As a Failure of Fire Prevention Policy and Practice
Andres Velasco
Eastern Kentucky University
This paper was prepared for FSE 101 Fire Prevention, taught by Professor Sobaski.
Cocoanut Grove: Examining an American Tragedy as a Failure of Fire Prevention Policy and Practice On November 28, 1942, approximately 1000 people packed into three main rooms of a two-level nightclub at 17 Piedmont Street in Boston, Massachusetts. The
Cocoanut Grove club was one of New England’s premier nightclubs, located just outside the theater district on the edge of Bay Village, one of the city’s oldest historical neighborhoods. “At the time the Coconut Grove was …show more content…
the largest and most popular nightspot of its type in the city of Boston and was referred to as ‘the poor man’s
Ritz’”(Cunningham, 2003). The tragic fire which swept through this building turned a dreamy fall night on the town into a nightmare for the victims of the fire, the survivors, and the collective consciousness of a city which has never forgotten this terrible event.
What will be examined in this paper is how the Cocoanut Grove fire was a perfect storm of negative interacting factors and an example of a catastrophic failure of fire prevention policy and practice.
Scope of the Tragedy Nearly half of the revelers who were in attendance at the party on Piedmont
Street lost their lives that night, and at least 170 more were seriously injured. The official death toll grew to 492 in the days and weeks that followed, which marks the Cocoanut
Grove incident as the deadliest nightclub fire in U.S. history. “All of the 492 dead had been identified 89 hours and 40 minutes after the alarm was sounded at 10:20 p.m. on
Saturday (Turner & Tuite, 2012, p.G3).” In this country only the Iroquois Theater fire of
1903 claimed more victims in a single-building fire. At the Iroquois Theater in Chicago,
602 perished, “most of them women and children attending a matinee at a theater that had been advertised as fireproof” (Esposito, 2005, p.226). The Cocoanut Grove catastrophe still holds its place as the worst fire in Boston history. Following the holocaust, the anguished city mourned its dead. “On December 3 alone, 150 funerals were scheduled.
The chapel bell at Malden’s Holy Cross Cemetery tolled almost continuously, as nineteen burials were scheduled” (Schorow, 2005, p.41).
Cause Unknown
How could this terrible event happen in the city known as the Athens of
America? Unfortunately, “[i]n this case, no official cause has been determined even after all these years (Beller & Sapochetti, 2000, p.91). The origin of the fire and its rapid spread mystified the experts who witnessed it and later investigated it.
The responsibility for analyzing all phases of the fire rested with William Arthur
Reilly, Boston’s fire commissioner, and Stephen J. Garrity, the state fire marshall to whom Reilly reported. They were assisted by Fire Chief Pope and the heads of
Fire Department divisions that had responded to the Grove alarms. These men had dealt with blazes in slums, warehouses, office buildings, and tenements for years. None of them had ever seen a fire that moved so fast, burned so fiercely, produced such curious gases, yet consumed so little of the building in which it broke out. (Benzaquin, 1959, p.215)
Some writers believe that a cause has been determined by advanced computerized fire modeling techniques. “As to the cause of the fire, in 1997, new information
and improved understanding of fire dynamics led to the determination that the flash fire was caused by extremely flammable methyl chloride leaking from a faulty refrigerator in a service area near the downstairs Melody Lounge” (Fire Rescue Magazine, 2010).
However, this is a misconception; the jury is still out, as Beller and Sapochetti explain,
“The last step in the scientific method is testing and selecting a hypothesis, which can only be done after carefully testing each hypothesis for validity. The methyl chloride hypothesis used as an example has yet to go through this rigorous process, which is why it remains only one of many speculated theories” (Beller & Sapochetti, 2000, p.93).
Four Critical Links
There are four crucial links in the fire prevention system: code adequacy, adoption of code, inspection and compliance. There were failures in each of these links at the time of the fire; it was a perfect storm of negative factors. First of all, there were code inadequacy issues – the classification of occupancy at that time was not adequate to deal with nightclubs.
Building Commissioner James Moody said that he had no power to compel the use of fireproof draperies or decorations and could not compel the Cocoanut
Grove to install fire sprinklers. “The Cocoanut Grove does not come under the heading of ‘places of public assembly’ and hence it was not subject to regulations that affect lodging houses and theaters” (Cocoanut Grove Coalition,
Codes and Standards) Secondly, codes that would have helped were in place before the fire, but weren’t yet adopted by the city of Boston.
A new Building Exits Code (the predecessor to today’s Life Safety Code) had been approved in by NFPA in February 1942, but the code had not adopted by the City of Boston. In it were the principles of safety that, had they been followed, would have prevented many deaths: • Exits available in reasonable travel distance • At least two ways out remote from each other—additional exits according to the number of persons and relative fire danger • Exit paths marked, unobstructed, well lighted • Plan views of favored types of emergency exits • Evacuation drills well planned, frequently practiced (Cocoanut Grove Coalition, Codes and Standards)
The Building Exits code said of revolving doors: “Revolving doors shall not be used on required exits except that approved collapsible revolving doors may be used between street floor (but not at foot of stairs) and street where specifically permitted by occupancy sections” (Building exits code, 1942, p.28). Third, a new lounge at the club circumvented the proper inspection process.
There was new construction to the night club in 1942 to build out the Broadway
Lounge. In inspecting the premises, the Building Commissioner found that the only error was the absence of a steel fire door between the new Broadway
Lounge and the Main Dining Room. The door had been ordered but not delivered. The new lounge was opened without the required certificate of inspection. (Cocoanut Grove Coalition , Codes and Standards). And fourth, there were compliance issues which contributed to the tragedy.
Various authors cite that the attendance at the club that night exceeded the legal maximum occupancy rate. “The fire started at approximately 2215 HRS, immediately causing widespread panic among the 1,000 nightclub patrons (well beyond the club’s official capacity of 460)” (Fire Rescue Magazine, 2010). “Into this environment on the night of the fire the management packed over a thousand revelers, far beyond the club 's legal capacity of about 600” (Steffen, 2009).
After the addition of the Broadway Lounge, the club had applied for a license as a restaurant with a capacity of 490 patrons. The reported capacity of all areas was approximately 600. On the night of November 28, 1942, the Cocoanut Grove was well over capacity, with estimates of over 1,000 occupants in the building at the time of the fire (Duval, 2006, p.6)
Fire Accelerates Adoption Process We can now look at how, in the aftermath of Cocoanut Grove, local governments addressed problems with the second link of the fire prevention system, adoption of fire code. At the time preceding the fire there was a big gap between national fire code recommendations and actual city fire codes which were officially adopted and on the books. “In Boston in particular, and across the nation in general, officials took a hard look at fire codes which, despite the presence of voluntary recommendations by national groups such as the National Fire Protection Association, are implemented and administered primarily at the municipal or county level” (Steffen, 2009). As Stephanie Schorow explains in The Cocoanut Grove Fire, the fire’s greatest impact upon the fire prevention system was not the creation of a bunch of new fire-safety codes (this is a common misconception); rather, the fire was instrumental in breaking down the psychological barriers of local lawmakers which before had made them unwilling to adopt national recommendations. “In 1943, Massachusetts created the
Massachusetts Board of Fire Prevention Regulations, which required municipal fire officials to enforce tougher state codes” (Schorow, 2005, p.70).
Code Adequacy Improves However, there were improvements to the fire codes in certain areas. The classification of occupancy shortfalls (these had failed to properly categorize nightclubs. as “places of public assembly”) which had hampered the fire prevention powers of
Boston Building Commissioner James Moody before the fire occurred were amended to include a new definition of nightclubs which now properly placed them in that category, and thus subject to stricter codes (Schorow, 2005, p.70). New job positions were created within the fire prevention system to provide manpower to enforce stricter fire codes for nightclubs. “The Boston Fire Department also established a position of department chemist, with the responsibility to evaluate draperies and decorations used in nightclubs” (Schorow, 2005, p.70). The Boston Fire Commissioner, William Arthur Reilly, conducted a thorough and far-reaching investigation. “Reilly questioned experts from his own department, as well as patrons, employees, and victims of the fire. Now, to interpret the testimony, he obtained the advice of authorities on wiring, chemistry, fire control, and building construction” (Benzaquin, 1959, p.216). The recommendations for fire prevention legislation he set forth in his “Report Concerning the Cocoanut Grove Fire, November
28, 1942,” were as follows:
1. Installation of automatic sprinklers in any room occupied as a restaurant, night club, or place of entertainment.
2. Prohibition of the use of basement rooms as places of assembly unless provision is made for at least two direct means of access to the street with installation of metal-covered automatic closing fire doors being required in
any passage existing between basement room and first floor.
3. Requirement of defined aisle space between tables in restaurants, such
tables to be firmly affixed to the floor to prevent upsetting and obstruction of
means of egress.
4. Exit doors in places of assembly to have so-called panic locks and no others.
Such exits to be marked by illuminated “EXIT” signs with the minimum candle
power to be specified in the law, and supplied by an electrical system…
5. Absolute prohibition of any fabric or material containing pyroxylin in places of
assembly.
6. Absolute prohibition in any place of assembly of the use of any suspended
cloth false ceiling.
7. Window openings of sufficient area, equipped with louvers secured by a
fusible link so as to open automatically when exposed to heat, for the purpose
of drawing off flames or gases, should be required in basement rooms used
as places of public assembly. A major lesson of this fire is that persons and
fire must be provided with separate means of exit. (Reilly, 1943, p.49)
This progressive agenda quickly garnered national backing from a broad base of lawmakers and constituents and impacted fire prevention legislation (the adoption of fire code, our second link) at the city and state levels. As Edward Keyes explains in his book Cocoanut Grove, “These recommendations and other appeals for tighter regulations by such organizations as the National Fire Prevention Association gained rapid and wide support all across the United States and Canada…As a direct result, stringent new laws were soon to be enacted by municipal and state governments across the country (1984, p.250). The fire had an almost immediate effect nationwide as within a week ten other cities rushed to change their codes. “Four days after the fire
St. Louis, Miami, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Detroit, Des Moines, Chicago, Kansas City,
Albany, and Helena, Montana all changed their fire regulations according to a United
Press report (Schorow, 2005, p.70). In conclusion, in examining the four crucial links in the fire prevention system which were each compromised in the pre-fire time period, we see that the first two links were unquestionably strengthened after the fire. However, whereas the writing of a code or a law may take a few weeks (or months) to complete and have an effective lifetime of many years, the cycle for inspections and compliance issues is much shorter. A fire inspection may take only a few hours to complete, and the reliability of its assessment may only last for a few weeks or months, depending on how dynamic the environment is that is being inspected. What this points to is that having adequate fire and life safety codes and written laws is only a foundation for an effective fire prevention system; it is only a starting point. Fire inspections still must be carried out regularly and thoroughly, and building owners must still make a good faith effort to comply with the applicable fire codes and laws for their type of occupancy.
Semper Vigilans
It is only by continual vigilance that disasters such as Cocoanut Grove can be prevented. The people who attend night clubs are not usually concerned with fire safety; it is probably one of the last things on their minds. That is why the job of the fire and safety professional is so important, for it is in situations like these that the inspector has to act as the informed eyes and ears of the customer, a sort of advocate in advance. “A brass plaque, corroded by Boston’s hard winters, is lodged in the sidewalk near the corner of Piedmont and Shawmut streets in the quaint Bay Village neighborhood”
(Schorow, 2005, p.68). “Installed along Piedmont Street in 1993, the plaque is Boston’s main memorial to the 492 people who died in the fire. It doesn’t fully capture the depth of the tragedy or its sweeping implications in subsequent years” (Cocoanut Grove Fire
Deserves, 2012). If the tragedies of the past can teach us one thing, it is that what we have left that is good should not be taken for granted, instead it should be guarded and protected at all costs. It is the duty of the living to remember the dead and to try to prevent unnecessary loss. For as Private Joker said in the movie Apocalypse
Now, “The dead know only one thing: it is better to be alive.”
References
Beller, D. & Sapochetti, J. (2000, May). Searching for Answers to the Cocoanut Grove Fire of 1942. NFPA Journal, May/June 2000, 84-93. Retrieved from http://www. nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf/cocogrove.pdf
Benzaquin, P. (1967). Fire in Boston’s Cocoanut Grove: Holocaust! Boston, MA: Branden Press.
Building exits code. (1942). Boston: National Fire Protection Association.
Cocoanut Grove Coalition. (n.d.) Codes and Standards. Retrieved from http://www .cocoanutgrovefire.org/home/documentation/codes-and-standards
Cocoanut Grove fire deserves a more prominent memorial. (2012, November 30). The Boston Globe. Retrieved from http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials /2012/11/30/cocoanut-grove-fire-key-episode-boston-history-deserves-more- prominent-memorial/asI5jCbBHDaG48o1pXggVI/story.html
Cunningham, T. (2003, August 10). Historical Perspective: Fires in Public Assembly Occupancies Part 1: The Coconut Grove. Retrieved from http://www. withthecommand.com/2003-Aug/MD-tom-public1.html
Esposito, J. (2005). Fire in the Grove: The Cocoanut Grove Tragedy and Its Aftermath. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
Fire Rescue Magazine. (2010, November 28). Remembering the Fire that Led to an Overhaul of Fire Codes. [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://my.firefighternation .com/profiles/blogs/remembering-the-fire-that-led
Reilly, W.A. (1943). Report concerning the Cocoanut Grove fire, November 28, 1942. Boston: City of Boston Printing Dept.
Schorow, S. (2005). The Cocoanut Grove Fire. Beverly, MA: Commonwealth Editions.
Steffen, D. (2009, June 14). How Regulation Came to Be: The Cocoanut Grove. The Daily Kos. Retrieved from http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/06/14/742474 /-How-Regulation-came-to-be-160-The-Cocoanut-Grove#
Turner, L. & Tuite, L. (2012, November 24). The Cocoanut Grove Fire 70th Anniversary. Boston Globe, p. G3. Retrieved from www.bostonglobe.com/archives