Hard Incompatibilism Vs Libertarianism
The Debate Between Libertarianism and Hard Incompatibilism
2,062 Words
Philip Samaan
1000634986
PHL105, 30/03/2014
Prof. J. Brunning
Mark Schranz Robert Kane argues for the existence of free will and for the existence of a deep connection between free will and moral responsibility. Kane firstly establishes that individuals possessing surface freedoms, such as buying what they will at a convenience store or watching what they will on a television set, do not necessarily indicate free will. He exemplifies the citizens of B. F. Skinner 's Walden Two. They are characterized as having the surface freedoms to "have and do what they will or choose, but only to the extent that they have been conditioned by behavioural engineers and neuro-chemists to will or choose what they can have and do" (Reasoning and Responsibility, 426). Kane stresses that such citizens, although possessing the surface freedoms to do or choose as they will, are void of any free will since they lack the ability to will what they want. The ability to will what one wants is identified by Robert Kane as deep freedom. The presence of this deep freedom, according to Kane, is the prerequisite of free will. Robert Kane …show more content…
acknowledges that the motives of individuals are determined by their character; however, he refers to Aristotle to support the existence of occasions where individuals responsibly perform or create undetermined, "free-willed" acts or decisions that form their character. Kane, in reference to Aristotle, holds that it is only possible for man to be responsible for wicked actions driven by his character if, and only if, at one point, he was responsible for forming the character from which such acts flow. Such acts are referred to, by Kane throughout the text, as self forming actions or SFAs. Kane stresses that SFAs are more abundant than individuals realize, and that through such actions, individuals demonstrate free will and are held morally responsible for their characters, and in turn, for the actions that flow from them. According to Kane, SFAs are possibilities in such cases where individuals are equally torn between two diametrically opposed sets of motives that influence them to perform either of two corresponding tasks (A or B). Kane claims that whether an individual chooses to perform A or B is the result of probabilistic causation. Derk Pereboom argues that determinism is true, and in doing so, supports that it is completely incompatible with the notion of moral responsibility.
Pereboom agrees with Baruch Spinoza, who maintains that, in accordance with the nature of the universe, all human beings lack the sort of free will required to be praiseworthy for works of good or blameworthy for works of wrongdoing. That is, Pereboom agrees that all human beings lack the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. In this essay, Pereboom first attempts to argue in favour of hard incompatibilism by rejecting the logical alternatives, libertarianism and compatibilism. He then advances to demonstrate how hard incompatibilism can be compatible with both morality and life
meaning. Pereboom distinguishes two categories of Libertarianism: event-causal Libertarianism, which claims that non-determined events are the cause of actions; and agent-causal Libertarianism, which holds that agents are the authors of their own actions, that is, their actions are indeterministically caused. Both categories of libertarianism hold that agents have free will and are morally responsible for their actions. Pereboom potently rejects the notion of event-causal Libertarianism when he cleverly points that if chance events are the cause of agent actions, then the action performed by an agent is by random cause. If the actions of an agent are governed by random causes, s/he cannot be held morally responsible. Pereboom advances to reject agent-causal libertarianism by demonstrating it to be irreconcilable with the laws of physics. He stresses that if an agent 's actions are undetermined, then so are the physical changes in the universe that follow. Since all physical changes in the universe are supposedly determined, Pereboom concludes that agent-causal libertarianism seems to defy the laws of physics, and thus, is too irrational to accept. Pereboom potently rejects compatibilism when he demonstrates circumstances in which the preconditions of moral responsibility are satisfied while individuals remain void of moral responsibility, and in turn, free will. He analogizes such cases with his introduction of the four cases of Professor Plum. In all cases, the preconditions of moral responsibility, according to compatibilism, are satisfied while Professor Plum remains void of any moral responsibility. As such, Pereboom points that compatibilism fails to provide the sufficient preconditions for moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is the result of free will, Pereboom concludes that compatibilism fails to vindicate the existence of free will. Upon Pereboom 's potent rejection of libertarianism and compatibilism, hard incompatibilism is what remains. Acknowledging that hard incompatibilism may sound unappealing to many individuals, Pereboom attempts to demonstrate that a world of hard incompatibilism may not be as unappealing as many would believe it to be. He stresses that a world of indeterminism would not necessarily rule out morality or the sense of meaning in life. To demonstrate such a notion, Pereboom provides several examples that show the continued usage of disciplinary measures for criminals; the maintained existence of character values, such as intelligence, beauty, love, and repentance; and the possibility of brightening the world 's future with the elimination of moral anger. In his essay, Robert Kane supports his notion of the existence of self forming actions when he analogizes a scenario in which a business woman, while on the way to a business meeting, witnesses a crime taking place in an alley. She is torn between two diametrically opposed sets of motives: her moral conscience urges her to help the victim of the crime in the alley, while her ambitions urge her to proceed to work as to prevent losses in her career. It is in such a scenario that Robert Kane points out that the business woman is faced with the challenge of overcoming her temptation of proceeding to work in order to help the crime victim. Whether the business woman overcomes her temptation, according to Kane, depends on her "effort of will". Kane stresses that, in such a scenario, the business would be held morally responsible for her action either way. If the business woman succumbs to her temptation to proceed to her business meeting, then she willfully did not allow her moral motives to succeed in pushing her to help the crime victim. If the business woman overcomes her temptation and helps the crime victim, then she wilfully allowed her moral motives to succeed in pushing her to help the crime victim. Note that in this scenario, Kane assumes the coexistence of two opposing wills in the business woman: a will to succumb to the temptation to proceed to the business meeting and the will to stop and help the crime victim. Whichever will the business woman chooses to act upon is completely determined by her indeterminate efforts, and thereby voluntarily performs either will. As such, being the author of her own volition, Robert Kane concludes that the business woman would be held morally responsible for her act upon either will. Clearly, there are problems with this analogy. If the business woman is the author of her own volition, that is, if her decision to either help the crime victim or proceed to her business meeting is completely undetermined, then so are the acts that follow. This, according to Pereboom, would be defiant of the laws of physics. The actions that follow from this undetermined decision would cause changes in the universe that are themselves, undetermined. Since the laws of physics are based on deterministic laws, the actions which proceed from the business woman 's indeterministic volition, which would contrarily be undetermined, would be defiant of the laws of physics. To support his rejection, Pereboom additionally considers the claim that the business woman 's indeterministic volition may be consistent with quantum physics, which holds that "the physical world is not in fact deterministic, but is rather governed by probabilistic statistical laws" (448). However, the business woman 's volition was completely undetermined, meaning that it should also be independent of, and thus, undetermined by probabilistic statistical laws. In such a case, for the business woman 's volition to repeatedly dovetail with what probabilistic statistical laws would predict would be what Pereboom calls, "a wild coincidence" (448). Thus, being incompatible with both the deterministic laws of physics and quantum physics, Robert Kane 's analogy is rendered incredible. Consequentially, Robert Kane fails to support his notion of the existence of self forming actions, and in turn, fails to support his notion that individuals, at one point in time, were responsible for the formation of their characters. With this, Kane fails to provide sufficient reasons as to why individuals should be held morally responsible, and consequently fails to support the existence of free will, which is held as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Pereboom provides a potent rejection of compatibilism through his analogy of the four cases of Professor Plum, and so leaves us with hard incompatibilism. However, would a world of hard incompatibilism really be as appealing as Pereboom claims it to be? For instance, if criminals were no longer morally responsible for their wrongdoings, they would simply be imprisoned for the sake of isolating their wrong doings from the remainder of the society. As Pereboom explains, as sufferers of illness and disease may be quarantined for the sake of reducing the spread of infection, criminals, who assumingly possess characters that are prone to wrongdoing, should be imprisoned for the sake of protecting society from their wrongdoings. However, every individual is determined by their character to perform wrongdoing at some point of their lives that may inflict harm to other individuals. Thus, how would the imprisonment of all individuals be unjustified? Or, conversely, how would the imprisonment of criminals be justified? Criminals, like all other individuals in this manner, would be determined at some point of their lives, by their characters, to perform a wrongdoing that may inflict harm upon other individuals. Thus, it is possible to see how a life of hard incompatibilism may lead to societal confusion regarding the justification of criminal imprisonment that may, in turn, provoke rebellions against it. Pereboom also holds that a life of hard incompatibilism would do no harm to the establishment of relationships, or even to the possibility of repentance from wrongdoings. For instance, trust, an essential component of relationships, is the product of deeming an individual constantly praiseworthy for beneficent actions. For instance, a child places much trust in a parent that provides nourishment, protection, and other necessities. The parent, in the shoes of the child, would be seen as praiseworthy for providing such things. However, a child restrains trust from a parent that is abusive or one that deliberately refrains from nourishing the child. The parent, from the shoes of the child, would be seen as blameworthy for such things. If the child did not hold a parent blameworthy for being abusive or deliberately refraining from providing nourishment, the child would hold nothing against that parent and have no reason to withdraw trust. If the child did not hold a parent praiseworthy for providing nourishment, protection, and other necessities, the child would not recognize that parent for any beneficent act, and would have no reason to deposit trust in that parent. Thus, there are clearly compatibility issues with hard incompatibilism and trust, an essential element of relationships. Without trust, the relationships that would exist in a life of hard incompatibilism would be relatively weak and unstable. Finally, Pereboom claims that repentance from wrongdoing would still exist in a life of hard indeterminism despite the absence of guilt. He claims that individuals would feel sorrow and regret for an immoral doing, which would drive them to repentance. However, how would individuals feel sorrow and regret for a doing they acknowledge they are not blameworthy for? It would be sensible for an individual to feel sorrow and regret on account of their own wrongdoing if s/he believe her/himself to be responsible for the harm inflicted on others as a result of this wrong doing. However, in a life of hard incompatibilism, that individual would believe no such thing, since no individuals would be held blameworthy or praiseworthy. Hence, there are clearly compatibility issues with hard incompatibilism and repentance from wrongdoing as well. Therefore, although Pereboom manages to successfully argue against libertarianism and compatibilism, he overestimates the appeal that a life of hard incompatibilism would offer as well.
Works Cited
Feinberg, Joel, and Russ Landau. Reason and responsibility: readings in some basic problems of philosophy. Fifteenth ed. Boston: Wadsworth, 2013. Print.
2,062 Words
Philip Samaan
1000634986
PHL105, 30/03/2014
Prof. J. Brunning
Mark Schranz Robert Kane argues for the existence of free will and for the existence of a deep connection between free will and moral responsibility. Kane firstly establishes that individuals possessing surface freedoms, such as buying what they will at a convenience store or watching what they will on a television set, do not necessarily indicate free will. He exemplifies the citizens of B. F. Skinner 's Walden Two. They are characterized as having the surface freedoms to "have and do what they will or choose, but only to the extent that they have been conditioned by behavioural engineers and neuro-chemists to will or choose what they can have and do" (Reasoning and Responsibility, 426). Kane stresses that such citizens, although possessing the surface freedoms to do or choose as they will, are void of any free will since they lack the ability to will what they want. The ability to will what one wants is identified by Robert Kane as deep freedom. The presence of this deep freedom, according to Kane, is the prerequisite of free will. Robert Kane …show more content…
acknowledges that the motives of individuals are determined by their character; however, he refers to Aristotle to support the existence of occasions where individuals responsibly perform or create undetermined, "free-willed" acts or decisions that form their character. Kane, in reference to Aristotle, holds that it is only possible for man to be responsible for wicked actions driven by his character if, and only if, at one point, he was responsible for forming the character from which such acts flow. Such acts are referred to, by Kane throughout the text, as self forming actions or SFAs. Kane stresses that SFAs are more abundant than individuals realize, and that through such actions, individuals demonstrate free will and are held morally responsible for their characters, and in turn, for the actions that flow from them. According to Kane, SFAs are possibilities in such cases where individuals are equally torn between two diametrically opposed sets of motives that influence them to perform either of two corresponding tasks (A or B). Kane claims that whether an individual chooses to perform A or B is the result of probabilistic causation. Derk Pereboom argues that determinism is true, and in doing so, supports that it is completely incompatible with the notion of moral responsibility.
Pereboom agrees with Baruch Spinoza, who maintains that, in accordance with the nature of the universe, all human beings lack the sort of free will required to be praiseworthy for works of good or blameworthy for works of wrongdoing. That is, Pereboom agrees that all human beings lack the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. In this essay, Pereboom first attempts to argue in favour of hard incompatibilism by rejecting the logical alternatives, libertarianism and compatibilism. He then advances to demonstrate how hard incompatibilism can be compatible with both morality and life
meaning. Pereboom distinguishes two categories of Libertarianism: event-causal Libertarianism, which claims that non-determined events are the cause of actions; and agent-causal Libertarianism, which holds that agents are the authors of their own actions, that is, their actions are indeterministically caused. Both categories of libertarianism hold that agents have free will and are morally responsible for their actions. Pereboom potently rejects the notion of event-causal Libertarianism when he cleverly points that if chance events are the cause of agent actions, then the action performed by an agent is by random cause. If the actions of an agent are governed by random causes, s/he cannot be held morally responsible. Pereboom advances to reject agent-causal libertarianism by demonstrating it to be irreconcilable with the laws of physics. He stresses that if an agent 's actions are undetermined, then so are the physical changes in the universe that follow. Since all physical changes in the universe are supposedly determined, Pereboom concludes that agent-causal libertarianism seems to defy the laws of physics, and thus, is too irrational to accept. Pereboom potently rejects compatibilism when he demonstrates circumstances in which the preconditions of moral responsibility are satisfied while individuals remain void of moral responsibility, and in turn, free will. He analogizes such cases with his introduction of the four cases of Professor Plum. In all cases, the preconditions of moral responsibility, according to compatibilism, are satisfied while Professor Plum remains void of any moral responsibility. As such, Pereboom points that compatibilism fails to provide the sufficient preconditions for moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is the result of free will, Pereboom concludes that compatibilism fails to vindicate the existence of free will. Upon Pereboom 's potent rejection of libertarianism and compatibilism, hard incompatibilism is what remains. Acknowledging that hard incompatibilism may sound unappealing to many individuals, Pereboom attempts to demonstrate that a world of hard incompatibilism may not be as unappealing as many would believe it to be. He stresses that a world of indeterminism would not necessarily rule out morality or the sense of meaning in life. To demonstrate such a notion, Pereboom provides several examples that show the continued usage of disciplinary measures for criminals; the maintained existence of character values, such as intelligence, beauty, love, and repentance; and the possibility of brightening the world 's future with the elimination of moral anger. In his essay, Robert Kane supports his notion of the existence of self forming actions when he analogizes a scenario in which a business woman, while on the way to a business meeting, witnesses a crime taking place in an alley. She is torn between two diametrically opposed sets of motives: her moral conscience urges her to help the victim of the crime in the alley, while her ambitions urge her to proceed to work as to prevent losses in her career. It is in such a scenario that Robert Kane points out that the business woman is faced with the challenge of overcoming her temptation of proceeding to work in order to help the crime victim. Whether the business woman overcomes her temptation, according to Kane, depends on her "effort of will". Kane stresses that, in such a scenario, the business would be held morally responsible for her action either way. If the business woman succumbs to her temptation to proceed to her business meeting, then she willfully did not allow her moral motives to succeed in pushing her to help the crime victim. If the business woman overcomes her temptation and helps the crime victim, then she wilfully allowed her moral motives to succeed in pushing her to help the crime victim. Note that in this scenario, Kane assumes the coexistence of two opposing wills in the business woman: a will to succumb to the temptation to proceed to the business meeting and the will to stop and help the crime victim. Whichever will the business woman chooses to act upon is completely determined by her indeterminate efforts, and thereby voluntarily performs either will. As such, being the author of her own volition, Robert Kane concludes that the business woman would be held morally responsible for her act upon either will. Clearly, there are problems with this analogy. If the business woman is the author of her own volition, that is, if her decision to either help the crime victim or proceed to her business meeting is completely undetermined, then so are the acts that follow. This, according to Pereboom, would be defiant of the laws of physics. The actions that follow from this undetermined decision would cause changes in the universe that are themselves, undetermined. Since the laws of physics are based on deterministic laws, the actions which proceed from the business woman 's indeterministic volition, which would contrarily be undetermined, would be defiant of the laws of physics. To support his rejection, Pereboom additionally considers the claim that the business woman 's indeterministic volition may be consistent with quantum physics, which holds that "the physical world is not in fact deterministic, but is rather governed by probabilistic statistical laws" (448). However, the business woman 's volition was completely undetermined, meaning that it should also be independent of, and thus, undetermined by probabilistic statistical laws. In such a case, for the business woman 's volition to repeatedly dovetail with what probabilistic statistical laws would predict would be what Pereboom calls, "a wild coincidence" (448). Thus, being incompatible with both the deterministic laws of physics and quantum physics, Robert Kane 's analogy is rendered incredible. Consequentially, Robert Kane fails to support his notion of the existence of self forming actions, and in turn, fails to support his notion that individuals, at one point in time, were responsible for the formation of their characters. With this, Kane fails to provide sufficient reasons as to why individuals should be held morally responsible, and consequently fails to support the existence of free will, which is held as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Pereboom provides a potent rejection of compatibilism through his analogy of the four cases of Professor Plum, and so leaves us with hard incompatibilism. However, would a world of hard incompatibilism really be as appealing as Pereboom claims it to be? For instance, if criminals were no longer morally responsible for their wrongdoings, they would simply be imprisoned for the sake of isolating their wrong doings from the remainder of the society. As Pereboom explains, as sufferers of illness and disease may be quarantined for the sake of reducing the spread of infection, criminals, who assumingly possess characters that are prone to wrongdoing, should be imprisoned for the sake of protecting society from their wrongdoings. However, every individual is determined by their character to perform wrongdoing at some point of their lives that may inflict harm to other individuals. Thus, how would the imprisonment of all individuals be unjustified? Or, conversely, how would the imprisonment of criminals be justified? Criminals, like all other individuals in this manner, would be determined at some point of their lives, by their characters, to perform a wrongdoing that may inflict harm upon other individuals. Thus, it is possible to see how a life of hard incompatibilism may lead to societal confusion regarding the justification of criminal imprisonment that may, in turn, provoke rebellions against it. Pereboom also holds that a life of hard incompatibilism would do no harm to the establishment of relationships, or even to the possibility of repentance from wrongdoings. For instance, trust, an essential component of relationships, is the product of deeming an individual constantly praiseworthy for beneficent actions. For instance, a child places much trust in a parent that provides nourishment, protection, and other necessities. The parent, in the shoes of the child, would be seen as praiseworthy for providing such things. However, a child restrains trust from a parent that is abusive or one that deliberately refrains from nourishing the child. The parent, from the shoes of the child, would be seen as blameworthy for such things. If the child did not hold a parent blameworthy for being abusive or deliberately refraining from providing nourishment, the child would hold nothing against that parent and have no reason to withdraw trust. If the child did not hold a parent praiseworthy for providing nourishment, protection, and other necessities, the child would not recognize that parent for any beneficent act, and would have no reason to deposit trust in that parent. Thus, there are clearly compatibility issues with hard incompatibilism and trust, an essential element of relationships. Without trust, the relationships that would exist in a life of hard incompatibilism would be relatively weak and unstable. Finally, Pereboom claims that repentance from wrongdoing would still exist in a life of hard indeterminism despite the absence of guilt. He claims that individuals would feel sorrow and regret for an immoral doing, which would drive them to repentance. However, how would individuals feel sorrow and regret for a doing they acknowledge they are not blameworthy for? It would be sensible for an individual to feel sorrow and regret on account of their own wrongdoing if s/he believe her/himself to be responsible for the harm inflicted on others as a result of this wrong doing. However, in a life of hard incompatibilism, that individual would believe no such thing, since no individuals would be held blameworthy or praiseworthy. Hence, there are clearly compatibility issues with hard incompatibilism and repentance from wrongdoing as well. Therefore, although Pereboom manages to successfully argue against libertarianism and compatibilism, he overestimates the appeal that a life of hard incompatibilism would offer as well.
Works Cited
Feinberg, Joel, and Russ Landau. Reason and responsibility: readings in some basic problems of philosophy. Fifteenth ed. Boston: Wadsworth, 2013. Print.