The claim on tort of negligence is based on three elements, which are duty of care, breach of duty and the breach resulted in Damage. The case of Donoghue v Stevenson, regarding the snail in the bottle of ginger beer, reached the House of Lord in 1932. Lord Atkin formulated a general principle from it to govern the existence of a duty of care and this was the neighbor principle. In order for a duty of care owed there must be reasonable foresight of harm to persons whom, it is reasonable to foresee, may be harmed by one’s acts or omissions. From this, we could conclude that the neighbor principle must contain foreseeability (see Smith and others v Littlewoods Organization) and proximity (see Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd).
The neighbor principle has led to the recognition of a duty of care in a number of diverse situations, making it easier for a victim to establish a case. Lord Wilberforce therefore enunciated his two-stage in Anns v Merton London Borough: 1) was the loss a foreseeable consequence of the defendants act, and 2) if the answer is yes, are there any other considerations to limit the scope of the duty. However, this was later rejected in Murphy v Brentwood District Council, and further classified that the courts would now only impose a duty of care when they could find precedent in comparable factual situations. As a result, the current test to determine whether a duty of care is owed is governed by the three-stage test set out in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman: 1) was the loss to the claimant foreseeable, 2) was there sufficient proximity between the parties, and 3) is it fair, just and reasonable, on public policy grounds to impose a duty of care. The above shown the courts has developed fair, just and reasonable to be the third requirement in the neighbor principle.
In the case Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, it illustrates the courts may decline to impose a duty because of policy considerations under ‘fair, just