Commerce Clause: One Of The Enumerated Powers In The Constitution

Question three. The Commerce Clause is one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution. It is granted to the Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. Today, the scope of the commerce power is left largely to Congress, “often pitting the power of Congress to advance its national agenda against judicial constraints that favor business or state interests (text, p. 324).” The Constitution states that, among other enumerated duties, Congress had the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes (text, p. 325).” Prior to the Commerce Clause, the Continental Congress held no power to raise revenue or to regulate commerce among the states. Its power to conclude treaties with foreign countries meant little to nothing, unless it could control commerce coming into state ports (text, p. 324). Furthermore, the intense issues between the states and various business transactions led to the necessity for a stronger federal government in order to effectively control internal disputes.
The scope of the Commerce Clause reached the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, as various discrepancies involving a power struggle between the federal and state governments emerged. In 1824, a New York state law permitted individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats
on the waters the state had domain over; moreover, the state law required all out-of-state steamboats to pay administrative fees for navigation privileges. Thomas Gibbons challenged the monopoly license granted by New York to Aaron Ogden. The potential and increasing turmoil from these state laws led to the Supreme Court having to decide if the state of New York withheld the power to regulate interstate commerce. The unanimous Court found that the regulation of navigation was included in the definition of commerce; thus, the state of New York’s licensing requirement was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. Chief Justice Marshall concludes that the licenses for the steamboats operated by Gibbons, which were granted under an act of Congress, gave full authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States, notwithstanding any law of Ne York to the contrary. Conflicting New York laws were unconstitutional and void (text, p. 330).
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens followed the framework of Gibbons v. Ogden, where the majority opinion determined that a Pennsylvania law requiring all ships entering or exiting the port of Philadelphia to employ a local pilot did not violate the Commerce Clause. Although the inclusion of navigation in the Commerce Clause has now been clearly defined, the “mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce, did not deprive the States of power to regulate pilots…but to leave its regulation [of pilots] to the several States…(text, p. 331).” It was within this particular case that the Supreme Court granted power to the
states.
Ultimately, there are a multiplex of cases that discuss the truth and validity concerning the boundaries of the Commerce Clause, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s [potential] framework concerning future holdings.