Comparing Suarez's Obligation, Rightness And Natural Law

This perspective of Suarez as occupying an intermediate position between voluntarism and naturalism has been questioned by Terrence Irwin. In Obligation, rightness and natural law, Irwin places Suarez squarely in the voluntarist camp when it comes to moral obligation and moral law. Despite lending a greater degree of coherency to Suarez's position, I believe that Irwin is fundamentally mistaken for characterizing Suarez's philosophy as voluntarist. Most notably, the rhetorical move is mistaken for failing to recognize the degree of difference between Suarez's position and the moral voluntarists that preceded him. I will attack Irwin's position with the help of Thomas Pink's position that the characteristic force of obligation leaves us responsible for and open to blame.
Reducing Suarez's position on law and obligation to mere voluntarism fails to do him justice. The content of the natural law is something that is created by nature itself, a position that voluntarists of the time would surely disagree with. I then go to show that, under the blame model, sinful acts are blameworthy and thus obligatory. I will first make the claim that this is more philosophically consistent than making a distinction between obligation and duty (as Irwin does). I will conclude by stating that Suarez's system can still be rendered comprehensible without this distinction. It is crucial to Suarez' legacy that his notion of obligation and law were equally influenced by naturalists, with obligation heavily relating to practical reason. We are given additional but important reasons to perform a given act when we are obliged