parliamentary committees) by calling for witnesses and documents, and doing all of this in a transparent fashion in cooperation with outside bodies.
Also, in some countries, parliaments have the authority to review and approve appointments of certain public officials. These practices vary considerably and take various institutional forms, even among jurisdictions with apparently similar oversight structures. Two oversight tools are of particular interest here: supreme audit institutions and anti-corruption commissions.
d. Representation
Representation is a combination of public deliberation and consensus building within parliament, as well as the engagement of citizens on matters of public policy.
Although it is perhaps less tangible than the other parliamentary roles, representation is an important parliamentary instrument for building integrity in public governance. It occurs through a number of different channels, such as the participation of civil society or the formation of political parties, and can have the effect of empowering citizens to reject corrupt practices and expose politicians and officials who engage in corrupt activity. In this way, parliamentarians can help establish public standards for appropriate behavior.
In the most direct sense, parliamentarians, as representatives of the people, are mandated to represent the wishes and concerns of their constituents. Especially in many developing countries, it is likely that a large number of these constituents will be poor. However, because corruption threatens and affects the poor in the worst way, parliamentarians, as their representatives, must prevent it. It falls to them to travel back regularly to their home regions to organize forums of discussions, listen to their constituents, understand the causes and effects of corruption, include this information and awareness in the formulation of anti-corruption policies, and monitor their impact. However, parliamentary practices and support services, regardless of party affiliation, might affect the capacity of individual parliamentarians to pursue a public leadership role in fighting corruption. Where public resources are provided to individual Members to maintain an office in their districts and funds for travel to retain regular face-to-face contact, this aspect of representation is likely to be more effective. Such constituency services are crucial for parliamentarians to retain the necessary legitimacy and public endorsement to pursue their policies.
e. Public Questioning and Media Involvement
As the fourth estate, an independent and attentive media can to a great extent support these parliamentary oversight efforts. Indeed, the media owe it to themselves and to society to participate in the fight against corruption and often do so effectively. Parliament can follow up on public exposure of corrupt officials, the prompting of investigations, and the exhibition of commercial wrongdoing by the media. While ministers may be obligated to respond, they do not always answer the questions posed by parliament.
Nonetheless, where there are independent media, such behavior attracts public attention and thereby reinforces parliamentary oversight. At the same time, parliament has a key role to play in ensuring a free and vibrant media to permit such oversight. It can promote a diverse media landscape, ensure the protection of journalists, push for free access to information, support media accountability, and so forth. An excellent example of such fruitful cooperation occurred during the aftermath of the war in the 1990s in Uganda. The collaboration between an active and representative parliament and a free and independent media, able to challenge the government and provide coverage of corruption scandals, allowed MPs to tackle several high profile cases of fraud.
f. Specialized Agencies
As the complexity of government has grown, complicated by globalization on one side and devolution and decentralization of power on the other, and as the range of financial instruments used in public finance has expanded, the need for professional expertise and resources has led to the creation of specialized parliamentary investigation and accountability agencies in many countries. The best-known of these agencies are supreme audit institutions (SAIs).
Although their mandates vary considerably, particularly among the differing governance systems, SAIs can help to deter waste and corruption by attesting to the financial accuracy of the data provided by the government; checking whether the executive’s spending has complied with applicable provisions, laws, and regulations; and reviewing the government’s performance (that is, whether it has delivered public services in an effective manner). To be effective, an SAI should feature a clear mandate, be independent, continuously update its expertise, and be allowed to report its results to specialized parliamentary committees such as the public accounts committee—which should then consider making recommendations to parliament for enactment. In addition, the need for specialist supporting organizations that are adequately resourced and independent of the executive is growing.
There has been a lot of debate surrounding the role and efficiency of anti-corruption commissions, another institution helping parliament to control corruption.
Indeed, sometimes created as hollow constructs, their sole purpose can be to delay meaningful legal reforms and satisfy the call for reforms from international donors. To ensure their effectiveness, they should be the result of a broad-based appeal by constituents. Moreover, to work successfully, anti-corruption commissions must be independent, part of a broader anti-corruption strategy, embedded in a reporting hierarchy encompassing the legislative and executive, and have the government enact its recommendations.
g. Corruption in Political Parties and Parliament
Little can be achieved by legislators on a national level if they do not first confront the specter of corruption within their ranks. Two particular sets of issues come to mind: political party financing and codes of conduct for parliamentarians.
As the strength of political parties has increased over time, they have become a locus of administrative power and therefore a potential agent of corruption, particularly where their accountability to their members and the entire electorate is weak. Riccardo Pelizzo illustrates this point in chapter 11, showing how the weak institutionalization of political parties in many developing countries increases the temptation to quell financial needs by illegal means. This problem is particularly acute during the electoral competition of political parties for power, leading to a race for financial resources, engendering the problem of party political funding, examined by Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. Corruption scandals in campaign financing, often implicating the parliamentarians themselves, abound and can take a multitude of forms such as vote buying, contributions from criminal sources, illegal use of state sources, and so forth. In many countries, this problem is compounded by traditions of patron-client relationships. The attitude of the electorate then becomes another issue: although they might be condemning corruption in general, they might still sell their votes. Also, in some cases, candidates for office believe that they have no other choice but to engage in illicit fund raising if they must pay for campaigning without public subsidies (Bryan and Baer 2005). Although the problem might never be completely solved, it is up to the legislators to formulate laws regulating campaign finances, including regulations on the disclosure of interests, spending and contribution limits, and the provision of public subsidies. It is also up to parliamentarians to pressurize the government to enforce such laws, establish ethics committees to monitor the political campaigns, and so forth.
The legitimacy of democracy does not only depend on the integrity of political parties. Parliamentarians themselves must adhere to strictly ethical behavior. Covering everything from conflicts of interest and the disclosure of assets to rules on post governmental employment and nepotism, codes of conduct and codes of ethics perform two functions: internally, they improve the behavior of legislators; externally, they restore the often-shattered public confidence in parliamentarians. To be effective, such codes must be accompanied by enforcement mechanisms and be based on a shared understanding by parliamentarians of what is appropriate behavior and what is not, because otherwise they amount to little else then empty promises. A practical insight into the development and application of codes of conduct is provided with Sir Philip Mawer’s case study of the House of Commons’ Parliamentary Codes of Conduct and Registers of Members’ Interests in the United Kingdom. One of the key aspects of this code is the open and publicly accessible disclosure of the assets of Members of Parliament (MPs), which provide the population with the knowledge of the interests that might affect the MP’s decision making.
Another important element is the relatively effective means of enforcement. Although ethical problems still do occur, it seems that this code has managed to restore public confidence in the parliamentary system in many ways.
CONCLUSION
Together, these four approaches to oversight—financial control, specialized agencies, public questioning, and media involvement—can be a powerful antidote to corruption. They are more effective to the degree that they have professional staff support and independent media to ensure that the public is well informed as to what is occurring—ultimately under their “authority.” However, where parliament itself is dominated by a corrupt executive or lacks representative legitimacy, these theoretical oversight powers might well not exist in practice. Thus, as with legislative power, they are only part of the parliamentary toolbox for curbing corruption.

Bibliography
Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 15, No.6, 2013), “LEGISLATIVE CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN THE NIGERIAN FOURTH REPUBLIC” by Monday Aliu.
CICP Global Programme Against Corruption Conference, Vienna, December 1999, “Prevention: An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption”.
“STATUS AND ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN A DEMOCRACY”, A public lecture delivered to mark the 47th Birthday of Michael Opeyemi Bamidele, Esq. on the 27th of July, 2010.
WBI Developmental Studies, “THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN CURBING CORRUPTION”, Edited by Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston, Riccardo Pelizzo.
Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa (2011 – 2016) By Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD) of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Collaboration with the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) Programme Document, “Combating Corruption, Improving Governance in Africa”. www.google.com

Bibliography: Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 15, No.6, 2013), “LEGISLATIVE CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN THE NIGERIAN FOURTH REPUBLIC” by Monday Aliu. CICP Global Programme Against Corruption Conference, Vienna, December 1999, “Prevention: An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption”. “STATUS AND ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN A DEMOCRACY”, A public lecture delivered to mark the 47th Birthday of Michael Opeyemi Bamidele, Esq. on the 27th of July, 2010. WBI Developmental Studies, “THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN CURBING CORRUPTION”, Edited by Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston, Riccardo Pelizzo. Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa (2011 – 2016) By Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD) of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Collaboration with the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) Programme Document, “Combating Corruption, Improving Governance in Africa”. www.google.com