Compare And Contrast The Arguments For And Against Legal Personhood Of Rivers

For most of human history the majority of the population lived at a subsistence level with a minimal environmental footprint. After the advent of industrialization, however, mankind’s impact on the environment dramatically increased over three centuries. Consequently, India and New Zealand gave legal personhood to three rivers, intending to protect the rivers from human pollution. This paper will argue that legal personhood for rivers can be harmful to people and is not the most effective way to protect the environment. In support of this analysis, this paper will also examine arguments for and against legal personhood for rivers, compare the different viewpoints of four authors, and present a recommended course of action.
The first popular
author is Kayla DeVault, a Shawnee woman living on a Navajo reservation who works as a research assistant and columnist. Julie Turkewitz is a correspondent for the New York Times and writes on environmental issues in the Rocky Mountain region. Ivo Vegter is an author and columnist who writes primarily on environmental economics and its effects on developing countries. The scholarly author, Peter Burdon, is an associate professor at the Adelaide Law School and deputy chair of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Ethics Specialist Group. The next step in this analysis is to examine several arguments supporting legal personhood for rivers.
Both DeVault and Turkewitz agree that nature, like human beings, has intrinsic rights that must be maintained. Thus, they argue that humans have a moral obligation to protect nature from pollution and to alter nature as little as possible (DeVault, Turkewitz). In addition, DeVault cites the need to protect Native American customs and religious practices, while Turkewitz also focuses on how legal personhood would protect fragile ecosystems from industrialization. Although DeVault does not discuss a connection between legal personhood for rivers and corporations, Turkewitz asserts that there is no different between legal rights for a corporation and a river. Although Burdon agrees with DeVault and Turkewitz that nature has inalienable and fundamental rights to exist and flourish, he argues that nature should not have a full range of human rights because nature cannot be held responsible for actions such as natural disasters (Burdon 78). After examining arguments for legal personhood for rivers, the next section investigates arguments against legal human rights for rivers.
Vegter agrees with Burdon that nature cannot exercise most human liberties and that rivers do not fit the definition of a legal person (Vegter).
To ensure the most effective protection, Burdon suggests that each natural feature is protected separately so that “rivers have river rights; trees have tree rights; birds have bird rights and humans have human rights” (79). He continues by emphasizing that any “desire” of a natural feature must be understood as a human construct, since an inanimate object cannot think, feel, or express itself. Vegter is concerned that, since a river must be represented by people, the legal custodians of the river could easily abuse their power. For example, if a lawyer could find any instance of harm against the river, he could be paid for representing the river in a lawsuit, regardless of the importance of the issue. After entertaining both sides of the argument, the next step is to compare the authors’
positions.
Turkewitz and DeVault agree that legal personhood for rivers would decrease pollution, thus improving the quality of life of human and animal communities. Vegter disagrees with this statement, and instead proposes that, while legal personhood for rivers might help animal communities, it would have an adverse effect on local human populations. Any development or encroachment on the rivers could be construed as harm, even for routine tasks that are necessary in developing countries, such as washing clothes or irrigating crops. The inability to use natural resources to complete these tasks could cripple economies in the developing world and keep hundreds of millions of people in poverty.
While Turkewitz argues that legal personhood for corporations is similar to personhood for rivers, Vegter counters this argument by stating that a corporation simply have the rights of the people it represents.
Also, corporations are under the rule of law, so a corporation can be taxed, brought to court, and face criminal charges. Since, a river cannot be held accountable for natural disasters, and since it does not represent a group of people, Vegter argues that granting legal personhood to a river is drastically different to giving rights to a corporation.
In summary, all the authors agree that the environment is a valuable part of human and animal life and should be protected, the only disagreement is on the best course of action for accomplishing this goal. After considering several viewpoints and the connections between them, the next logical step will be to find the most effective course of action to avoid river
pollution.
First, a common argument for granting rivers legal personhood is that it will make environmental protection easier because harm to the environment can more easily be brought into the legal system and punished. The primary shortcoming of this argument is that legal personhood for rivers only helps with the prosecution but does not help with enforcement. For example, before the Indian government had given legal personhood to Ganges and Yamuna in 2017, the government had extensive environmental protection laws, but it was unable to enforce them (Chandra 5). The threat of punishment is an important motivator that keeps people from committing crimes, but if there is no retribution for the wrongdoings, they have little incentive to follow the law.
Second, the legal rights of the river will inevitably be used as a political weapon. As Lord Acton stated, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” (Acton 2018) As argued by Vegter, the river cannot act of its own accord or speak for itself, it must be represented by people, people that can easily be corrupted by power. The representatives of the river would have significant motivation to act to advance their own goals, even if those goals were not in the best interests of the river. Not only could this harm the river, but it could harm human beings.
Third, Burdon correctly pointed out that rivers cannot use most of the rights of legal persons and rational beings deserve different legal rights than nature. Since humans can feel emotional and physical pain, they should be given legal priority over inanimate objects to limit the total pain and suffering in the world. Vegter states that not only should people be given legal preference, but also the lawsuits that are sustained by the courts should prioritize the wellbeing of people over the human-defined desires of inanimate objects.
In light of these arguments, all of the authors are correct in asserting that rivers should be protected, but Burdon provides compelling evidence and arguments for his suggested course of action, that is, creating individual rights for rivers. Vegter provides valid arguments that refute the reasoning of both DeVault and Turkewitz, while providing an excellent perspective from an economic viewpoint.
In conclusion, nature has intrinsic value that should be protected, but not at the expense of diminishing the value of rational human beings. Granting the rights of humans to inanimate objects would have questionable efficacy to prevent pollution and has the potential to harm humans. As Burdon stated, rivers should have river rights, but this should not overshadow the fact that humans still need to have human rights.