Coady's Essay 'Tactical Definition Of Terrorism'

The tactical definition of terrorism in Coady’s essay is the organized use of violence to target non-combatants for political purposes. Non-combatants are any person’s that do not directly coherence with the agents of aggression. The just war tradition tells us the conditions under which it can be right to resort to war (jus ad bellum) and to guide us in the permissible methods by which we should wage a legitimate war (jus in bello). Given the just war tradition and the tactical definition of terrorism, terrorism is morrally wrong. In addition, the supreme emergency must be accounted for. The definition of supreme emergency allows for the violation of the normal immunity of terrorism to be permissible in warfare, though only with a heavy burden of remorse. However, the theory of supreme emergency suffers from grave defects whether it is offered as an exemption on behalf of a state, or some less established political community, or a group claiming to represent either.Therefore, all forms of terrorism and their exemptions are morally wrong.
The main argument that Coady explains is that terrorism comes in many forms, but the most prevalent is the organized us of violence to target the “innocent.” He argues that this form of terrorism is extremely immoral on the grounds that people not associated with the physical agents of aggression should not be punished for the other group’s wrong-doings.
He goes on to explain that for an act of terrorism to be considered before an act of war is because of the just war tradition. The just war tradition has two main divisions which help us to understand when a war should happen and what needs to be considered during the
war. Coady first concentrates on the idea of the “innocent” victims in his tactical definition of terrorism. His definition of a non-combatant expresses this clearly as a person that is not directly related to the chain of command given to them by the state, or on their own accord. These people need to be protected from harm and death. He quotes Yasser Arafat as stating that “no degree of oppression and no level of desperation can ever justify the killing of innocent civilians.” This is meant to describe the position of the innocents and the immoral affects afficted upon them. However, the innocent are often the ones who suffer from the acts although they have no part in the movements themselves other than to be used as a tactic. This is why he issues his definition of terrorism to be a tactical one rather than an ideology. He states that this tendency to use terrorism as a tactic should be resisted, since states can and do use the tactic of attacking the innocent. He also questions the political definition of terrorism by explaining how non-state agents can affect the state by using terrorism. He uses the political definition only briefly to contrast the tactical definition. Although the contrast is brief, he makes it simple to understand that the political definition is not the one worth divulging at this point. He then goes on to state that terrorist acts can be, and usually are, both expressive and politically purposive. But he then quickly questions whether these purposes are particularly realistc because the argument that being a terrorist to merely be expressive is futile. The just war tradition helps to explain when it is right to resort to war (jus ad bellum) and to explain the guides to be used during the war (jus in bello). There are several conditions listed under the jus ad bellum including; there must be a just cause for going to war, war must be declared and waged by legitimate authority, and other conditions. However, the concentrated upon area of the just war tradition seems to be the jus in bello. There are basically two governing principles under this division: the principal of discrimination and the principle of proportionality. The principle of discrimination limits the kind of violence that can be used by qualifying a legitimate target. The principle of proportionality limits the degree of response by requiring that the vilent methods used do not inflict more damage than the original offence could require. He again decides to further concentrate his argument to the principle of discrimination. He explains that he does this because it is the principle most relevant to his approach to terrorism. The major part of the discrimination principle seems to be the concern the fact that non-combatants should be protected from direct attack. He goes on to state that just because someone is a non-combatant, it does not mean that they do not have cruel minds, but rather they have no direct chain of authority to carry out aggression. He concludes by stating which kinds of terrorism are moral, if any. The first that he considers is the use of terrorism to combat terrorism. He immediately states that attacking the innocent is illegitimate when used by non-state groups, and equally as immoral as when the state uses terrorism in return. His second is the use of violence to capture terrorists. This is legitimate if it accords with the conditions of jus ad bellum. It is unclear whether this notion would ever govern the right to go to war, seeing as it must be a last resort. On the other hand, it may be legitimate if the sole purpose was to capture the terrorist to prevent further terrorist attacks from occurring. Lastly, he specifically reminisces that strafing to aid the military overthrow is likely to be both politically and morally inadequate as a response to terrorism. This act deals far too much damage to the innocent. Therefore it must be ruled out as well. The evaluation of this essay is one that