Inspector Of Taxes V. Kiernan Analysis

Critical Assessment of judgement in Inspector of Taxes v. Kiernan

Inspector of Taxes v. Kiernan (hereinafter referred to as Kiernan) is a Supreme Court case which, at first glance, would appear to deal with a rather innocuous question, can “pigs” be referred to as “cattle”? The question of whether pigs can be included within the confines of the the term cattle might seem both banal and quite absurd, but the judgement on this question has had repercussions for many subsquent cases since this matter was arbitrated on. 1 Kiernan demonstrates one of the common approaches that can be taken when acts or statutes are being interpreted in this jurisdiction, namely the literal rule.The literal rule is a means of interpreting legislation whereby the wording or ordinary meaning of the legislation is paramount. Furthermore, this case is important for practioners of the law as it shows how even a minor technicality such as a minor mistake in the wording of legislation can
judgment. He expressed the opinion that the case Phillips(Inspector of Taxes) v Bourne “was wrongly decided”.Certainly Phillips(Inspector of Taxes) v Bourne had persuasive value for the Kiernan judgment and stare decisis is certainly a powerful maxim in a common law jurisdiction like Ireland. However, precedent cannot always be the singularly decisive factor in deciding a case. Hence why Henchy J. stated the opinion above. As Atkinson J. stated in his judgment on that case: “There is not the faintest doubt, I think, that in 1806 the word "cattle" would have been construed so as to include pigs. Even in 1842 (which is over 100 years ago) I think the same result would have followed. So much for the dictionary approach”.8 Finlay, Henchy & Hederman JJ disagreed with that assessment. In 1806 pigs were construed as cattle, but the ordinary meaning of cattle changed in the following hundred years such that cattle became a term exclusive to “bovine