It is commonly accepted within the English Contract Law that the models of contractual fairness must exist in contractual disputes. Essential to these models is the doctrine of consideration and the principles that comes under the doctrine of consideration such as laws derived from both Williams v Roffey (1990) and Stilk v Myrick (1809).
Starting with the development of the doctrine of consideration and the principles developed in Williams v Roffey and Stilk v Myrick, I will discuss why these aspects seem inconsistent and incongruent with the common sense but at the same why they must be maintained to endorse the contractual fairness. This essay will analyse the implications of Williams v Roffey on the law concerning the performance of duty which a promisee is already obliged to perform.
The doctrine of consideration has developed over several years. At first, the doctrine of consideration was merely based on the grounds of moral obligation. However, this doctrine really developed later on and in the year 1842 in the case of Thomas v Thomas, consideration was described as
‘Something which is of some value in the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff; it may be some detriment to the plaintiff or some benefit to the defendant, but at all events it must be moving from the plaintiff’.[ S. Salzedo, P. Brunner & M. Ottley, 2004. p 48 ]
This standard interpretation of the doctrine of consideration is supported by the idea of ‘reciprocity’ which was considered and further developed in the case of Currie v Misa (1875), where the judge gave a definition of the traditional view as,
‘A valuable consideration in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other’. [R.Stone, 2002. p 76]
This definition suggests that a