Compare And Contrast Goffman And Foucault

Goffman and Foucault: Institutionalisation and Identity
Social welfare institutions threaten people’s identity as they are built with the purpose of gathering ‘abnormal’ people from society and institutionalising them in order to create a better or just society (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982). Goffman and Foucault both discuss how institutions such as mental hospitals, prisons and even schools take away peoples identity by forcing them to be subordinated to a hierarchy of power; whereby they must follow rules and regulations and therefore must act in ways that may be alien to them and to their identity. Institutions take away a person’s ability to be in command of an audience, it takes away “self-determination autonomy and freedom of action” (Goffman,
1961 p.47). This essay will outline and discuss the various ways in which social welfare institutions break down and take away peoples identities in efforts to effectively control them.
People seek information from others while in the presence of them. They are interested in in others socio-economic status, their conceptions of themselves, their attitudes and competencies (McIntyre, 1999). Goffman (1959) discusses the ways in which people interact and engage with one another through performance. This is called ‘Dramaturgy’. People put on an act when they are in the company of others, expressing characteristics that they feel are favourable to them in order to make a good impression. This essentially creates a mask for the person, in which they represent the conception that they have formed of themselves and play the role of who they would like to be, and not necessarily who they really are. This is called ‘impression management’. Essentially the people become involved in an ‘information game’ which McIntyre (1999, p.108) describes as a “potentially infinite cycle of concealment, discovery and false revelation”. These performances depend on the setting and environment in which the person is acting. For example, a teacher may hold authority in a class room because of the way it is laid out for them, in that they are at the top facing students in a powerful manner.
Goffman (1959) goes on to explain that there are stimuli such as ‘appearance’ and ‘manner’ that tell others what a performers social status is and what role they will act out in different settings. Performance is socialised to fit the expectations of society, therefore, performers have a tendency to represent themselves in a way that gives observers an ‘idealized’ impression. Essentially, a person alters what they wish to convey in order to make their impression favourable and acceptable in different situations. However, it is easier to alter an impression at the beginning of an encounter than halfway through due to contradictions in performance (McIntyre, 1999). In order to do this, the performer must conceal action which does not hold up to societal standards and therefore they must foster the impression that they were meant to play this role and that they have not had to sacrifice their own standards to achieve this role.
People manage information about themselves so as not to be discredited or stigmatised by others (Goffman, 1963). People use symbols in order to convey an image of themselves in a favourable way. For example, people in the police force wear uniform in order to show their identity as an authoritative figure. However, this can also lead to stigmatisation or stereotyping as people may convey images of themselves unwillingly, ie; if they have a mental illness and cannot control what is perceived of them, they can be labelled and this can lead to discrimination (Link, 1987). Personal identity is the assumption that the individual can be differentiated by all others due to social and biological facts that are attached to them, this is called positive identification. Identification can be held in terms of photo I.D (drivers licence), etc. which are used to safeguard against “potential misrepresentation of social identity (Goffman, 1963, p.79). However, this documentation also comes with a limitation on the way a person wishes to present themselves due to biological facts. People can manage their social and personal identities in a way that conceals their stigma symbols in order to appear ‘normal’ if their stigmatizing attribute is not readily visible (Joachim and Acorn, 2000). For example, if someone has a history of criminal offences they may wish to change their name in order to not be identified as a criminal.
Moreover, people engage in certain practices in order to avoid embarrassment (Goffman, 1959). An unmeant gesture or action may be overlooked by the audience due to its discordance with the original performance – this is to avoid embarrassment or social humiliation. Control is achieved by influencing a social situation in such a way that the actor’s impression made on the audience leads them to “act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan” (McIntyre, 1999, p.105). However, the audience may scrutinise a performer if they are misrepresenting themselves , although it is understood that every performer engages in concealed practices (Goffman, 1959) due to the fact that people have separate private and public lives and so act differently in these different settings. Essentially, through dramaturgy and performance, we can control what is perceived of us, we can control our contact and communication with others and therefore, have control over our own impression of self and identity. Furthermore, Foucault believed that power relations produced different identities. However, rather than seeing power as an oppression of identity, he saw it as a “negotiation and play where identities are formed” (Mills, 2003, p.91).
Foucault (1988) discusses how since the 17th century, houses of confinement have replaced corporal punishment as a measure to hold and control ‘mad men’. Unemployed or ‘mad’ people were housed in institutions, which came at a cost of their individual liberty and identity. He states that madness was perceived in society as being poor, incapacity to work and the inability to integrate with a group. He describes houses of confinement as a ‘semi-judicial structure’, an administrative reorganisation whereby people are sent and stay there under authority and are ruled by order and regulation. Essentially, institutions are set up for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal. The institutions constitute a “massive assault” on the identities of those imprisoned in them (Berger, 1963) as they become active subjects of the hierarchies of power. People from all backgrounds were forced to stay in the same building, whether they be criminals, mentally ill or poor. They were all confined to the same rules and limitations. These houses separated the inmates from the wider society and they were under a moral obligation to conform to the authoritarian forms of constraint. They had rights to be fed, clothed, etc., but they must accept the ‘physical and moral constraint of confinement’ (Foucault, 1988, p.45). The directors of these establishments exercised their powers among the people and so had power and authority over all administration, correction and punishment within the institution, taking away all the inmates rights to express individuality, or identity (Oliver, 2010).
Similarly, Goffman (1961) was concerned with the ways ‘total institutions’ institutionalised patients and socialised them into the role of being a ‘good inmate’ by taking away their identity and ability to perform/act. He stated that ‘total institutions’ were any institutions that held people for a number of reasons, in this list were general hospitals, mental hospitals, prisons and schools. He discussed that the main feature of these institutions is that they break down the barriers that separate the ‘three spheres of life’. Firstly, all aspects of the inmates’ life is undertaken in the same place and under the same authority daily. Secondly, all the inmates must carry out daily activities together in the same manner, which leaves no room for individualism. Thirdly, activities that the patients are engaged in are kept to a tight schedule, delegated by people in charge. The activities carried out by the inmates are due to a ‘rational plan’ that fulfils the aims of the institution. Essentially, inmates are subjected to “regulations and judgements by staff” on a daily basis and are sanctioned if they take action that has not been prescribed by staff (Goffman, 1961, p.43). Their privacy is also violated as they are socially organised due to continuous surveillance by staff and other inmates, which leads to a break-down of self-action and inmates begin to act in a certain way due to being observed (Weinstein, 1994).
Furthermore, Foucault (1995, pp.200-2005) describes how prisoners are governed through timetables, collective training and total surveillance and the fear or punishment. Foucault discusses ‘Panopticism’, a subtle discipline and power, which is a mechanism for keeping order in institutions by means of surveillance. Institutions are built in such a way that people in authority are able to observe and supervise inmates constantly and so power is exercised in such a way that physical confrontation is not needed. All individuals are subordinated to the organisational power of surveillance and are constantly examined and under the knowledge that any slight movement is being watched at all times (Mills, 2003). Cells are made in such a way that the inmate is constantly visible to supervisors but have no visibility themselves. The inmate knows that they are always under supervision and so internalises this control and assumes responsibility for their actions. This type of disciplinary procedure forces the inmate to regulate their behaviour by engaging in time-keeping and self-control. In this way, the inmate is forced to act as if they are constantly under surveillance, even when they are not (Oliver, 2010). The panopticon also observes staff, so that it can evaluate the maintenance and functioning of the institution. Foucault (1995) states that this mechanism is not only used in prisons but is also used in hospitals, schools, and employing organisations.
Inmates come to an institution with a ‘presenting culture’ whereby they have their own conception of themselves and have their own ways of dealing with “conflicts, discrediting’s and failures” (Goffman, 1961, p.23). However, once they stay long enough, ‘disculturation’ occurs due to the inability of the inmate to “keep up with recent social changes on the outside”. Schmid and Jones (1990) state that because of this, inmates have to create false identities which are social rather than personal, and allow the inmate to interact with others on the inside. This involves a concealment of their outside identity, their ‘true’ identity. The institution also strips them of their identity by degradation, humiliation and profanations of the self, which happen during the admission process. The admission process shapes the inmate to fit the expectations of staff. Admission procedures need the cooperation of inmates in order to be successful. The inmate must be obedient and accept that they are moving on and leaving behind the outside world. This entails a dispossession of property and one’s self, in which they lose their identity. Where an inmate refuses to cooperate, the staff will focus on trying to ‘break’ the individual in order for them to conform to their authority (Weinstein, 1994).
The loss of identity through the admission process means that the inmate has no means of presenting their usual image of themselves onto others (Schmid and Jones, 1990). Patients/inmates are often put in their place from the first day in order to gain swift control over them and prevent further difficulties (Taxel, 1953). They are forced to obey the demands of staff, having to engage in acts that often humiliate their self-concept, such as standing to attention for an officer or having to respond to authority in a humiliating manner. In this way, the inmate is required to take on life that is alien to their own – a ‘disidentifying’ role (Goffman, 1961). Weinstein (1994, p.268) states that upon entering institutions, “processes are set in motion to destroy the inmates’ old self and create a new self”. The person is taken away from their normal social roles and stripped of their identity. Furthermore, Mills (2003) outlines how Foucault highlights that when people enter institutions, their mask of identity which they had control over in the outside world is taken away and the figure of which they had once been recognised is stripped of them. Each person is then categorised and labelled under what their offence is, by authority. In this way, authority tells the inmate “who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterised; how he is to be recognised; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way” (Foucault, 1995, p.199).
The inmate experiences ‘contaminative exposure’ whereby their body or self-identifying objects and belongings may be defiled.
This also happens in the admission process where personal belongings can be inspected and the inmate may be frisked and searched before entering the institution. These searches carry on as a regular occurrence for inmates, which violates their own personal space and identity. Inmates are in a mixture of people from all backgrounds, therefore, an inmate may feel contaminated by the fact that they may be surrounded by “undesirable fellow inmates” (Goffman, 1961, p.36). Inmates may also feel contaminated if private property is used to publicly humiliate them. The inmates’ personal information is also violated as their past behaviour and outside life is kept on record for staff to view (Goffman, 1961). Foucault also discusses how knowledge is power, in that, experts and professionals are able to assess and evaluate inmates based on case files and records and so are more able to control them (Mills, 2003). The inmates are subjected to observation from professionals who are provided with their personal information (Oliver,
2010).
Inmates must also endure ‘mortification’ whereby they must do things or have things done to them that show that they have no power in the situation and that staff have control (force feeding, restrictive regulations, etc.). While this mortification ensues, a privilege system is in place, which rewards inmates for following staffs requirements for their conduct. This establishes a relationship between inmate and staff as they are able to gain a part of ones lost self. Inmates are punished if they are not obedient; they may be withdrawn from receiving privileges or may have their right to earn them taken away. This punishment and privileges system is a mode of organisation within an institution and allows for the reassemble of inmates identities (Goffman, 1961).
Work from the inmates may be required from the institution. In some institutions labour is induced, not by reward but by the threat of physical punishment (Goffman, 1961,). This makes inmates time more valuable to the staff than to themselves which alienates their sense of self and sense of possession (identity). Similarly, Foucault (1988) outlines that workhouses were set up in order to assure trade for inmates, and to ensure control and authority were being exercised over them. They were also set up as a way of otherwise ‘useless’ people giving back to the economy, which benefited the wider society. In this way, inmates were subject to the rules of forced labour, whether they wanted to work or not.
Because of ‘disculturation’ the individual fails to “acquire some of the habits currently required in the wider society” and so fears going back into the outside world. Furthermore, release is likely to come just when the inmate has finally learned how to live on the inside. The inmate may leave with limits on their freedom as they may be still under surveillance from friends, family and employers and may have to seek help in order to not revert back to the behaviour that got them into the institution in the first place (Goffman, 1961, p.25). Essentially, the inmates’ institutional identity inevitably becomes inseparable from their ‘true’ identity on the outside (Schmid and Jones, 1990).
Goffman and Foucault both recognise institutions as a way of segregating the abnormal from the normal in society in efforts to create the ‘perfect city’. From what Goffman and Foucault outline in their work, it is clear that social welfare institutions such as hospitals, prisons and schools operate in a way that breaks down individuals’ identity and forces them to be subordinated to the hierarchical powers of discipline in order to be easily controlled. Inmates can no longer rely on the image/identity that they had created and were once recognised by on the outside world, which makes them more vulnerable and easy to shape. Due to strict routine, organisation and surveillance, inmates have no choice but to change their behaviours in order to survive institutionalisation relatively undamaged. This is a form of social control and organisation that attempts to correct ‘abnormal’ individuals by breaking down and stripping away their personal identity and forming a new, socially acceptable one.

Children in residential Care: Institutionalisation
Residential care is similar to the type of social welfare institutions described by Goffman and Foucault. This is due to the fact that residential care is usually set up for troubled children/young people, who are seen as a problem in society and therefore are placed in programmes which help to alter their behaviour in a way that is socially acceptable, thus changing their identity. Unlike the institutions discussed by Goffman and Foucault, staff running residential centres aim to allow for as much personal space and expression of individuality/identity as possible. However, if a child stays in residential care for a prolonged period of time, they inevitably become somewhat institutionalised. This institutionalisation occurs due to routine, scheduled activities and programmes and rules and regulations, all of which must be adhered to on a daily basis by the children and staff (European Commission Daphne Programme, 2007). The institutionalisation of a child depends on the functional complexity of the residential homes’ facilities, the characteristics of the programmes that the child engages with, and their length of stay (Young et al, 1988).
Beker and Magnuson (1996) state that children living in residential care live in a planned environment with planned activities which the child is required to be obedient to. The child is alienated from the normal ‘goings on’ of life, and is subjected to following an organizational, subordinated role in the residential home. This is similar to the segregated lives (described by Goffman and Foucault) of the inmates and the subordinated role they must play in an institution.
Chipping (2012) explored the social and emotional effects of residential care on children due to institutionalisation. She states that residential care can further damage a child’s emotional well-being unless the child has a strong resilience to the changes that occur when transitioning from the home to care. The removal of the child from the home and transition to residential care challenges their abilities to cope with stress and pressure. Furthermore, Young et al (1988) state that children are distanced from their home and families, which is a crucial part of their identity. This identity is immediately taken from them when they are put into residential care. Children in residential care are exposed to and are under surveillance from a large amount of staff who have control over them. This has an effect of altering the child’s behaviour, as they may fear getting punished if their behaviour is not in accordance to the rules and regulations laid out by staff (Similar to the panoptican outlined by Foucault). The care that the children receive from staff tends to be highly regimented and children are segregated according to their behaviour, social abilities and capabilities. Because of this, children must repress their personal identities and adapt to the roles they have been forced into (Office of Child Development, 2012).
It is evident that a residential care setting for children is similar to the institutions outlined by Goffman and Foucault. This is due to the fact that, despite staff’s best interests in allowing for individuality, in efforts to easily control and care for the children, it inevitably takes away their identity and makes them subordinated to the power of the staff. Bibliography
Beker, J. and Magnuson, D. (1996) ‘Residential education is an important option for at-risk youth: Learning from the Israeli experience’, Residential Treatment for Children and Youth, 13(3), 3-48.
Berger, P.L. (1963) Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.
Chipping, C. (2012) Residential Care: The Social and Emotional Effect of Being in Care and Leaving Care on Young People, [online] available: http://www.academia.edu/1761642/Residential_care_The_social_and_emotional_effects_of_being_in_care_and_leaving_care_on_young_people, [Accessed 21st Nov 2014].
Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. (1982) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton: Harvester.
European Commission Daphne Programme (2007) De-institutionalising and Transforming Children’s Services: A Guide to Good Practice, Birmingham: University of Birmingham.
Foucault, M. (1988) Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, London: Vintage.
Foucault, M. (1995) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, 2nd ed., London: Vintage.
Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, United States: Anchor.
Goffman, E. (1961) Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, United States: Anchor.
Goffman, E. (1963) Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Joachim, G. and Acorn, S. (2000) ‘Stigma of visible and invisible chronic conditions’, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(1), 243-248.
Link, B.G.
(1987) ‘Understanding labelling effects in the area of mental disorders: An assessment of the effects of expectations of rejection’, American Sociological Review, 52(1), 90-112.
McIntyre, L.J. (1999) The Practical Skeptic: Readings in Sociology, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company.
Mills, S. (2003) Michel Foucault: Routledge Critical Thinkers, London: Routledge.
Office of Child Development (2012) ‘Understanding Institutionalised Children: Developmental Issues, Intervention, and Policy Implications’, Developments, 26(3), 4-8.
Oliver, P. (2010) Foucault: The Key Ideas, United states: McGraw-Hill.
Schmid, T. J. and Jones, R. S. (1990) “Experiential Orientations to the Prison Experience: The Case of First-Time, Short-Term Inmates”, in Gale Miller and James A. Holstein (eds.) Perspectives on Social Problems, Greenwhich: JAI Press, 189-210.
Taxel, H. (1953) “Authority Structure in a Mental Hospital Ward”, unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.
Weinstein, R. M. (1994) ‘Goffmans Asylums and the Social Situation of Mental Patients’, Psychiatry, 57(4), 348-367.
Young, T.M., Dore, M.M. and Pappenfort, D.M. (1988) ‘Residential Group Care for Children Considered Emotionally Disturbed 1966-1981, Social Science Review, 62(1),
158-170.