Civil Society: Power to Change?

How important is civil society to bringing about political and social change? In this essay we will explore the varying importance of civil society in different countries and across periods of time and how this relative importance is reflected in its capability for both political and social change; the former relating to a modification in the political structure or constitution and the latter an alteration in social order within society.
A civil society is defined as ‘a diverse sphere of social activity, distinguished from the state, the market, the public and the private spheres’8, a visual representation of this is shown by Janoski’s model (Fig. 1), where civil society is everything within the three overlapping spheres below that of the state.

Fig 1.8

These ‘non-state actors’1 represent what Putnam calls the ‘social capital’11 which he says ‘exist within certain networks of norms and trust to enable participants to

function more effectively in pursuing a common goal’9. I’d agree with Putnam that
‘social capital’ are imperative in civil society achieving change. However, I’d argue its ability to do so depends on the individual circumstances, therefore civil society’s importance cannot be qualified as a whole- but instead is relative to specific cases.
Similarly, although I find Janoski’s model useful in providing a basis in understanding what civil society is comprised of, it is just a single perspective and due to the idea of theory should be treated as a map- that is just an abstract subject to evolution. For example, he places the police in the ‘state sphere’, however I would argue that despite their employment by the state, when off duty a policeman remains active in the interests of society- and so overlaps into the public sphere. I will draw mainly on the theories of Putnam, Dahl and Gellner’s civil society to both agree and contest what they perceive as a civil society and therefore its importance in instigating change.
I am particularly interested is the nature of the change, as I would argue it has significant importance since ultimately the type of change will support or indeed restrict the extent of civil society’s involvement. Firstly we will look at the instantaneous revolutionary transformations of The French Revolution and the more current ‘Arab Spring’ to see how civil society’s importance and methods have developed. Following this we will consider a more structured and managed political change through procedures involving political parties. With the help Putnams’s findings on ‘active civil engagement’11, I’ll consider the case for the possible decline of participation in civil society with the example of reduced turn-out rates in the electorate1. Within the evaluations of each case I will draw on the pluralist argument that civil society is a ‘main condition of a properly functioning democratic order’10 by using examples of countries in different stages of democratisation, such as the UK and Switzerland, to show how the type of democracy (‘direct and participatory’2) as well as political structures can affect also civil society’s ability to inspire change.
In conclusion I will reiterate that the importance of civil society can only be relative to a specific example and the context in which you decide to understand the term
‘civil society’. Furthermore although there is some evidence for a decline in citizenship, civil society still remains at the forefront of political and social change within both democratic and non-democratic states.

The Oxford Dictionary defines change as: ‘the act or an instance of making or becoming different’5. In the context of my first examples the ‘act’ was one of revolution where the ‘social capital’ within civil society united in a ‘social movement’1 to achieve a common goal- that being freedom via democratisation.
In his book, Brubaker3 breaks The French Revolution down into two contributory revolutions which made up the national revolution: ‘the bourgeois revolution’ and
‘the democratic revolution’3. The former represents a primarily social change in an alteration to social order, demonstrated by the emergence of a popular or middle class with ‘common rights bound by common obligations’ giving rise to the concept of ‘civil equity’3 (Sieyes). The effect of the latter, in contrast, focuses on the advance in political rights enabled by the democratisation of the state allowing the social capital greater ‘civil equality and political participation’3. Putnam would argue that this opportunity for greater participation allows for greater ‘active civil engagement’ which he says contributes to a more stable and therefore effective civil society11.
Gellner7 would also recognise the importance of ‘freedom’ brought about by democratisation. He says it is ‘the principle condition that makes a society civil’10 in so much that the citizens can ‘freely organise themselves into these groups and organisations at various levels’10. In the context of the French Revolution the emerging class based society demonstrates an organisation into groups whilst the condition of democracy allows them to do this freely.
The term ‘democracy’ comes from the Greek ‘Demos Kratos’2 which literally means
‘people rule’2, suggesting the ‘people’ are granted freedom from the state. In Tunisia this ‘freedom’ was established by the over throw of the oppressive authoritarian regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali14. As well as the ‘people’, the media were an equally important actor14 of the civil society; particularly in organising demonstrations and rallying support amongst society. One report said ‘protesters took to the streets with "a rock in one hand, a cell phone in the other"’14. This highlights how modernisation and technological advances have changed the way civil society operates from the historical example of France to present day Tunisia. The media’s role in Tunisia also provides a ground for reasoning that we shouldn’t necessarily focus on civil society’s importance as a whole in achieving change but rather the relative importance of specific actors as well.

Pietrzyk highlights the importance of ‘democratisation of the social and political spheres and the development of civil society as a mutual process to political and economic stability’10. He draws on Dahl’s ‘Five key conditions for a substantive democracy’4 to summarise what he says are necessary factors of democracy, these are: ‘effective participation through the expression of views, voting equality, enlightened understanding of political issues promoting decisions based on citizen’s best interests, control of the agenda by the masses’ rather than by what C Wright
Mills refers to as ‘The Power Elite’16 and universal inclusion. However, an elitist would critique the view that the co-existence of democracy and civil society is essential for stability. They would argue that there is no such thing as a ‘substantive democracy’; and instead support the ‘top-down’1 approach, where the ‘elites’ of society are the only actors able to generate change. Similarly, rational choice theorists reject the importance of a civil society and say it’s simply a ‘temporary alliance of same interests’10 suggesting a lack of long term cohesion in civil society’s motives and so reducing it’s importance.
Furthermore, although Dahl says ‘a thriving’ civil society contributes to a ‘substantive democracy’4 the example’s discussed show that even in the absence of democracy
(pre-revolution) the importance of civil society, in facilitating change, is not diminished. This supports Gellner’s notion of ‘civic spirit’7 as a necessary accompaniment for a successful civil society. He says ‘civil society cannot just be identified with the existence of plural institutions which are able to counterbalance the state’10, in other words ‘civic spirit’ is seen as superior in binding citizens to their obligations and responsibilities rather than the presence of Dahl’s5 conditions of a democracy. I would agree with Gellner in this instance, however, it must be noted that in what Dahl describes as a ‘substantive democracy’ a political change of this nature would be carried out in a very different way. Despite his view that civil society’s presence is more useful than just a democracy, Gellner does recognise the importance of democracy as ‘providing a basis for legitimate politics’1 that is politics in a competitive and transparent environment- which we will look at in the case of the UK.
Instead of violent demonstrations and social uproar we will now turn to examine a democratic elective system, as in the 2010 UK general election when David Cameron

and his conservative-liberal democratic coalition government replaced Gordon
Brown’s labour government.
This is an example of a more managed change than a revolutionary one, where the electorate (as part of civil society) vote for their preferential candidate and in turn they are elected to represent the views of society through their role in ‘democratic guardianship’2. In the case of the UK, ‘a single member district plurality’ (SMDP) voting system is in place1, where one candidate is elected per constituency to give a
‘first past the post’1 result- that is the person with the most votes wins and no majority (at least 50% of the vote) is necessary. This differs from that of a proportionately representative system where a majority is necessary; this system is adopted by the majority of continental Europe.
That aside, arguably plural systems reduce civil society’s importance in the decision and instead concentrates the policy making with ‘The Power Elite’16 since the result is not directly proportionate to that of the votes collected and therefore it is less representative of the individual interests of all actors and minorities in society, suggesting a situation of ‘democratic deficit’1. On top of this there is the issue of accountability where ‘safe seats’1 exist in a parliament, these are the seats which are not contestable when the election is carried out, in the case of the UK only 26% of the seats were marginal in the 2010 election17. This is evidence for how civil society’s ability to instigate change can be reduced by the specific political system in place in a state. Although this arguably shows that the single voter may have less influence over the result in such a system, it doesn’t necessary diminish civil society’s influence as a whole. In Janoski’s model8 ‘political parties’ are placed in the public sphere and so by his defintion are part of civil society, even if they are the entities which contribute to the making up of the state. Rhodes defined the ‘core executive’ as ‘the complex web of institutions, network and practices surrounding the prime minister, cabinet, cabinet committees and their official counterparts’13, suggesting that in fact there is a downward distribution of power from the top in a process known in the politics jargon as ‘agentification’1 , this is the decentralisation of decision making from
Westminster (in the UK) to regional constituencies. Putnam’s work in Italy supports

this as he concludes ‘the performance of government and other social institutions is powerfully influenced by citizen engagement in community affairs’12.
However, liberalists would contest the degree of power which is actually filtered to the masses, they would argue that the budgets and information for most schemes is still tied-up in the higher governmental procedures.
Switzerland is sometimes termed a ‘direct democracy’1 as their civil society is thought to have greater engagement through the wide use of referendums. It takes just
‘50000 of the country’s 7.3 million citizens who so object to a law or policy that they want to see it struck down to sign a petition to force a binding referendum’1, which in theory puts more power in the hands of the electorate. However, in line with this
Papadopoulos (2001)1 research found ‘the Swiss political class have become increasingly adept at doing deals in order to head off, or at least control, the effects of referendums’1, in light of this it’s difficult to quantify the overall power balance between the state and society.
Furthermore there is the issue of electoral turn-out; if turnout is low it will affect the legitimacy of the result as well as the overall representation of society. This narrowing of the ideological base could lessen civil society’s importance, as it contradicts the nature of freedom of choice in a democracy and instead supports centralisation of politics1.
The electoral turn out can be directly linked to Tilly’s classification of citizenship into
‘thick and thin’15, the former referring to the ‘rooted cosmopolitans’1 who are more active in society (so more likely to vote) and promote the freedom to participate through their civic virtue7. The latter denotes a more negative form where citizenship is a just public status, inherently separate from private lives.
Bellamy2 introduces two main reasons for the rise of this ‘thin’ citizenship these are:
1) ‘the growth of a more consumer-orientated attitude towards the state’ and 2) ‘the cultural fragmentation and attenuation of the political community’2. He argues that the competitive nature of privatisation undermines ‘civic attitudes’ hence people’s willingness to contribute to society will decline and therefore an ‘affluent contented majority’ class can emerged at the expense of the less affluent members of society leading to what he describes as ‘social exclusion’ of classes2. This links to decline in electoral turn out as if people choose not to contribute by way of voting then parties

may receive criticism for departing from their role as ‘inclusive and principled movements aiming at the collective good’3 which, as Bellamy suggests, could result in a lapse in people’s confidence in political parties and so they may seek alternative routes to have an influence in society- such as pressure groups. However, the capacity for these pressure groups to influence political change depends upon the system in place in the given state: be it pluralist or neo-corporatist1. The former refers to a more liberal structure, where competition between interest groups representing specific policy areas exists in a non-hierarchal arrangement4. Neocorporatism on the other hand is based on ‘tri-partite bargaining’1 processes which, although more efficient than the time consuming pluralism alternative, restricts negotiation and therefore limits the capability of civil society.
This is important as the type of citizen and therefore their propensity to participate in such groups will influence the level of what Putnam calls ‘active civil engagement’, which he considers a vital factor contributing to Dahl’s ‘thriving’5 civil society. In his research on the United States (US) Putnam concludes there is a decline in civil participation11 for example he found ‘fewer people join organisations, sign petitions and even evidence suggesting people socialise less with their friends and families’11.
In Tilly’s terms this would represent a move towards ‘thin’ citizenship, and Putnam argues this is significant because ‘a well-functioning and strong democracy is dependent on active civil engagement’11 and that ‘social capital’ are inherent to this process. It seems to be evident, throughout the examples discussed, that civil society-with or without the co-existence of a democratic regime, is at the forefront of both political and social change. The French Revolution, arguably, sets the basis for the popular model of liberal democracy currently adopted by most states, in the western world in particular10. Dahl’s ‘Five key conditions for democracy’4 is useful in providing us with an outline for the main social and political changes the revolutions brought about, however we the changes felt differ in each. Another key point made was the change in operations within civil society, demonstrated by the use of the media and technological communication in Tunisia which was essential in the success of overturning the oppressive state.

On top of this I highlighted the importance of how we perceive civil society in reflection of its importance. The pluralist argument would see civil society as a main condition of a functioning democracy10, whereas an elitist would disagree that civil society has an importance as they would say democracy only exists as ‘formal’ where the capability for change is concentrated with the elite in a ‘top-down’ system1.
However, given the evidence in revolutionary examples I would argue that civil society is able to undermine the elites and so will conclude that in a revolutionary transformation civil society has an over-riding importance, whereas in the more evolutionary forms of change there is greater interdependence between civil society and the state as although the ‘final word’ may be considered to be with the elected they must perform to gain the confidence and support from the electorate to reach that position and of course to maintain it.

References
1)

Bale, Tim (2013) European Politics: A Comparative Introduction, 3rd ed., Chp 7 and 8 p

2)

Bellamy, Richard (2008) Citizenship, a very short introduction. Oxford University Press,
Chp 5 ‘Participation and democracy’ pg98-116

3)

Brubaker, Rogers. (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. 3 23.60
944 Chp 2 pg 39, 40, 43

4)

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and its critics, Yale University Press

5)

Dorling Kindersley, Oxford Dictionary. Oxford University Press (1998) p141

6)

Encyclopedia Britannica. 2013. French Revolution (1787-99). [online] Available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/219315/French-Revolution [Accessed: 24
Oct 2013].

7)

Gellner, E. (1991). Civil society in historical context. International Social Science Journal

8)

Janoski, Thomas, Ed.(2005) The handbook of political sociology: states, civil societies, and globalization, New York/Cambridge: CUP

9)

Mclean, Iain and McMillan, Alistair (2005) The Consise Oxford Dictionary of Politics.
Oxford Paperback Reference, pg487

10)

Pietrzyk, I. Dorota, (2003) Democracy or Civil Society? Political Studies Association: Vol
23 (1), 38-45

11)

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community, New York/London: Touchstone

12)

Putnam, Robert D (Dec., 1995), PS: Political Science and Politics Vol. 28, No. 4 pp. 664-683

13)

Rhodes, R.A.W (1995). ‘From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive’, in R.A.W.
Rhodes and P. Dunleavy (eds.), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive. New York:
St Martian’s Press.

14)

Ryan, Y. 2013. How Tunisia 's revolution began. [online] Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html [Accessed: 24 Oct 2013].

15)

Tilly, Charles. 1996. Citizenship, Identity and Social History, London: Routledge

16)

Wright Mills, C. (1956). The Power Elite. The Power Elite

17)

UK Parliament. 2013. General elections. [online] Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/education/about-your-parliament/general-elections/ [Accessed: 30 Oct 2013]

References: 1) Bale, Tim (2013) European Politics: A Comparative Introduction, 3rd ed., Chp 7 and 8 p 2) Bellamy, Richard (2008) Citizenship, a very short introduction Brubaker, Rogers. (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. 3 23.60 944 Chp 2 pg 39, 40, 43 8) Janoski, Thomas, Ed.(2005) The handbook of political sociology: states, civil societies, Mclean, Iain and McMillan, Alistair (2005) The Consise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Pietrzyk, I. Dorota, (2003) Democracy or Civil Society? Political Studies Association: Vol 23 (1), 38-45 Putnam, Robert D (Dec., 1995), PS: Political Science and Politics Vol. 28, No. 4 pp 13) Rhodes, R.A.W (1995)