Clri Research Paper
University of London
Common Law Reasoning and Institutions
Essay Title: ‘The approach of the Law Lords to statutory interpretation has been radically changed by the Human Rights Act. Judges now see themselves as legislating human rights through their interpretation of Acts of Parliament.’
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In the Human Rights Act, judges are legislating human rights through their own way of interpretation of the Acts of Parliament. The Human Rights Act was introduced and implemented during Tony Blair’s time. This makes sure UK respects and obeys to the EU laws. Hence, economic burden and legal are lessen as there is no such need to go to the ECHR in Strausburg for cases of such issues. Statutory interpretation is a method or process used by the courts in a manner to interpret or discover laws that were passed down by Parliament. Due to the issue of separation of powers, judges are to interpret as they sees fit to do so within their role, so as to not having the judiciary interfering in their line of legislative functions. The common methods or general methods of interpretation were developed solely by the judges. The Parliament has no part or role in this matter. The Interpretation Act 1978 was introduced and passed down to ease the burden of enabling statutes to be drafted more conveniently, and mostly are the definitions of the common provisions. The first approach known as literal approach is meant by defining the words of the statute as ordinary and plain even though if it leads to absurdity in the case of Stock v Frank Jones. The literal interpretation was applied by the courts and they were not willing to read into the words of the statute. Judges might seek to look and search the dictionaries, law journals, and several other relevant materials to clarify the ambiguity of the words that were going to be used literally in the case. Thus, judges might consider adopting the approach of the Golden Rule to sway away from an
Common Law Reasoning and Institutions
Essay Title: ‘The approach of the Law Lords to statutory interpretation has been radically changed by the Human Rights Act. Judges now see themselves as legislating human rights through their interpretation of Acts of Parliament.’
Student Number:
Candidate Number:
In the Human Rights Act, judges are legislating human rights through their own way of interpretation of the Acts of Parliament. The Human Rights Act was introduced and implemented during Tony Blair’s time. This makes sure UK respects and obeys to the EU laws. Hence, economic burden and legal are lessen as there is no such need to go to the ECHR in Strausburg for cases of such issues. Statutory interpretation is a method or process used by the courts in a manner to interpret or discover laws that were passed down by Parliament. Due to the issue of separation of powers, judges are to interpret as they sees fit to do so within their role, so as to not having the judiciary interfering in their line of legislative functions. The common methods or general methods of interpretation were developed solely by the judges. The Parliament has no part or role in this matter. The Interpretation Act 1978 was introduced and passed down to ease the burden of enabling statutes to be drafted more conveniently, and mostly are the definitions of the common provisions. The first approach known as literal approach is meant by defining the words of the statute as ordinary and plain even though if it leads to absurdity in the case of Stock v Frank Jones. The literal interpretation was applied by the courts and they were not willing to read into the words of the statute. Judges might seek to look and search the dictionaries, law journals, and several other relevant materials to clarify the ambiguity of the words that were going to be used literally in the case. Thus, judges might consider adopting the approach of the Golden Rule to sway away from an
Bibliography: 1. Adam Gearey, Wayne Morrison & Robert Jago, ‘Politics of Common Law’, (Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), p.102 2. Hansard HL Deb 03 November 1997 vol 582 cc1227-312 3. ‘The Interpretation of Statutes’, Law Commission Report. no. 21, 1969 4. Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 5. Pepper v Hart [1993], 1 All ER, 42 6. Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142 7. Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 W.L.R. 830 8. R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Spath Holme (2001) 2 W.L.R. 15 9. Fitzpatrick v Sterling [2001] 1 A.C. 27