Col Boyd’s leadership prowess came from the simple fact that he was an expert in his field. His credibility came not from text book education or on the recommendation of superiors, but from experience. A seasoned combat veteran of the Korean War and graduate of the United States Air Force Fighter Weapons School, he was in tune with operational mission of the Air Force. Despite the United States success in air to air engagements in the Korean War, Boyd concluded that much of the success was due to the superiority of aircraft technology and rather than the skill of the pilots. Post WWII pilot training focused mostly on aerial gunnery and less on air-to-air tactics. While assigned at the Weapons School as an instructor he took it upon himself to usher in change that he understood was needed. At night and on his own initiative, he wrote the “Aerial Attack Study,” the first manual on jet air-to air combat. Rejected at first, it was distributed surreptitiously, pilot to pilot, squadron to squadron until the Air Force decided to adopt it (Hammond, 5). Boyd had a standing bet that he could maneuver from a position of disadvantage (the adversary to his rear or 'six' in a firing position) to a position of advantage (Boyd on the opponent's tail in a position to fire) in less than 40 seconds. If the adversary could hold Boyd off for more than 40 seconds, the instructor would pay them 40 dollars (Cowen,
Col Boyd’s leadership prowess came from the simple fact that he was an expert in his field. His credibility came not from text book education or on the recommendation of superiors, but from experience. A seasoned combat veteran of the Korean War and graduate of the United States Air Force Fighter Weapons School, he was in tune with operational mission of the Air Force. Despite the United States success in air to air engagements in the Korean War, Boyd concluded that much of the success was due to the superiority of aircraft technology and rather than the skill of the pilots. Post WWII pilot training focused mostly on aerial gunnery and less on air-to-air tactics. While assigned at the Weapons School as an instructor he took it upon himself to usher in change that he understood was needed. At night and on his own initiative, he wrote the “Aerial Attack Study,” the first manual on jet air-to air combat. Rejected at first, it was distributed surreptitiously, pilot to pilot, squadron to squadron until the Air Force decided to adopt it (Hammond, 5). Boyd had a standing bet that he could maneuver from a position of disadvantage (the adversary to his rear or 'six' in a firing position) to a position of advantage (Boyd on the opponent's tail in a position to fire) in less than 40 seconds. If the adversary could hold Boyd off for more than 40 seconds, the instructor would pay them 40 dollars (Cowen,