Rationality In Thomas Hobbes Leviathan

but such a system would have to take for granted Hobbes’ values and rationality—it would not work ‘right out of the box’ as deontology or utilitarianism does; more on this later.
For now, let’s assume that our purpose will require an appeal to a Pareto Superior alternative to Hobbes. Theories abound of how to do this, but we need one that can do this without permitting state coercion, while also accounting for morality. Unfortunately, it is difficult, though not impossible, to find compelling examples of such theories in practice in the world right now. Fortunately, it has similarly been difficult to find archetypes of Hobbes’ Leviathan in the world as well (many states might appreciate Hobbes, but few model themselves in a way that is wholly
When we value reason as Schiller does, the entire paradigm of such a society’s political theory shifts. A game theoretic model of this alternative compared to Hobbes’ Leviathan could be shown as a prisoner’s dilemma for each player, where every player knows the setup of the game, and all are inclined to cooperate because of a mutual understanding through reason. This sort of rationality differs from Hobbes’ in two key ways: first, it recognizes that, although both players are always inclined to defect at the other’s expense, they are both ultimately made better off by not doing so; and second, (all else equal) it values aggregate utility of all players over individual utility. Thus, the universalist solves the prisoner’s dilemma not through some elaborate coercive apparatus, but instead merely by thinking about someone other than himself (and note, he need not sacrifice his own self-interest; he simply adds others to the equation). With this understanding, not only does morality play an essential role in such a theory of association, but also reciprocated cooperation helps ensure that no one ends up
We must take the time to educate everyone about the problem (such as starvation as a result of unchecked consumption), and then show how it would be immoral to commit certain acts (overconsumption). Only from these bases would a group be normatively empowered in enforcing some regulation in an otherwise ethically ambiguous situation. In those realms outside of ethics, the standard for forming and enforcing collectively-agreed upon rules is higher, although still achievable. Thus, laws are, by nature, separate from both rules and